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Preface 
The objective of this study is to identify viable approaches to the delivery of basic services for 
people living in poor urban settings in Namibia. Two towns, Outapi and Ondangwa, located in the 
populous north, are used as case councils. An important element of the study is to explore the 
relations between the local governments and citizens, and the ability of civil society to act as 
development agents. Hence, the report examines challenges for improved service delivery as seen 
from (i) the two local government institutions finding themselves in between the central government 
and its own poor population; and (ii) the informal settlement population with hitherto unfulfilled 
expectations for basic services. 
In the context of the recent Namibian Decentralisation Policy and the government’s 
increasing preoccupation with urbanisation and local government reforms the study aims to inform 
development policies. Accordingly, in November 2004 an earlier draft of the report was presented 
and findings discussed in meetings with the Ministry of Regional Administration, Local 
Government and Housing involving senior ministerial staff and stakeholders from civil society. In 
February 2005, a revised and extended version of the study was presented at several workshops in 
Namibia: at the UNAM-Main Campus involving researchers from various departments; at the 
UNAM-Northern Campus involving researchers, representatives from Outapi Town Council, NGOs 
and civil based organisations; and in Ondangwa TC involving council staff, councillors and 
representatives from informal settlements. The research team would like to thank the participants of 
these meetings for valuable comments and suggestions for improvements of the drafts.  
The study is funded by the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (NORAD) as 
part of its support for Research and Institutional Co-operation with Developing Countries. The 
research on which the report is based is founded on a long standing institutional collaboration 
between the Social Sciences Division (SSD) at the University of Namibia (UNAM), Windhoek, and 
Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), Bergen, Norway. The aim of this collaboration is to train 
researchers at SSD in applied development work. Thus, the team of researchers from SSD and CMI 
have conducted several workshops where methodologies and the outline of the study have been 
discussed. Moreover, in January and February 2004, the team conducted joint fieldwork in the two 
case councils.  
The writing and editing have primarily been done by Odd-Helge Fjeldstad (CMI) and 
Gisela Geisler (CMI). In addition, Selma Nangulah (SSD), Albertina Shifotoka (SSD) and Akiser 
Pomuti (SSD) have contributed to chapters 2 and 3, and Gert van Rooy (SSD) has made 
contributions to chapter 4. Knut Nygaard (CMI) systematised relevant information based on the 
citizen survey for chapters 4, 5 and 6. SSD staff conducted the citizen survey and the preliminary 
data processing. Special thanks to Christa Schier (SSD) who processed the questionnaires into a 
SPSS-database, to the CMI librarians for their assistance, and to Inge Tvedten (CMI) who initiated 
the study. The most important acknowledgement, of course, is due to the administrative staff in 
Ondangwa and Outapi Town Councils who facilitated the study, and the people in the surveyed 
settlements who took the time to speak to us. We hope the report will be considered useful – and be 
used – by policymakers and development practitioners in Namibia, as well as well by researchers, 
students, and aid officials. Points of view and any remaining errors can be attributed to the authors. 
 
Bergen, 24 November 2005 
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Executive summary  
1. Introduction  
1.1 This report focuses on challenges for improved service delivery in poor urban areas in Namibia. 
Two towns, Outapi and Ondangwa, located in the populous north, are used as case councils. 
The objective of the study is to identify viable approaches to the delivery of housing, water, 
electricity, and sanitation – the inadequacy of which all currently have detrimental effects on 
the poor. The study examines the issue of service delivery as seen from both the councils and 
the informal settlement population. The relationship between local governments and citizens, 
and the ability of civil society to act as development agent is an important part of the study. 
1.2 The research has been conducted by a multidisciplinary research team from Chr. Michelsen 
Institute (CMI), Norway, and the Social Sciences Division (SSD), University of Namibia. The 
analysis is based on a variety of sources of data collected during fieldwork in 2004, including 
official, research and media reports, policy documents, a comprehensive citizen survey, and 
interviews with a wide range of stakeholders, including council staff, elected councillors and 
citizens in the two case councils, representatives from NGOs and CBOs, staff and councillors in 
the Oshana and Omusati regions, and staff at the Ministry of Regional and Local Government 
and Housing (MRLGH) in Windhoek.  
2. The local government system in Namibia 
2.1 Namibia has a three-tier system of governance: central government, regional councils and local 
authorities. The Local Authority Act of 1992 distinguishes between municipalities, towns and 
villages, with municipalities being the highest and most autonomous type of local authority. 
Municipality and town councils are expected to be financially autonomous, operating on a full 
cost recovery basis for all services they deliver, although some - mainly sector specific and area 
based - cross-subsidisation occurs. Councils generate most of their funds from user fees except 
for the more established authorities which levy property taxes and sell land (erven). Local 
authorities receive limited funding from central government for specific investment projects and 
for recurrent cost support on an ad hoc basis.  
2.2 Town councils rely to a large extent on user charges, especially on water and electricity, by 
adding a surcharge to the cost of the utilities. However, the majority of town councils are not 
determining their tariffs in accordance with an approved tariff policy, causing trading services, 
including water distribution, to run with significant losses. The situation is worsened by an 
increasing number of consumers who do not pay for basic services due to various reasons, 
including affordability. A number of town councils therefore find it increasingly difficult to 
sustain their service levels without using their accumulated surpluses.  
2.3 There are indications that for the country on aggregate, service provision through local 
authorities has not improved notably for electricity since independence, and may have worsened 
with respect to water supply. Information on the trends for other services, such as sanitation and 
the provision of urban building plots, is not available. But there is little reason to expect that the 
provision of these services suggest a different picture. It is likely that the overall supply of 
services in informal urban settlements has deteriorated.  
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3. Urban poverty, housing and land tenure 
3.1 Rapid urbanisation in Namibia has occurred largely as a result of high rates of population 
growth, drought, and a decline in the ability of the land to support growing populations. 
Approximately 40% of the urban population live in informal settlements, with unemployment 
being a major problem, particularly in the north. The current national unemployment rate is 
estimated to 31%. The highest unemployment rate is found among young people in urban areas, 
notably women. The majority of urban dwellers who cannot find employment in the formal 
sector seek livelihoods in the informal economy.  
3.2 Access to housing is inadequate and urban service delivery such as of water, electricity, sewage 
and waste disposal represent severe problems. The government’s poverty reduction strategy 
acknowledges that poverty and unequal access to services in general are major problems. 
However, the poverty reduction action programme has no explicit role for local authorities. This 
impasse may have potentially serious consequences for local government finances. Rural-to-
urban migration is likely to increase the financial burden of municipalities and town councils. In 
the absence of significant central government financial transfers, the different local authorities 
have to carry the lion’s share of costs from their internal resources when developing and 
upgrading poor informal areas. Although plans are in place in many local authorities, the 
process of developing and/or upgrading informal townships is very slow, due to financial 
constraints and the characteristics of land tenure.  
3.3 Informal settlement dwellers are vulnerable to eviction, especially if they live in so-called 
impermanent houses such as iron shacks or traditional houses. The formalisation of informal 
settlements often forces poorer residents into other informal areas. Town councils are required 
to pay compensation to resettled residents who own permanent structures (brick houses) or 
traditional homesteads. In practice, monetary compensation is rarely adequate and therefore no 
incentive for moving. Residents living in iron shacks receive no compensation at all, even if  as 
often happens  they are moved from prime sites close to the business centre or the main road to 
more remote areas with even fewer services and less business opportunities.   
3.4 Provision of affordable serviced land in an environment of secure tenure for low income 
households and the establishment of incremental development areas are part of the National 
Housing Plan. Local authorities are encouraged to reduce the costs of developing land by 
applying appropriate infrastructure standards and cross subsidisation, and to upgrade informal 
settlements without forcing residents out. However, the policy, where it was applied, has largely 
failed.   
3.5 The National Housing Programme Build Together provides soft loans to low-income 
households that lack the collateral to be considered by commercial banks. The Namibia 
Housing Action Group (NHAG) and its subsidiary, the Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia 
(SDFN) cater for residents who are not able to access Build Together loans. SDFN is one of the 
few micro finance institutions in Namibia offering savings and loan products on a group basis. 
It also negotiates land for the resettlement from town councils for their members. The co-
operation with councils, however, potentially makes SDFN a tool of council policy and action, 
which might not always be in the interests of its members. 
4. Socio economic profiles of Ondangwa and Outapi 
4.1 This chapter presents socio-economic profiles of the two town councils, based on the citizen 
survey conducted as part of this study.  The data provides detailed information on the household 
characteristics of the residents, and information about citizens’ access to services, including 
electricity, sanitation, water and social amenities such as health services and schools.  
4.2 Ondangwa town was proclaimed in 1997, and became an autonomous town council in 1998. 
The town had a population of 10,900 in 2001, according to the population and housing census. 
About 40% of the town’s population live in eight informal settlements. The number of brick 
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houses has increased since independence, with older settlements having more and younger ones 
less. Most informal settlements in Ondangwa are managed by informal Settlement Committees 
on a voluntary basis. These committees act as a link between the communities and the local 
authority. 
4.3 Outapi town council was promulgated in 1997 and received autonomy from the central 
government in July 2002. The population in 2001, according to the census, was 2,640 of whom 
half live in informal settlements. It is one of the fastest growing urban centres in Namibia. In 
Outapi, only 25% of the informal settlement dwellers live in iron shacks, compared to 55% in 
Ondangwa.  
4.4 In Ondangwa, more than 40% of household members in the 16 to 25 years age bracket are 
unemployed and looking for work. In Outapi, the total share of unemployed who are looking for 
work is 9%, and more than 16% for household members aged 16 to 35 years. While as many as 
55% in the formal settlements in Ondangwa are wage employees, this applies for only 28% in 
the informal settlements. In Outapi, the majority of the adult household members in the formal 
settlements (51%) are wage employees, compared to only 24% in the informal settlements. 
Moreover, the share of wage employees among female household members is higher in the 
formal settlements (45%) than in the informal ones (18%). 
4.5 While the share of female headed households (FFH) is generally high in Namibia (45%), it is 
higher in the North. In Ondangwa FFH made up 57 % of households in informal and 45% in 
formal settlements. In Outapi FHH dominated in the formal settlements (51%), compared to 
44% in informal settings. Moreover, even though there is a general perception that FHH are 
poorer, their housing standards are only marginally worse than their male counterparts, also in 
informal settlements. 
4.6 In both Ondangwa and Outapi the majority of the respondents consider that the level of 
household consumption is not adequate to cover needs. Only about 1% of the residents in the 
formal and informal settlements are satisfied with available resources. For the respondents in 
Outapi, the most important (and significant) monthly expenditures are food, water, electricity 
and site/property rent. Apart from food and water, the other expenditures are ranked lower by 
the respondents in Ondangwa.  
4.7 While all the respondents say their households have access to water, only 61% say they have 
access to electricity and 27% to sewage. The largest discrepancy in service delivery between the 
formal and the informal settlements in Ondangwa is for electricity, which is available for 87% 
of the households surveyed in the formal settlements, but only for 15% of the informal 
settlement dwellers. Sewage provision is the other service with a significant discrepancy 
between formal and informal settlements. In Outapi, the coverage of electricity is relatively well 
developed (70%), while various sanitation services (garbage disposal, sewage and communal 
toilets) are less covered, particularly in the informal settlements.   
4.8 The services prioritised for improvement by citizens in Ondangwa are schools, health services 
and water supply. These are also the same services that people are most ‘satisfied’ with at 
present. The services prioritised for improvement in Outapi are water, electricity supply and 
health services, which also have the highest satisfaction rates. 
5. Service delivery: Challenges from the councils’ perspectives  
5.1 Limited planning capacity, combined with lack of relevant data and statistics represent major 
constraints for the design and implementation of council plans in both Ondangwa and Outapi. 
Since no socio-economic profiles are yet available in the two councils, there is limited 
knowledge about needs. Subsequently, a key weakness that has been identified is the lack of 
local authority preparedness for planning and robust decision-making. Although some direct 
consultations with residents about plans and priorities take place in Outapi, planning in both 
case councils often is still based on guesswork rather than established facts. 
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5.2 The weaknesses in planning capacity have opened a market for private consultants, which has 
made surveying very expensive. Moreover, lack of qualified personnel to take charge of the 
operations, maintenance of infrastructure, financial management and accounting are problems 
Ondangwa and Outapi town councils have largely in common.   
5.3 The demarcation of powers, functions and duties of councillors and council staff are not 
delineated. The functions of the regional councils are not very clear either.  
5.4 In principle, Ondangwa and Outapi town councils are supposed to be autonomous and self-
sufficient bodies. In practice, however, neither council is financially viable. Assessment rates 
and charges on local services, particularly water, comprise the major revenue sources. In both 
councils there is a potential to improve collection efficiency, for instance by outsourcing 
revenue collection. But, the mixed experiences from Outapi with privatised collection of site 
rates and fees show that further outsourcing requires proper planning, including training of the 
collectors. Moreover, to enhance citizens’ compliance, stronger links between payment of 
charges and service delivery are required. 
5.5 NORED has taken over the electricity supply of all local authorities in the Northern Region 
with the exception of Oshakati TC. The establishment of NORED in 2002 seems, however, to 
have benefited neither Ondangwa nor Outapi. Lack of transparency has marked NORED’s 
dealing with the two councils. In addition, the councils are still responsible for the development 
of new electricity infrastructure. Furthermore, no maintenance agreement between the local 
authorities and NORED is in place. Consequently, there is a need to renegotiate the councils’ 
agreement with NORED.  
6. Service delivery: Challenges from the citizens’ perspectives 
6.1 The study reveals substantial differences between Ondangwa and Outapi with respect to 
citizens’ attitudes and coping strategies. Differences between the formal and informal 
settlement dwellers are especially huge in Ondangwa, where people living in the informal 
settlements are clearly disadvantaged. Such gaps also exist in Outapi, but they are less 
pronounced.  
6.2 Lack of sanitation in the informal settlements is a problem in the two councils, leading to 
stagnant water sources (oshana) being used both as toilets and as a source of water, sometimes 
even for drinking. The sewage lines installed in Ondangwa's informal settlements did not 
improve sanitation, but instead added to poor peoples’ payment burden. Sustainable sanitation 
solutions for informal settlements cannot at this time be fulfilled by flush toilets. 
6.3 Residents of Ondangwa’s informal settlements generally appear to be poorer and lead a more 
precarious existence compared to their counterparts in Outapi. Furthermore, people in informal 
settlements in Ondangwa perceive the town council and the local councillors as less trustworthy 
compared to Outapi, where the informal settlement appears a place of business and temporary 
residence. In Ondangwa, by contrast, investing in rural relations is an essential part of many 
residents’ survival strategies. Losing rural connections is a condemnation to urban poverty, 
marked by alcoholism and a lack of energy to move forward.  
6.4 Neighbours and the community also play an important role in the survival strategies of the poor, 
while NGOs and formalised CBOs hardly play any role. In Ondangwa this is apparent by the 
importance many informal residents attach to the community based settlement committees, with 
functions that encompass traditional authority roles and mediation with the council. In Outapi, 
residents have higher trust in the council as reflected in a more open, interactive and critical 
relationship with the town council. People also have a stronger adherence to the traditional 
authority in Outapi leaving only a minor role to settlement committees.  
6.5 In both councils a mismatch between citizens’ dissatisfaction with service delivery and their 
willingness to pay for the services was observed. People give highest priority to improved water 
and electricity supply, which also have top priority in peoples’ monthly expenditure plans. With 
respect to other services, such as street lightning, market place facilities, storm water drainage 
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etc, people may complain about quality and limited availability, but are not willing to contribute 
financially to their improvement.  
7. Lessons and policy recommendations 
7.1 This final chapter provides a set of policy recommendations for improving the delivery of basic 
services to people living in poor urban settings in Namibia. Though interlinked, the 
recommendations are organised in accordance with challenges related to (1) local governance 
and citizen participation; (2) finances and financial management; and (3) sustainable service 
delivery and coping strategies for poor people. 
 
Local governance and citizen participation 
7.2 Town councils should as a matter of immediate priority develop socio-economic profiles 
reflecting availability and affordability of key services. This will require co-ordination and 
support from the central government. 
7.3 Considering the inadequate financial resources and the short supply of qualified staff, especially 
engineers and accountants, adjoining towns should consider to jointly hire such personnel and 
share their services and costs. 
7.4 Good internal communication within the CMT is essential for the performance of the council. 
Co-ordination between staff is important to avoid duplication and confusion in their separate 
dealings with communities. Since the demarcation of powers, functions and duties between 
elected councillors and administrative staff are currently unclear the MRLGH should in 
collaboration with ALAN organise workshops that clarify the respective roles. New councillors 
need to be particularly targeted. 
7.5 To improve and strengthen trust relations between council and residents, the councils should 
engage a member of the traditional authority in order to interpret customary law and the 
attitudes of the people, and provide for institutionalised meetings. Representatives of the 
settlement committees might also be granted a more permanent place as observers or 
participants in council meetings.  
7.6 Effective mechanisms for citizen involvement in planning and priority setting with respect to 
service delivery need to be put in place, be they by means of settlement committees or by direct 
dealings with the council. If intermediaries such as settlement committees are used on a 
voluntary basis they need to receive incentives and be compensated for their costs. 
 
Finances and financial management 
7.7 There is an urgent need to establish and maintain a database on local government finances and 
expenditures. The potential benefit of establishing and maintaining such a database may be 
substantial. There is also a need to improve the financial reporting in order to make this 
information accessible to council staff, elected councillors and the general public. 
7.8 Transfer of grants from the central government and revenue sharing between central and sub-
national levels of government, which take into account the different needs and priorities of 
councils, are essential components of fiscal decentralisation.   
7.9 Local government fiscal reforms require an adjusted revenue structure and strengthening of 
local financial management capacity. Improvement of the accountability of revenue collectors 
and elected councillors requires substantial central government commitment.  
7.10 Citizen compliance needs to be improved by enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of 
revenue administration. Relevant instruments include improvements to billing and accounting 
systems, establishment of more accessible and efficient payment facilities, and strengthening of 
the capacity to follow up cases of non-payment through fair and reasonable enforcement. 
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Service delivery and coping strategies 
7.11 Local authorities should be given an explicit role in the national poverty reduction 
programme. Additional funding from the central levels should follow. 
7.12 Alternative ways to financing services are required if the service level is to be extended. 
This can be achieved through more realistic planning and focused priority setting which 
also reflects the priorities and financial constraints of citizens, including the poor. It is 
essential to choose cost-effective and appropriate technology for service provision to 
different target groups, and to provide service users with incentives to maintain the 
facilities.  
7.13 Communal water taps should be assigned to limited numbers of households, in order to 
avoid disconnection due to breakage and misuse by outsiders. Since many poor households 
are unable to raise connection fees, town councils should create alternative financing 
options, such as work for connection, payment in instalments and credit schemes for 
residents to pay for both connections and part-payment for infrastructure development in 
informal settlements. In a situation characterised by high unemployment rates and health 
problems related to waterborne diseases, such measures are likely also to have other 
positive spin-off effects on the welfare of poor urban residents.  
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1 Introduction 
The urbanisation of poverty is one of the most dramatic developments on the African continent, 
yielding contrasting images of affluent residential and business districts and utter misery in 
sprawling shantytowns or slums. More than 50% of Africa’s population will soon live in towns and 
cities (UN, 2001), and 50% of Africa’s poor will live in urban slums by 2025 (Kamete et al, 2001). 
Southern Africa is the most urbanised region on the continent, with Angola currently having an 
urban population of more than 60%, South Africa 55% and Namibia more than 30% albeit with one 
of Africa’s highest urban growth rates. Urban migration does not seem to slow down, taking 
hundreds of thousands of women, men and children to towns in search of a better life. The large 
majority of these end up in poverty-stricken informal settlements in urban areas. 
Urbanisation in Namibia shares a number of key characteristics with other countries in the 
region: 
 
• There is a correlation between urbanisation and economic development and growth. 
• Urban areas play a significant role in the democratisation process, through political mobilisation 
and local government. 
• There is a close link between urban and rural development, both in macro-economic terms and 
through urban-rural links. 
• The environmental problems facing developing countries are increasingly associated with 
growing towns and urban centres. 
• Poverty is increasingly an attribute of urbanisation, and urban poverty exhibits specific features 
different from poverty observed in rural areas. 
 
However, Namibia also has a number of special features. These include the large proportion of the 
urban population living in Windhoek, the capital city; the high urban growth rate particularly in 
towns in the densely populated northern part of the country; and an exceptionally skewed 
distribution of economic resources. Given the short time-span since independence in 1990 and the 
late development of a relevant political and legal framework, the central, regional and local 
governments have only recently started to grapple with the challenges facing urban development. 
High urban growth rates, with about 40% of the urban population at present living in poverty ridden 
informal settlements, lie at the core of these challenges.  
The focus of this study is the provision of basic services to the people living in poor urban 
settings in Namibia. The study does this through a combined focus on local government governance 
and finances, and livelihood strategies of the urban poor in the town councils of Outapi and 
Ondangwa respectively. Both towns are located in the populous northern Namibia. Ondangwa is 
situated in the Oshana region and has a population of approximately 11,000 inhabitants.1 About 
40% of the town’s population live in informal settlements. Prior to independence, Ondangwa 
functioned as an administrative centre of the then Owamboland and had very few formal 
commercial activities. Currently the town functions as a commercial centre for a densely populated 
rural hinterland. Outapi is situated in the Omusati region and has a population of approximately 
3,000 inhabitants. About 50% of the population live in informal settlements. Since before 
independence, Outapi has functioned as a rural centre predominated by informal business activities. 
                                                     
1 The population data in this report refers to the 2001 Housing and Population Census (RoN, 2003; Table 
1.2.3, p. 21). Other sources, however, operate with different numbers. For instance, the strategic plan for 
Ondangwa refers to a population size of 29,373 (p. 4), which is the same figure used by MRLGH (2004b). In 
comparison, Outapi’s strategic plan (p. 6) operates with 1,900 residents living within the proclaimed town 
boundaries (p. 6), while the MRLGH (2004b) refers to a population size of 14,000.  
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Today Outapi is the administrative centre of the Omusati region, and is one of the fastest growing 
urban centres in Namibia. It has been selected by the Ministry of Regional and Local Government 
and Housing to spearhead the implementation of Namibia’s decentralisation policies and service 
delivery strategies through the Fast Track Infrastructure Delivery Programme.2 
The main objective of this report is to identify sustainable approaches to the delivery 
of basic services in the form of housing, water, electricity, and sanitation for the poor informal 
settlements in urban areas. The current service delivery approach of the government has left out 
informal settlements and has instead focused on improving and expanding services in formal areas. 
Limited attention is currently given to alternative approaches to service delivery to informal 
settlement dwellers. This situation has detrimental effects on the poor. The research team has 
approached this matter by analysing local authorities’ capacity for revenue enhancement and 
financial management, and governance issues such as accountability and responsiveness of local 
government (see Figure 1.1). Accordingly, the report examines challenges for pro-poor service 
delivery as seen from (i) the local governments caught between expectations of the central 
government and their own poor population; and (ii) the informal settlement population with hitherto 
unfulfilled expectations for basic services in the form of housing, water, electricity and sanitation. 
The study suggests that main obstacles to improved service delivery to people living in the informal 
settlements are associated with distrustful relations between the local governments and the 
communities, weak ability and incoherent efforts by the civil society to act as development agents, 
and inadequate government driven approaches. In particular, the study argues that the local 
governments’ need for revenues to finance service provision is incompatible with the ability of 
citizens in informal settlements to pay for these services. On this basis, the study identifies possible 
approaches to service delivery in informal settlement areas in Namibian towns.   
 
 
 
                                                     
2 The Fast Track Infrastructure Development Programme is a Government sponsored programme designed to seek speedy 
provision the much needed services such as water, electricity, roads, oxidation ponds, new housing and serviced ervens. 
This programme was piloted in Outapi in 2004 and was replicated the same year in Oshakati, the administrative centre of 
the Oshana region. The focus of this programme, however, did not target service delivery for the poor informal settlement 
areas but service delivery for the formal and formalised areas of the urban areas.   
CMI REPORT LOCAL GOVERNANCE, URBAN POVERTY AND SERVICE DELIVERY IN NAMIBIA R 2005: 12 
 3
 
Figure 1.1 Analytical framework 
 
We have combined qualitative and quantitative research methods to investigate the challenges 
facing service delivery in poor urban areas. Our analysis is therefore based on a variety of sources 
of information collected during 2004. These sources include among others (i) official reports and 
raw data on local government finances, management, and service delivery in Namibia; (ii) policy 
documents and reports on decentralisation and housing policies produced by the government, the 
town councils themselves, donors and various consultants; (iii) personal interviews and discussions 
with councillors, the council management teams and citizens in informal settlements in Ondangwa 
and Outapi; (iv) a citizen survey covering 376 respondents in the two case councils; and (v) 
interviews and discussions with staff and councillors in the Oshana and Omusati regions, officials at 
the Ministry of Regional and Local Government and Housing (MRLGH) in Windhoek, 
representatives from NGOs, aid workers, consultants and researchers.  
The remaining part of this report is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 presents briefly the 
main characteristics of the local government system and decentralisation policies in Namibia, 
including trends in service delivery and the local finance system. Urban poverty, housing and land 
tenure policies are discussed in chapter 3. Thereafter, chapter 4 provides a socio-economic profile 
of the two case councils, Ondangwa and Outapi, based on the citizen survey, which was conducted 
in April 2004. In chapter 5, the constraints facing pro-poor service delivery in the two councils are 
discussed, followed by a discussion in chapter 6 of the challenges and priorities for service delivery 
as perceived by citizens. Finally, chapter 7 examines lessons learned from these case studies, which 
aim to inform the formulation and design of service delivery approaches in poor urban settings in 
Namibia.   
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2 The local government system in Namibia 
The present local authorities in Namibia are established in accordance with the Local Authorities 
Act 23 of 1992, as amended by the Local Authorities Amendment Act 17 of 2002. It is not possible 
to understand the present local government system without a historical perspective. Accordingly, in 
this chapter we briefly review the pre-independence local government system in urban settings, 
emphasising the housing and service delivery policies. Thereafter, a brief account of the 
institutional changes in local government after independence is presented. This is followed by a 
short assessment of the trends in the provision of key services and local government finances since 
independence. It is concluded that the local government system has been unable to cope with the 
demand for services that is driven by an increasing urbanisation.    
2.1 Sub-national entities before independence3  
At independence in 1990 the new government inherited a local government system ill fitted to meet 
the expectations of the newly proclaimed political order of liberal democracy, accountable 
government, and a non-discriminatory delivery of public services. In addition, no coherent service 
delivery strategy for informal settlements existed, which the government could have used as the 
basis for new policies. Prior to independence informal settlement dwellers in urban centres were 
equated with ‘illegal squatters from the homelands’, who were not entitled to service delivery 
within the borders of formal urban areas. On the other hand, informal settlements located on the 
outskirts of formal urban centres were regarded as being part of the rural ‘homelands’ or so called 
‘Bantustans’ which were administrated by the Traditional Authorities as part of the overall 
‘homeland’ administration. The residents of these informal settlements curiously did not have the 
status as ‘illegal squatters’ since they were not part of the towns. Service delivery and upgrading 
were accordingly deemed the task of those authorities rather than the responsibility of the central 
government. Hence, service delivery at the sub-national level was ethnically, socially and spatially 
biased in favour of affluent, white residential areas. Indeed, it was official policy that towns should 
be made as unattractive as possible to discourage in-migration of non-whites (UNDP, 1989:VII, 2).  
 This urban development policy implied that no room was made for the formulation of 
suitable service delivery strategies to accommodate the needs of the urban poor. The most important 
impact of this divided development policy approach was on public administration in general and 
local government in particular. Larger urban areas south of the so called Red Cordon Fence, which 
separated northern Namibia from the rest of the country, were run by local governments in the form 
of municipalities, the boundaries of which dated back to the German colonial period before 1918. 
All the larger urban areas were divided first according to racial lines (i.e. so called Blacks, 
Coloureds and Whites), then according to income status within the racial divines, and lastly 
according to formal or informal status. Only Whites had voting rights, but they had to meet specific 
residential and property ownership rights qualifications. Blacks and Coloureds as defined during the 
apartheid era did not have the same residential and property ownership rights until the mid-1980s.   
Smaller urban settlements south of the Red Cordon Fence and all small formal and 
formalised urban settlements in the ‘Bantustans’ were managed by a village advisory board 
appointed by the central government. Urban settlements with village status were run by village 
secretaries with funding coming directly from central government (in the case of non-‘Bantustan’ 
urban settlements) and funding from the homeland government (in the case of formal and 
                                                     
3 This section draws on Simon (1983, 1988, 1996); Toetemeyer (2000:116-117; 2001); and UNDP (1986, 
1989).   
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formalised urban settlements situated in Bantustan areas). Before independence the population 
growth in all smaller urban settlements south of the Red Cordon Fence was very slow compared to 
that north of the Fence. This meant that the control of informal settlement growth south of the Red 
Cordon Fence was relatively easy compared to the situation in the north.  
During the mid-1980s some measures of the separate development policy (e.g. influx 
control and group areas regulations) were relaxed to allow freer movement of people. Freehold and 
leasehold rights were also extended to upper and middle income Blacks and Coloureds living in the 
larger urban settlements. Permanent employment was used as collateral for loans from lending 
institutions to develop upper and middle income housing. Private sector mechanisms for financing 
the construction of houses were administered by the then Transitional Government of National 
Unity (TGNU) as a means of easing the financial burden of the local authorities. Financial 
institutions such as SWABOU and most private banks were the main lenders to Blacks and 
Coloureds with permanent employment status. Guarantees on behalf of the borrowers to the 
financial institutions were offered by the employers (mainly the central government, parastatals, 
municipalities, and some private companies).   
Housing for the lower to lower-middle income groups was catered through the government 
owned National Housing Enterprise (NHE) at predetermined interest rates. It was assumed that the 
provision of low-cost housing for the poorest sections of the urban population would encourage 
increased rural-urban migration which would then be hard to control, and create urban 
unemployment and overcrowding. The state was therefore reluctant to finance the provision and 
servicing of low-cost housing. The upgrading of existing and planning of new townships, and the 
provision of serviced land and secure land rights in larger urban areas were all seen as causing an 
increase in rural-urban migration, and were thus avoided.  
From 1985 onwards policy measures aimed at segregating the population according to 
income and racial lines were abolished by the Transitional Government of National Unity. In 
principle, this opened up all residential areas, but in practice a high degree of de facto segregation 
persisted in all urban areas, especially outside of Windhoek. From 1988 onward informal 
settlements started to mushroom in larger urban areas south of the Red Cordon Fence because of (i) 
the abolishment of the restrictive and cohesive policy measures, (ii) the acceptance of the rights of 
squatters to shelter, and (iii) the acknowledgement that rural-urban migration was unavoidable as  it 
was linked to peoples’ aspirations for improving their lives    
Unlike south of the Red Cordon Fence, the population of the informal settlements in the 
north started to expand from 1975 onwards when the protracted war between SWAPO and the 
South African Defence Force (SADF) intensified. Informal settlements in the north were established 
by people working predominantly for the SADF and the South African Police Force. Most of these 
informal settlements were located close to army camps, while some surrounded formal and 
formalised urban centres, mainly for safety reasons. None of the informal settlements north of the 
Red Cordon Fence were planned and formalised, as all were located in the traditional authority 
administered areas. Moreover, no services were provided for informal settlement dwellers until 
independence, nor did they have amenities such as schools and clinics.  
Thus, before independence almost all the proclaimed local authorities were situated in 
central and southern Namibia. No local government (village or municipal) was ever instituted in the 
so-called homelands (communal areas), although 70% of the population lived there, and 
urbanisation in these areas, especially in the north, had increased.4 Second-tier ethnic 
administrations managed these areas on an agency basis for the Peri-Urban Development Board. 
Their legal powers were extensive and included those relating to land, education, health, housing 
and social welfare services, civil defence and security, and control of traditional authorities (UNDP, 
1989:III, 1). However, there were huge differences in the  number and the quality of staff and the 
                                                     
4 The exception was in Namaland that had four proclaimed townships: Gibeon, Tses, Berseba and Soromaas 
(UNDP, 1989: VII, 4).   
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level of finances (through taxes and transfers) between these ethnic authorities – and hence in the 
level of services they were able to provide.  
2.2 The present local government system 
With Independence, the racially segregated local authorities were abolished. The formerly 
segregated townships were fully integrated into the municipal administration through the abolition 
of racially based advisory boards, and the election of councillors who represent the entire urban 
population (Simon, 1996:74-75). Moreover, at independence SWAPO wanted an executive 
Presidency while the opposition demanded elected regional councils to administer rural areas (see 
Tötemeyer, 2000, 2001). Both demands were incorporated in the new Constitution, which 
established a three-tier system of governance: central government, regional councils and local 
authorities. Key services, such as health, education and agricultural extension, were centralised 
under line ministries. The second tier – the regional councils – is presently responsible for specified 
service delivery in rural areas,5 while the third tier – the local authorities – is responsible for service 
delivery in urban areas. Institutionally, local authorities fall within the respective regions where they 
are situated (NALAO et al, 2004:10). But through proclamation, local authorities become 
autonomous bodies under the general supervision and guidance of the Ministry of Regional Local 
Government and Housing (MRLGH), even though they have to co-operate with Regional Councils 
and Traditional Authorities.6  
The Local Authority Act of 1992 distinguishes between municipalities, towns and villages, 
with municipalities being the highest and most autonomous type of local authority (MRLGH, 
2003:7).7 Municipalities are further classified into two groups, i.e. Part I and Part II municipalities. 
Part I municipalities generally have a solid financial basis and great autonomy with regard to the 
determination of property tax and obtaining loans. Part II municipalities have a more fragile 
financial basis and are subject to control exercised by the MRLGH with respect to setting property 
rates and obtaining credit facilities. Most of the Town Councils cannot balance their budgets 
without substantial transfers from the central government or donor assistance (Tötemeyer, 2000; 
MRLGH, 2004). This implies that their financial autonomy, in general, is limited. 
At present Namibia has 16 municipal councils (MC), of which three are Part I, compared to 
15 at independence (see Table 2.1). This contrasts with the 15 town councils (TC), of which only 
Lüderitz existed at independence. The others were all established in 1992 under the new act. 
Moreover, all but two town councils (Lüderitz and Henties Bay) are situated in the former 
‘Bantustans’, mostly excised from land in the communal areas. The village councils (VC), like the 
                                                     
5 At present there are 13 regional councils established under the Regional Authorities Act adopted in 1992. 
The Regional Councils do not administrate the Local Authority Council. The Constituencies elect the 
Regional Councils. The President of the RC is picked from its members, and is the state’s representative in the 
Region. During the first years after independence, regional councils did not have much capacity to deliver 
services due to constraints of funds and staff. This is gradually changing. Regional councils are central in the 
decentralisation process, which the government has now embarked upon.  See Tötemeyer (2000) for 
descriptions of the aims and implementation of decentralisation.   
6 See Tötemeyer (2000) for a description of the functions of the Regional Councils and Traditional 
Authorities, respectively.  
7 The constitutional framework for the decentralisation policy and supporting legislations is Chapter 12, 
Article 102(1) and 102(3) of the Namibian Constitution. Article 102(1) enables the central government to 
create regional and local government structures through various Acts of Parliament, while Article 102(3) is 
the constitutional corner stone for the determination and establishment of regional and local councils. Since 
2000, five Acts supporting the Namibian decentralisation process have been passed: (1) the Decentralisation 
Enabling Act No 33 of 2000; (2) the Trust Fund for Regional Development and Equity Provision Act No 22 of 
2000; (3) the Local Authority Amendment Act No 24 of 2000; (4) the Regional Councils Amendment Act No 
30 of 2000; and (5) the Traditional Authority Act No 25 of 2000. Objectives and key elements of the 
decentralisation policy in Namibia are described in MRLGH (1997, 1998, 1998b). 
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municipalities, are mostly found in the central and southern part of the country.8 At present there are 
15 village councils (MRLGH, 2003:8).  
The municipal and town councils are governed by a council. The Minister responsible for 
Regional and Local Government, and Housing9 determines the number of councillors, which may 
vary between seven and twelve elected members (ibid). Currently, town councils consist of seven 
members (MRLGH, 2004:10). Normally the council administration is divided into departments of 
general administration, finance, health, engineering, and planning. They vary considerably in terms 
of personnel, income and patterns of expenditure (Tvedten & Mupotola, 1995).  
Local authorities carry out a number of functions as specified in Section 3(2) of the Local 
Government Act No. 23 of 1992, as amended by the Local Authorities Amendment Act No. 17 of 
2002. According to the Acts, local authorities are responsible for the provision, operation and 
maintenance of most municipal infrastructure and services. Roads, drainage, water supply, 
sewerage, electricity distribution, street lightning and solid waste management, as well as access to 
land and housing are all functions that are the responsibility of local authorities (NALAO et al, 
2004:11). However, no indication is given which services all local authorities should be delivering 
as a minimum requirement (MRLGH, 2004:14). Thus, some services may be delivered by all three 
types of councils, while others might be specific to certain councils only and might even depend on 
ministerial approval. However, the provision of water, electricity, sewerage, refuse collection and 
land is more common and counts among the council’s most important revenue sources.     
According to the Local Government Act of 1992 (section 4, p. 18), the President is 
empowered to proclaim new municipalities and town councils, and also to alter the status of local 
authority councils. Both upgrading and downgrading of councils from Town council to Part II 
municipality, and from Village to Town council, and vice versa have happened. This does, however, 
not necessarily imply that functions change. According to Simon (1996), town councils only 
provide slightly more and different functions than the village councils,10 although the former are 
larger and better staffed. Municipalities tend to provide the largest range of services. 
 
                                                     
8 Villages are small settlements that formally are not declared as urban areas (Tvedten & Mupotola, 1995:9).   
9 See Promulgation of Local Authorities Amendment Act, 2002, amendment of section 1 of the Local 
Government Act No. 23 of 1992 (para. 1.e). 
10 Simon (1996:62) also shows that there is little relationship between the population size of a village council, 
the number of staff employed, and the type of services they provide.   
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Table 2.1 Local Authorities by type and population (1991 and 2001)  
 
Local authority Region Council category 
Year 
est. 
Population 
1991 
Population 
2001 
Annual 
average 
growth 
(in %)11 
Windhoek Khomas M1 <1992 147 056 233 529 4.62 
Swakopmund Erongo M1 <1992 17 681 23 808 2.98 
Walvis Bay* Erongo M1 <1992 30 452 43 611 3.59 
       
Gobabis Omaheke M2 <1992 8 340 13 856 5.08 
Grootfontein Otjozondjupa M2 <1992 12 829 14 249 1.05 
Karasburg Karas M2 <1992 4 602 4 075 -1.22 
Karibib Erongo M2 <1992 3 067 3 726 1.95 
Keetmanshoop Karas M2 <1992 15 032 15 778 0.48 
Mariental Hardap M2 <1992 7 581 9 836 2.60 
Okahandja Otjozondjupa M2 <1992 11 040 14 039 2.40 
Omaruru Erongo M2 <1992 4 851 4 761 -0.19 
Otavi Otjozondjupa M2 <1992 3 506 3 813 0.84 
Otjiwarongo Otjozondjupa M2 <1992 15 921 19 614 2.09 
Outjo Kunene M2 <1992 4 535 6 013 2.82 
Tsumeb Oshikoto M2 <1992 16 211 14 929 -0.82 
Usakos Erongo M2 <1992 3 548 2 926 -1.93 
       
Arandis Erongo T 1992 4 303 3 974 -0.80 
Eenhana Ohangwena T 2000 na 2 814 na 
Henties Bay Erongo T <1992 1 612 3 285 7.12 
Katima Mulilo Caprivi T 1992 13 377 22 134 5.04 
Khorixas Kunene T 1992 7 358 5 890 -2.23 
Luderitz Karas T <1992 7 700 13 295 5.46 
Okakarara Otjozondjupa T 1992 3 725 3 296 -1.22 
Ondangwa Oshana T 1992 7 926 10 900 3.19 
Ongwediva Oshana T 1992 6 197 10 742 5.50 
Opuwo Kunene T 1992 4 234 5 101 1.86 
Oshakati Oshana T 1992 21 439 28 255 2.76 
Outapi Omusati T 2000 na 2 640 na 
Rehoboth Hardap T 1992 21 439 21 308 -0.06 
Rundu Okavango T 1992 19 366 36 964 6.46 
Oranjemund Karas T >2000 na 4 451 na 
       
TOTAL       424 928 603 612 3.51 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors based on Groupe Huit/MoF (2001) and 2001 Census (RoN, 2003) 
* Until 1994 Walvis Bay was under South African control. 
 
 
Major changes in the functions of local authorities are, however, under way. One concerns the 
increasing interest in public-private partnerships for the provision of services such as refuse 
collection, cleansing services etc. As shown by Simon (1996), many councils relied on private 
companies to carry out some of their functions already by the mid-1990s. Interviews with council 
                                                     
11 Annual average growth rate (%) = ( ) kxx tkt //ln + *100 = ( ln ( pop2001/pop1991 ) / 10 ) * 100 
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staff and councillors in Ondangwa and Outapi in January 2004 confirmed that this trend has 
continued because the councils’ are under substantial fiscal stress. Some authorities, for example, 
try to reduce financial losses incurred in running specific services and to increase service levels by 
outsourcing functions.  Furthermore, some councils simply do not have the staff to run certain 
functions and therefore need to outsource. The other major change arises from nationally driven 
restructuring of major services like electricity and water, reflected in the establishment of the 
parastatals Nampower and Namwater. They aim at improving cost recovery, efficiency and service 
levels for these sectors.  
2.3 Trends in the provision of key services since independence12 
There were major differences in the quality of and access to services between local authorities and 
between regions immediately after Independence. Indeed, such inequalities were also substantial 
within these jurisdictions. This is not surprising, given the pre-independence apartheid based 
institutional framework for service provision described above, and given that the South African 
colonial power at first actively discouraged in-migration to urban areas (see section 2.1), and later 
only set aside relatively limited funds for the provision of urban services to non-whites. It is also not 
surprising that, with the re-organisation of local authorities along non-racial lines after 
independence and with a government that is more actively pursuing broad-based provision of 
services, more non-white urban inhabitants have access to key local government services - such as 
water and electricity - today, as compared to ten years ago. How much the service provision 
situation has improved since then, however, still is in question.        
Unfortunately, neither the government nor the MRLGH and the utility companies publish 
aggregate data on access to the main services provided through local authorities. Such data may be 
available in some councils, but even that is not certain.13 Countrywide statistics on service delivery 
are not collected either. In the absence of such information, it is necessary to use indicative 
evidence to analyse access to key services such as electricity and water in urban Namibia, including 
the urban population growth rate; the trend in the volume of electricity and water supplied to local 
authorities in the 1990s; the price trend for these utilities since independence compared with the 
consumer price index; and the volume of investments in the infrastructure for electricity and water 
distribution in local authority jurisdictions.   
Firstly, there are urban population growth rates. Around independence in 1991, 27% of 
Namibia’s population lived in urban areas - of which more than one-third lived in the capital 
(Melber, 1996). Based on the census of 1991, the annual urban growth rate was set at around 4.5%, 
but the basis for this figure is weak. Growth estimates for Windhoek, for example, vary between 
3.9% and 10% (Tvedten & Mupotola, 1995:9). From table 2.1, we see that the annual average 
growth rate for Windhoek from the 1991 to the 2001 population census is 4.6%. The average 
population growth rate for municipal (M1 and M2) and town councils was 3.5%, but there are large 
differences between the local authorities. Whereas Henties Bay has experienced an annual 
population growth of 7.1%, Khorixas has seen an annual decline of 2.2%. Tvedten & Mupotola 
(1995:16) assumed an urban population growth rate of between 4.5% and 6.5%. At present, 
however, two major but opposite trends should be taken into account. One is that in-migration is 
probably on the increase compared to the early 1990s, when the migration restrictions of the 
apartheid era most likely still had an impact. The other is that the population growth rate for the 
country as a whole was above 3% at independence, but life expectancy is now falling significantly 
due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic (RoN, 2003). Hence, UNDP (2005) estimates the annual national 
population growth rate for the period 2003-15 to 1%, while the Census 2001 estimated 2.6% (RoN, 
2003). In the following, we assume an average annual urban population growth rate of 3.5%, which 
                                                     
12 This section draws on Fjeldstad & Therkildsen (2002). 
13 Many municipalities and town councils, for example, do not have reliable information on household access 
to water within their jurisdiction.   
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is the average annual urban population growth rate for the period 1991-2001 as estimated from the 
Census data (see Table 2.1).  
 
Secondly, there is the trend in the volume of key services supplied to local authorities, in the period 
1990-98.14 Table 2.2 shows, for instance, that the annual growth rate of the electricity supply to 
local authorities has been around 7% since independence – i.e. higher than the estimated growth rate 
for the urban population. Consequently, access to electricity may have increased, assuming that the 
average domestic consumer buys a similar amount of electricity today as ten years ago.    
 
The growth rate for water supply to local authorities (2.5%) in the same period, however, is well 
below the urban population growth rate of 3.5%. But the figures are more difficult to interpret for a 
number of reasons. The supply figures do not include water produced by the authorities themselves. 
Such ‘own’ production accounts for 10-20% of total consumption in Windhoek City Council, for 
example. But no overview of own production exists for all councils.  Moreover, some councils have 
tried to promote water saving behaviour and this may have affected average household 
consumption. Droughts also affect consumption. Finally, changes in leakages in the water 
distribution pipelines over time may affect the observed water supply trend. Thus, although the 
figures in table 2.2 do not directly reflect the number of people with access to electricity and water, 
the trends may indicate that access to electricity has increased while access to water has decreased 
significantly during the period 1990-98.     
 
 
Table 2.2 Electricity and water supplied, 1990-1998  
 
Description 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Annual 
Growth 
(%) 
Electricity, Total (a) 1612 1718 1715 1495 1600 1660 1707 1707 1837 1.6 
- of which to LAs (b) 608 650 715 778 845 887 955 955 1050 6.8 
- of which to rural areas 10 12 14 21 24 28 33 33 44 18.5 
           
Water, total (b) 41.3 42.4 46.1 44.3 48.7 56.8 51.4 48.8 - 2.4 
- of which to LAs (c) 25.4 25.7 26.8 27.9 29.8 30.1 30.2 30.7 - 2.7 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office (1994, table 11.1); Central Bureau of Statistics (1999, tables 11.1 and 11.4) 
(a): Gigawatt hours (GWh). 
(b) : Million cubic metres; water supplied for domestic consumption 
(c): Excluding Windhoek City Council, which supplies around 10-20% from own sources, and which in 
recent years has introduced various water conservation measures. Water supplied to game reserves, 
government institutions, tourist centres and ‘other’ is also excluded. 
 
 
This conclusion is supported by the trends in electricity and water prices in the 1990s. Table 2.3 
shows that both electricity and water prices have increased faster than the overall consumer price 
index (CPI), and that the cost of water in particular has increased substantially. Everything else 
being equal, this may have diminished the demand for water.   
Third, there are indications that the proportion of the urban population living in informal 
settlement areas is growing (see chapter 3). Figures by Tvedten & Mupotola (1995:13-15) indicate 
that from 30% to 75% of the urban population in Northern towns lived in such settlements in 1995. 
                                                     
14 These are the most recent data we have gained access to.  
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In Windhoek the percentage was estimated 17-20% in 1995, and increased to 24% in 2000 (Gulyani 
& Connors, 2002:22).  
 
 
Table 2.3 Consumer price index: all items, electricity and water, 1992-2001 
 
Description 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Annual 
growth 
(%) 
All items 100 116.3 127.9 138.2 150.4 159.7 173.4 189.5 8.0 
Electricity 100 103.6 128.5 139.9 157.4 169.0 180.5 198.1 8.5 
Water 100 113.6 143.4 160.6 209.1 260.3 302.4 348.7 15.6 
 
 Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (1999, table 16.1a) for all items.  The CPI for electricity and water is 
based on information specifically extracted by the CBS for this report.   
 
 
The final piece of evidence, which provides useful insight into the provision of electricity and 
water, concerns the volume of investments in the distributional infrastructure by local authorities in 
these sectors in the 1990s. The investment growth rates for these sectors are unlikely to have kept 
up with urban population growth. This supports the view that service levels with respect to 
electricity and water have stagnated or actually declined in some urban councils since 
independence.   
Despite the lack of solid data, the evidence presented above indicates that on aggregate for 
the country, key services provided through local authorities have not improved notably for 
electricity since independence and may actually have worsened with respect to water. Information 
on the trends for other services, such as sanitation and the provision of urban building plots, is not 
available. But there is little reason to expect that the provision of these services suggest a different 
picture than that outlined above. Nor is there, indeed, reason to believe that significant 
improvements in any services have occurred since 2000. It is likely that the overall supply of 
services in informal urban settlements has deteriorated. These conclusions are based on analyses of 
aggregate trends and average figures. As shown later in this report, a closer analysis of service 
delivery in Ondangwa and Outapi also shows that the inequality of provision has increased within 
the town councils since independence. 
These facts point to serious problems with regard to the financing of the services that local 
authorities are supposed to provide. User charges have so far been major revenue sources.  It is 
towards the features of these that we now turn.   
2.4 The local government finance system 
A major principle of local government in Namibia is that they should, ideally, be financially 
autonomous. Thus, the Local Government Act 1992 allows for three types of local authorities: 
municipalities, town councils and village councils based on this one major principle only as it is 
spelled out at the beginning of the Local Authorities Act, 1992 (see section 2.2). To obtain 
municipal status, a council must pay all costs related to the execution of its powers and functions 
out of its own funds.  Town council status is obtained when a council is able to pay some of these 
costs. Village council status is obtained if it can perform specified mandatory functions, but there is 
no specific requirement for financial self-sufficiency stated in the act.  
There are three interesting implications of the self-sufficiency principle. First, the 
classification of councils is not related to the population size of the council (see also Simon, 1996) 
as is the case in many other African countries. Second, since the principle is only stated in general 
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terms in the Act, it gives the Minister responsible for Regional and Local Government and 
Housing15 considerable power of discretion with respect to the classification of councils,16 as well as 
the upgrading and downgrading of councils depending on their financial situation. Finally, the 
financially self-sufficient municipal councils have a considerable degree of autonomy in running 
their affairs as shown below.  
Namibia’s 45 local authorities,17 which are established in the urban areas only, are learning to 
live with the situation outlined above:  
 
• they aim - or are pushed - to operate on a full cost recovery basis for all services that they 
deliver, although some - mainly sector specific and area based - cross-subsidisation is made (the 
main parastatal utility service providers also cross-subsidise within their sectors);  
• they generate most of their funds from user fees except for the more well established authorities 
which levy property taxes and sell land (erfs); and   
• they receive limited funding from central government, and then mainly for specific investment 
projects on an ad hoc basis. There is also some recurrent cost support from the central 
government on an ad hoc basis.18 
 
In other words, Namibian local authorities are forced, partly by default and partly due to political 
and historical reasons, to survive financially on their own without much financial support from the 
central government. They are, in a financial sense, relatively autonomous. This is quite remarkable. 
Namibia is one of the richest countries in sub-Saharan Africa and its public revenues are quite 
substantial. At the same time, the country has one of the highest income inequalities in the world. A 
proclaimed objective of SWAPO, the ruling party since independence, has been to provide services 
– also to the poor. SWAPO is also firmly entrenched politically, having won all national and the 
large majority of the local elections since Independence in 1990. Yet, central government has not 
developed a local government finance system that could help it to provide equal access to services 
across (and within) local authorities. Instead, local authorities rely mainly on user charges, 
especially on water and electricity, to obtain the revenues that are needed to finance their operations 
(Chirawu et al., 1999:40-41). This revenue is generated by a surcharge added to the cost of the 
utilities that the local authorities typically buy from the utility companies, or, if the authority itself 
produces the utility, added to the cost of producing it. However, according to a recent study 
commissioned by the ministry responsible for local government (MRLGH, 2004:19), the majority 
of town councils are not determining their tariffs in accordance with an approved tariff policy. 
Hence, several trading services, including water distribution, are operated with significant losses in 
a number of local authorities. The situation is worsened by an increasing number of outstanding 
debtors in all local authorities, i.e. consumers who do not pay for basic services due to various 
reasons, including affordability.   
A number of town councils therefore find it increasingly difficult to sustain their service 
levels without using their accumulated surpluses (ibid). This problem is developing in spite of the 
                                                     
15 Amendments to the act in 2000 transferred this power from the President to the Minister of RLGH.   
16 Moreover, there are no specific criteria for the classification of municipalities into part I and part II 
councils. 
17 ‘Local government’ and ‘local authorities’ are used interchangeably and refer to municipalities, town 
councils and village councils as specified in The Local Government Act, 1992. Regional councils are not 
regarded as local authorities in this report. These councils - currently central to the government's 
decentralisation efforts - are only dealt with in as far as they are important for understanding local authority 
financing.  Traditional authorities are not dealt with either, as they are not important for service provision in 
urban areas. More detailed analyses of regional councils and traditional authorities are provided by Keulder 
(1997, 2000) and Tötemeyer (2000). 
18 Newly established town councils received operational subsidies from the MRLGH until 2002. According to 
MRLGH (2004:14), however, these operational subsidies have since been terminated apart from in three 
councils, i.e. Eenhana, Outapi and Opuwo. 
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fact that the annual operational budgets of the newly established town councils often are boosted 
with a provision from the sale of land (erven) and transfers from the Capital Development Fund, 
which is normally utilised to fund new developments and capital projects (ibid.).  
2.5 Summary 
Namibia has a three-tier system of governance: central government, regional councils and local 
authorities. The Local Authority Act of 1992 distinguishes between municipalities, towns and 
villages, with municipalities being the highest and most autonomous type of local authority. A 
major principle of local government in Namibia is that they should, ideally, be financially 
autonomous. This implies that Namibia’s 45 local authorities  
 
• aim - or are pushed - to operate on a full cost recovery basis for all services that they 
deliver, although some - mainly sector specific and area based - cross-subsidisation is 
made;  
• generate most of their funds from user fees except for the more well established 
authorities which levy property taxes and sell land (erven); and   
• receive limited funding from central government, and then mainly for specific investment 
projects on an ad hoc basis, although there might be some recurrent cost support from the 
central government on an ad hoc basis. 
 
Local authorities rely mainly on user charges, especially on water and electricity, to obtain the 
revenues that are needed to finance their operations. This revenue is generated by a surcharge added 
to the cost of the utilities that the local authorities typically buy from the utility companies, or, if the 
authority itself produces the utility, added to the cost of producing it. However, the majority of town 
councils are not determining their tariffs in accordance with an approved tariff policy. Hence, 
several trading services, including water distribution, are operated with significant losses in many 
councils. The situation is worsened by an increasing number of outstanding debtors in all local 
authorities, i.e. consumers who do not pay for basic services due to various reasons, including 
affordability.   
A number of town councils therefore find it increasingly difficult to sustain their service 
levels without using their accumulated surpluses. There are indications that on aggregate for the 
country, key services provided through local authorities have not improved notably for electricity 
since independence and may actually have worsened with respect to water. Information on the 
trends for other services, such as sanitation and the provision of urban building plots, is not 
available. But there is little reason to expect that the provision of these services suggest a different 
picture than that outlined above. It is likely that the overall supply of services in informal urban 
settlements has deteriorated. This problem is developing in spite of the fact that the annual 
operational budgets of the newly established town councils often are boosted with a provision from 
the sale of land (erven) and transfers from the Capital Development Fund, which is normally 
utilised to fund new developments and capital projects. 
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3 Urban poverty, housing and land tenure 
This chapter provides an overview of main characteristics of the urbanisation process in Namibia, 
and discusses challenges facing policies regulating the upgrading of poor informal settlements, as 
reflected in the land tenure systems and the national housing policy.  
3.1 Urbanisation and urban poverty 
Due to the colonial policy of apartheid, urban areas have historically been located in the central 
parts of the country with the north functioning as a rural labour reserve area (Melber, 1996). While 
the principal towns of Windhoek and Walvis Bay still attract the largest number of migrants, the 
urbanisation rate in the north has increased substantially since independence to the current rate of 
7.5% (Groupe Huit/MoF, 2001:12). There are considerable differences in the size of urban centres 
in Namibia, however (see Table 2.1). Windhoek is by far the largest urban centre housing 39% of 
the urban population in 2001, followed by Walvis Bay (7.2%), Rundu (6.1%) and Oshakati (4.7%). 
The population of Ondangwa makes up 1.8% (10,900 inhabitants) of Namibia’s total urban 
population and Outapi 0.4% (2,640 inhabitants). The most urbanised regions are Khomas (with 
Windhoek CC) and Erongo (with Walvis Bay CC), where 93% and 80%, respectively, of the 
population live in urban areas (RoN, 2003). As many as 40% of the people residing in the Khomas 
region are migrants from the northern and central regions, which are primarily rural. This reflects 
the high rural-urban migration to the capital city. There is also a large inflow of migrants from the 
north to Walvis Bay and the Erongo region.  
Rapid urbanisation in Namibia has occurred largely as a result of high rates of population 
growth, drought, and a decline in the ability of the land to support growing populations. Internal 
migration is largely based on first-generation migrants trying to make a new life for themselves in 
towns and cities (Tvedten & Pomuti, 1998). As is common in most developing countries, urban 
areas are perceived by the rural population to have better educational and medical facilities, better 
employment and economic opportunities than rural areas (Tostensen et al, 2001; Pendleton & 
Frayne, 1998; Frayne & Pendleton, 2003). Moreover, during the period under South African rule 
the majority of the population in Namibia was restricted to  settlement areas assigned according to 
ethnicity and land tenure patterns. Pass laws effectively prevented Black and Coloured people from 
moving into urban areas to search for employment or reside there without employment. When these 
restrictions were lifted, large-scale migration started to urban areas, away from the under-resourced 
communal areas. 
Approximately 40% of the urban population in Namibia today live in informal settlements, 
with unemployment being a major problem particularly in the north. The current national 
unemployment rate is estimated at 31% (RoN, 2003). The highest unemployment rate is found 
among young people in urban areas, notably women. According to Tvedten & Pomuti (1998), the 
majority of the urban dwellers who cannot find employment in the formal sector seek livelihoods in 
the informal economy. This sector is relatively easy to enter since it operates on a smaller scale than 
the formal sector. However, access to housing is inadequate, and urban services such as water, 
electricity, sewage and waste disposal represent severe problems (NPC, 1998; Groupe Huit//MoF, 
2001, 2002; Gulyani et al., 2002). For instance, over 60% of the households in the informal 
settlements of Oshakati and and Ondangwa live in corrugated irons shacks while the few brick 
houses tend to be in very poor condition. Sanitation is a serious problem in these areas, where a 
high number of people do not have access to any type of toilets. Even though urban-rural links 
remain important, there are indications that particularly the poorest sections of the population are 
increasingly encapsulated in urban areas. 
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3.2 The role of local authorities in the poverty reduction strategy  
Although only circumstantial evidence exists to show that there are large inequalities in the 
services provided by local authorities and that these are, perhaps, widening, there is no doubt that 
poverty and unequal access to services in general are major problems. This was also 
acknowledged by the government when it approved the Poverty Reduction Strategy in 1998 (NPC, 
1998), which focused on three central areas of poverty reduction: (a) a more equitable and efficient 
delivery of services ‘in the context of Namibia’s commitment to regional decentralisation’; (b) the 
acceleration of equitable agricultural expansion; and (c) employment creation outside agriculture.  
With respect to service delivery the starting point for poverty reduction is that the standards 
presently provided in the richer regions are not affordable country-wide. Consequently, each line 
ministry engaged in service delivery is required to define – and estimate the costs and budgets for 
– nationally applicable minimum standards that are lower than the present standards in a region 
such as Khomas. The Central government then supports regions that do not have the finances to 
reach the national minimum standard. Regions and individuals seeking a higher standard of service 
would need to identify alternative (private or collective) sources of supplementary financing, for 
example through user charges or taxation (ibid. 21). 
This approach has been technically feasible and similar to those pursued in other African 
countries (such as Tanzania and Uganda). However, neither the strategy paper nor the subsequent 
implementation plan for poverty reduction has received much attention in practice. Moreover, 
there is no mention of local authorities in the 1998 strategy. The more recent National Poverty 
Reduction Action Programme (NPC, 2004) refers to the role of Regional Councils and 
Development Committees, but makes no explicit reference to local authorities. Thus, a recent 
review states that co-operation with ALAN in the production of local economic development 
planning has yet to be done (ibid. 83).  
Obviously, it is difficult to determine the reasons behind this failure. It could be an error of 
omission; a lack of information about the consequences of urbanisation for local authority finances 
and service provision; a deliberate decision to focus on poverty issues in rural rather than urban 
areas given budget constraints; a reluctance to come to grips with the hard and explicit choices that 
would need to be made in order to decide on specific national minimum standards; or a 
combination of all these reasons. Whatever the case may be, this impasse in dealing explicitly with 
the poverty issue - and with the role of local government in dealing with poverty in urban areas – 
may have serious consequences for local government finances.  
In particular, it is likely that urban migration will further increase the financial burden of 
municipalities and town councils. In the absence of significant central government subsidies, the 
various local authorities have to carry the lion’s share of the costs from their internal resources 
when developing and upgrading poor informal areas through the instalment of infrastructure and 
provision of basic services (MRLGH, 2004:20). Although plans are in place in many local 
authorities, the process of developing and/or upgrading informal townships into (semi-)formal 
areas with demarcated stands, water supply, electricity and roads, has been very slow. This 
problem is partly due to the financial constraints facing many town councils, but also due to the 
characteristics of the land tenure system in Namibia, as discussed in the following section.  
3.3 Land tenure and land rights 
Land tenure systems 
Roughly half of Namibia’s land is held under freehold title, while the rest is referred to as 
‘communal land’. Until recently, communal land could not be held under freehold title and could 
therefore not be sold or mortgaged. It was commonly held under customary tenure controlled by the 
local traditional authorities. This also applied to land that was not registered in and around urban 
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settlements. With the establishment of additional local authorities in 1992, the land falling within 
the boundaries of the local authorities was placed under their jurisdiction. This shift from traditional 
authority to local government control had severe consequences for both traditional authorities and 
the residents in informal settlements. According to Juma & Christensen (2001), more than 45,000 
families, particularly the poor in urban informal settlements today face problems regarding long-
term security of land tenure rights in Namibia.  
Customary rights to land were usually usufruct rights, which were granted upon payment of 
a nominal sum to the administrating traditional authority. This sum was ZAR 25-50 for smaller 
plots and up to ZAR 3,000 for the largest plots in Ondangwa, for example. Thereafter the occupier 
needed only to pay a symbolic ZAR 1 per year to reaffirm his/her right to occupy. In effect rights 
and obligations worked similar to a 99 year lease, meaning that family members could take over the 
plot. There were some restrictions to the tenure of the land, however. It could, for example, not be 
sold to third parties, nor could it be subdivided. If the land was no longer used it reverted back to 
the traditional authority. Despite these restrictions many residents in informal settlements who have 
occupied their land for many years feel that they ‘own’ their plots.  
Changes in tenure systems in urban areas 
With the takeover of the town councils these rights were overturned. From one day to another 
traditional ‘owners’ of land were declassified to being tenants, who rent plots from the local 
authority, and forthwith were liable to register with the local authority and to pay a monthly plot 
rent (N$ 6-12). Their rights were greatly diminished in that they no longer are able to pass the plot 
on to family members without prior permission of the town council. More importantly, they can be 
evicted any time if the council decides to use the land for other purposes, such as for formal 
housing, industrial or business developments etc. Informal settlement dwellers are particularly 
vulnerable to eviction if they live in so-called ’impermanent houses’ such as iron shacks or 
combinations of mud-brick/ iron sheet houses. Persons who have been thus affected will not be 
compensated for their apparent loss of security of tenure.  
The position of traditional authorities 
On the other side, traditional local authorities, too, have not been compensated for the loss of land 
and revenue previously emanating from their control over sections of land within the boundaries of 
the town councils. Other former revenue sources, such as fees for shops and other businesses for 
slaughtering of animals, have also been appropriated by town councils. Moreover, the revenue bases 
of traditional authorities have not been replaced by other sources, nor do they receive government 
salaries. Yet, traditional authorities are still recognised by central and local governments, and town 
councils rely on them for certain tasks. Traditional authorities still consider it their right to allocate 
and control communal land, although the new Communal Land Act of 2003 makes provision of 
Land Boards, which largely bypass them.19 In fact, the Traditional Authorities Act stipulates that 
any conflicts between the traditional authority regulations and central government regulations are to 
be solved in favour of the central government. 
Compensation policies and practices 
When town councils formalise informal settlements, residents who cannot afford the price of plots 
and brick houses and/or cannot afford connection to services, are forced to resettle in other informal 
areas. Theoretically, town councils should pay compensation to resettled residents who own 
permanent structures or traditional homesteads. Residents living in iron shacks are not recognised as 
owning property and they receive no compensation. Houses built with sun-dried mud-brick, but not 
                                                     
19 Interview with Senior Councillor, Ndoga Kingdom, Ondangwa, 6.02.04. 
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in a traditional kraal also receive no compensation. In case of relocation the latter category of 
dweller is provided with a new designated rental plot only where he/she again will have to pay plot 
rent. Shack dwellers are often moved from prime sites close to the business centre or the main road 
to more remote and unattractive areas where they will meet fewer services (often only communal 
water taps) and fewer business opportunities, particularly in the informal sector.  
Compensation for permanent or traditional structures is not adequate. Residents in 
traditional homesteads are offered two options: monetary compensation for the productive land, at 
N$ 200/ha, and N$ 250/m2 of floor space of dwellings constructed with bricks and iron sheets.20 
Hence, only part of the traditional dwellings that a traditional ‘house’ occupies is compensated for 
and the enclosed space, which holds many structures for various purposes, is not considered. The 
other option is compensation in kind, whereby alternative plots of land, either for agriculture or 
urban re-settlement are offered. Similar rules are followed for permanent structures in the informal 
settlements. The options are not attractive to residents, and in practice town councils often offer 
alternative plots only since they lack finances for monetary compensation. Many residents refuse to 
move to less attractive sites without adequate compensation. Shack dwellers rarely have such an 
option, since they cannot claim compensation.  
Flexible urban land tenure 
After Independence two land conferences identified security of tenure as one of the most crucial 
issues with regard to urban land. It was acknowledged that the majority of Namibians would be 
unable to purchase land and thus acquire title deeds. Therefore measures to simplify the costly and 
inflexible formal property registration procedures were proposed. As a consequence, a second 
property registration system parallel to and interchangeable with the existing system was developed. 
The Flexible Urban Land Tenure System is the result of years of research and pilot projects: it is 
intended to provide an affordable, more secure, but also simple land right which can be upgraded 
according to the needs and financial capabilities of the holders and the government alike. The 
Flexible Urban Land Tenure Bill was prepared in 1999, but was, at the time of our research still not 
promulgated. Potentially, the Bill will address the tenure security needs of poor urban communities 
living in informal settlements.  
The Bill introduces two new types of tenure, namely a starter title, which is a statutory form 
of tenure registered in respect of a block of land, and the landhold title, a statutory form of tenure 
with all the important aspects of a freehold title, but without the lengthy procedures and 
complications. The first tenure allows for perpetual occupation of a plot as part of a group managed 
block, with somewhat restricted rights of transfer. Most importantly, the upgraded tenure with 
respect to group managed plots gives the right to mortgage it and thus to use it as collateral. While 
the Block in its entirety is registered under a centrally registered freehold ownership, the sub-plots 
are registered locally only, thus simplifying and shortening the registration process and making land 
registration cheaper while still providing security of tenure (see Juma & Christensen, 2001:6-7).  
The Flexible Urban Land Tenure Bill will be one foundation of the operations of the Shack 
Dweller Federation of Namibia (SDFN), for example. The Federation already has started to 
negotiate blocks of land from the town councils or municipalities, and plans to offer members 
landhold titles to individual plots, while helping members to build upgraded permanent houses on 
the land. In fact, the saving groups of the SDFN have been following the development principles of 
what the Flexible Urban Land Tenure aims to achieve. The saving groups are voluntary associations 
in the SDFN network that buy and develop blocks of land and then give their members transferable 
rights pertaining to identifiable areas of land. The SDFN also negotiates land for the resettlement of 
shack dwellers, who cannot afford to build permanent houses under the flexible land tenure system.  
                                                     
20 These data were obtained from the local traditional authority, Ondangwa. The government scheduled rates 
of 1992 (MRLGH) are much higher and more inclusive, however. Policy and practice thus seem to differ. 
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3.4 The national housing policy 
The National Housing Policy of 1991 emphasises the need for partnership between public, semi-
public, and private sectors, with the government acting as a facilitator rather than a direct provider 
of housing. The Government sees its role as mainly intervening in areas that are beyond the 
individuals’ control, such as access to serviced land and finances. The policy advocates community 
participation in the planning, design and implementation of the housing policy.  
Provision of affordable serviced land in an environment of secure tenure for low income 
households is part of the National Housing Plan. Regulation of informal settlements and the 
establishment of incremental development areas are also included in the Plan. Local authorities are 
encouraged to reduce the costs of developing land for housing by applying appropriate 
infrastructure standards and through cross subsidisation. The Plan also spells out that Local 
Authorities are encouraged to set aside areas for new migrants where they are allowed to build 
‘houses with temporary materials’, which can be gradually improved over time. Local authorities 
are also encouraged to upgrade informal settlements without forcing residents out. 
Thus, a town council may set aside land for the construction of informal housing structures 
or buildings (i.e. structures or buildings of a temporary nature, which are not dwelling houses), 
incremental houses or initial self-help dwellings as contemplated in the National Housing 
Development Act.21 However, experience has shown that this policy, where it was applied, largely 
failed during the 1990’s, when the government experimented with the idea of ‘reception areas’. 
These were intended as temporary places of residence until people could be properly resettled in 
accordance with policy guidelines (Gulyani et al., 2002).  
According to the World Bank, large scale land invasions happened even prior to the site 
lay-out, which meant that the councils could not contain growth within the boundaries of the set-
aside areas, nor could families displaced by up-grading be actually resettled in these areas (Gulyani 
& Connors, 2002). For instance, in Okangwena, an informal settlement in Ondangwa, shack 
dwellers spontaneously left to secure plots in the newly designated areas for informal settlement 
when they heard rumours that the council intended to formalise Okangwena and evict shack 
dwellers unable (or unwilling) to upgrade shacks to brick houses.22  
Various programmes have been established to improve the housing and basic service 
delivery for the urban poor. The National Housing Programme Build Together was started in 1992. 
It was designed as a “People’s Process of Housing”. It is meant to offer poorer households the 
possibility to build houses according to their needs, priorities and resources. Later Build Together 
was decentralised to regional and local councils. In Ondangwa, for example, the programme was 
decentralised in 1998 and the Town Council took over sole responsibility in 2003. 
Build Together provides soft loans to low-income households that are too risky for 
commercial banks or to people who lack the collateral demanded by commercial banks. Applicants 
should have a regular formal income, but should not earn more than N$2000 per month. The 
interest rate depends on the loan amount, but is on average 5.5% p.a. The largest loan amount is N$ 
32,000 repayable over 20 years at an annual interest rate of 9%: this works out to a repayment rate 
of N$287 per month. The cost of ’Build Together’ houses is up to 40% lower than that of houses 
produced by contractors in the formal sector.23 This is achieved by using informal and family 
labour, which are supervised by the Council.   
Initially the Build Together Programme gave loans as a combination of loan and building 
materials up-front. This was changed after it was realised that loans were not repaid and that money 
ran out half way through the building process and resulted in many half build houses. Now loans are 
                                                     
21 National Housing Policy (draft), see RoN (2004).  
22 Interviews, Okangwena, January 2004. 
23 Matthew Itewa, ‘Housing the low-income population in Namibia. Increasing affordability by adopting 
appropriate building standards and materials.’ Ministry of Regional and Local Government and Housing, 
Windhoek  (no date). 
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disbursed in four instalments in line with progress in the building process. The first instalment is 
meant for the foundation and the windows, the second to put in door frames and to ready the house 
for roofing, the third instalment is for the roof, and the last instalment is to pay for plastering, toilet, 
water and electricity connection. Flush toilets, water and sewer connections are an obligatory 
feature of Build Together houses. A number of standard housing plans are available, but prospective 
homeowners can also draw up their own designs, which are evaluated by the Council and then 
accepted or rejected. 
Build Together houses are meant to be built in formalised areas, since the design always 
includes connection to water, sewage and electricity. However, the Ondangwa Town Council, for 
example, ran out of building space in the formal areas and has accommodated approved loan 
receivers in the programme in informal settlements, such as in Okangwena. In this area service 
delivery is not yet completed and home-owners wait for connection to sewage, water and electricity. 
The fact that the Build Together houses are built on Council owned land, which is rented out to 
occupants, also poses serious problems as to the home-owners’ rights to the plots (and the 
buildings). These can only be resolved if/when the area is formalised. Even then it is not clear if all 
residents will be able to afford plots. A large number of the borrowers are women (65% in 
Ondangwa between 2003/2004).24 Moreover, many are council or government employees, a fact 
that seems to anger those who are lacking steady formal employment. In Ondangwa, for instance, 
the number of applications for Build Together loans by far has exceeded the supply. Hence, the 
number of rejected applicants has been twice the number of those who were successful.25  
The Namibia Housing Action Group (NHAG) and its partner the SDFN try to “empower the 
poor to negotiate and lobby for land through saving schemes and groups”. They cater precisely for 
those residents of informal settlements who are not able access or afford Build Together loans. 
NHAG, as a trust, obtains funds for the activities of the SDFN and assists with the administration of 
the Twahangana Fund, which is operated by the SDFN. The organisation conducted a survey of 
3000 households in informal settlements, which revealed that 36% of the sampled families were 
headed by women and that 70% were earning below N$600. Moreover, the median income of 
female headed households (FHH) was 30-50% lower than those of male headed households (MHH). 
The organisation concluded that “conventional systems of recovering land development costs are 
not viable for the majority of people living in informal settlements”, particularly for women.26   
The Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia (SDFN) has been working on the basis of preparing 
members to take up loans. Members are grouped and initially encouraged to save money on a group 
administered bank account. In order to raise incomes the SDF provides business loans up to N$ 500 
at an interest rate of 2% p.m. Only when group members have a proven record of regular savings 
will the group agree to the granting of a loan for a brick or clay block house. A loan for a brick 
house is up to N$ 15,000, with repayment over eleven years of between N$150-200/month at an 
annual interest rate of 5%. Previously building loans of the Federation were pegged at 1% per 
month, but have been reduced to 0.5 % after a reduction of interest for Build Together loans. Unlike 
Build Together customers, SDFN clients just have to prove that they can save, rather than have a 
regular proven income. This opens the loans up to the many women who work in the informal 
economy. Hence, the vast majority of members are women (60-90%).27  
The Shack Dwellers Federation is also, as already mentioned, involved in negotiating plots 
for their members. In a number of municipalities and town councils the SDFN has negotiated plots 
from the council for members to build their houses (or shacks). The outstanding issue has been the 
passing of the Flexible Land Tenure  Bill, which allows group tenure of group plots and offers an 
incremental and simplified way to obtaining land rights. The cooperation with councils potentially 
                                                     
24 Interview with Town Council Ondangwa, 21.01.2004 
25 ibid. 
26 Document of the Ministry of Regional and Local Government and Housing (not dated). 
http://209.88.21.39/main/publications/CountryReport.asp  
27 Itewa, Housing the Low-income Population (p. 11). 
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makes SDF a tool of council policy and action, which might not be in the interests of its members. 
In Ondangwa, for example, the Shack Dwellers Federation has become an essential part of the 
council plan to formalise Okangwena A. The SDFN is expected to handle both the up-grading of 
current plots via the awaited Flexible Urban Land Tenure and the resettling of members who cannot 
afford tenure/brick houses. In fact, even though the Federation has been helping 25,000 of its 
members with negotiating secure tenure, this still does not mean that these members are also able to 
afford loans to construct brick houses. 
3.5 Summary 
Rapid urbanisation in Namibia has occurred largely as a result of high rates of population growth, 
drought, and a decline in the ability of the land to support growing populations. Approximately 40% 
of the urban population live in informal settlements, with unemployment being a major problem 
particularly in the north. The current national unemployment rate is estimated to 31%. The highest 
unemployment rate is found among young people in urban areas, notably women. The majority of 
the urban dwellers who cannot find employment in the formal sector seek livelihoods in the 
informal economy. This sector is relatively easy to enter since it operates on a smaller scale than the 
formal sector. However, access to housing is inadequate, and urban services such as water, 
electricity, sewage and waste disposal represent severe problems.  
With respect to service delivery, the starting point for poverty reduction is that the standards 
presently provided in the richer regions are not affordable country wide. Consequently, each line 
ministry engaged in service delivery is required to define – and estimate the costs and budgets for – 
nationally applicable minimum standards. However, no explicit role for local authorities is made in 
the poverty reduction action programme. This impasse may have potentially serious consequences 
for local government finances. In particular, it is likely that urban migration will increase the 
financial burden of municipalities and town councils. In the absence of significant central 
government subsidies, the various local authorities have to carry the lion’s share of the costs from 
their internal resources when developing and upgrading poor informal areas through the instalment 
of infrastructure and provision of basic services. 
Although plans are in place in many local authorities, the process of developing and/or upgrading 
poverty stricken informal settlements into (semi-)formal areas with demarcated stands, water 
supply, electricity and roads, is very slow. This problem is partly due to the financial constraints 
facing many town councils, but also due to the characteristics of the land tenure system. 
Until recently, communal land could not be held under freehold title and could therefore not 
be sold or mortgaged. It was commonly held under customary tenure controlled by the local 
traditional authorities. This also applied to not registered land in and around urban settlements. With 
the establishment of additional local authorities in 1992, the land falling within the boundaries of 
the local authorities was placed under their jurisdiction, even though it was previously administered 
by traditional authorities. This shift had severe consequences for both traditional authorities and 
settlers in informal settlements. Firstly, traditional local authorities were not compensated for the 
loss of land and revenue emanating from their previous control over sections of land within the 
boundaries of the town councils. Secondly, informal settlement dwellers became particularly 
vulnerable to eviction, especially if they live in so-called impermanent houses such as iron shacks, 
traditional houses or combinations of mud-brick-iron sheet houses. Persons who have been thus 
affected are not compensated for their apparent loss of security of tenure.  
When town councils formalise informal settlements residents who cannot afford the price of 
plots and/or cannot afford connection to services, are forced to resettle in informal areas. 
Theoretically, town councils should pay compensation to resettled residents who own permanent 
structures or traditional homesteads. Residents living in iron shacks are not recognised as owning 
property and they receive no compensation. Shack dwellers are often moved from prime sites close 
to the business centre or the main road to more remote and unattractive areas where they will meet 
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fewer services, often only communal water taps, and fewer business opportunities particularly in the 
informal sector. With respect to permanent structures (e.g. brick houses), compensation is rarely 
adequate, and therefore not attractive to residents.  
Provision of affordable serviced land in an environment of secure tenure for low income 
households is part of the National Housing Plan. Regulation of informal settlements and the 
establishment of incremental development areas are also included in the Plan. Local authorities are 
encouraged to reduce the costs of developing land for housing by applying appropriate 
infrastructure standards and through cross subsidisation. The Plan also spells out that Local 
Authorities are encouraged to set aside areas for new migrants where they are allowed to build 
‘houses with temporary materials’, which can be gradually improved over time. Local authorities 
are also encouraged to upgrade informal settlements without forcing residents out.  
The Flexible Land Tenure Bill introduces two new types of tenure, namely the starter title 
and the landhold title. The first tenure allows for perpetual occupation of a plot as part of a group 
managed block, with restricted rights of transfer. The upgraded form also gives the right to 
mortgage the plot and thus to use it as collateral.  
Various programmes have been established to improve the housing and basic service 
delivery for the urban poor. The National Housing Programme Build Together and the Namibia 
Housing Action Group (NHAG) and its subsidiary the Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia 
(SDFN) cater precisely for those residents of informal settlements who are too risky for commercial 
banks and/or lack collateral. The Shack Dwellers Federation (SDF) has negotiated plots from the 
council for members to build their houses (or shacks). The co-operation with councils, however, 
potentially makes SDF a tool of council policy and action, which might not be in the interests of its 
members. 
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4 Socio-economic profiles of Ondangwa and Outapi  
4.1 Introduction 
Urbanisation in the communal areas in Northern Namibia took place much later than in the central 
and southern towns. The towns expanded largely as a result of the increased militarisation of the 
northern areas from the mid-1970s onwards. They became effectively segregated between formal 
and fully serviced white sections and non-developed informal settlements. Hence, some informal 
settlements grew when the South African Defence Force (SADF) soldiers, housed in barracks 
started to build shacks, where they kept their women and spent time when on leave from the army. 
Uupopo informal settlement in Ondagwa has such a history.28 Residents in these informal 
settlements were generally only provided water services. The urban population in the north was thus 
initially mainly made up of soldiers working for the SADF and their families, people working in 
trade and industries servicing military structures, and people fleeing the war in rural areas both in 
Namibia and Angola (Tvedten & Pomuti , 1998).  
The fact that the North Central Region29 was the primary area of the war between SADF 
and SWAPO, created racial dislocation but also economic opportunities which led to the rapid 
growth particularly of Oshakati and Ondangwa. However, because of the war, development was 
skewed and artificial and could not be maintained after the withdrawal of the armed forces. In 1988, 
22% of the population were employed by the armed forces. By independence, the majority of these 
people lost their jobs and joined the large numbers of former exiles who were settled in the 
Oshakati/Ondangwa nexus (Pendleton, LeBeau & Tapscott, 1993). The commercial sector remained 
skewed towards the supply of liquor to the soldiers. In 1990, 20% of all enterprises were liquor 
outlets. Today the number of liquor vendors might even have increased as the sale of homebrewed 
and bottled beer is the major source of income for women in informal settlements.   
The ceasing of military operations after independence removed the main obstacles for 
people to move into the towns from the surrounding rural areas. Many people settled in informal 
settlements or shanties in the outskirts of the urban centres. In Oshakati, for instance, more than 
35,000 people lived outside the formal urban boundaries in 1993, mainly in shanties on state-owned 
land. Currently, over 60% of the Oshakati urban population live in 9 informal settlements (Frayne & 
Pendleton, 2003). The informal areas often have poor housing and inadequate physical 
infrastructure. In the case of Oshakati, 64% of the households live in corrugated iron shacks while 
most of the few brick houses are in poor condition. The most common water source is communal 
water taps. There is also inadequate sanitation with over two thirds of the population in these 
settlements using the ‘bush toilets’ (Tvedten & Pomuti, 1998).  
The rapidly growing informal settlements on the outskirts of the northern towns are 
generally associated with deforestation, increased waste management problems, crime, poverty, 
limited access to adequate sanitation and the spread of water-borne diseases. Hence, in recent years, 
several town councils in the north have surveyed large plots of land where they will re-locate 
squatters.  
 This chapter presents socio-economic profiles of the two case councils, Ondangwa and 
Outapi, based on a citizen survey which was carried out in April 2004 as part of our study. The two 
town councils themselves have not carried out resident surveys and socio-economic data are 
generally missing. According to Ondangwa Town Council’s Strategic Plan for 2003-2008 (p. 11), 
“[p]resently, Ondangwa knows too little about the household characteristics of its residents, types of 
                                                     
28 Interview, Uupopo 4 February 2004 
29 Previously know as the Owambo Homeland. 
CMI REPORT LOCAL GOVERNANCE, URBAN POVERTY AND SERVICE DELIVERY IN NAMIBIA R 2005: 12 
 23
businesses and trends in the lives of its population… There is too little knowledge about the need 
for infrastructure investments, access to electricity, sanitation, water and social amenities. Data on 
availability, coverage and affordability of services is lacking. In the same vein demand for service 
levels and affordability are based on assumptions and guess work. Subsequently, a key challenge 
that has been identified is the lack of local authority preparedness for planning and robust decision 
making.” Hence, planning is often based on the impressions council management teams and 
councillors have of the town’s development needs, and they are often guided by political parameters 
rather than facts.  
To our knowledge, this is the first citizen survey providing detailed socio-economic data for 
these councils. The survey covers 376 respondents; 214 in Ondangwa and 162 in Outapi. Each 
respondent provided an extensive characterisation of the members of their respective households. 
The total number of household members covered by the survey is 1,682 giving an average of 4.5 
members per household. The survey covered formal and informal settlements in both case councils. 
The distribution of the respondents over settlements in the two respective town councils is given in 
Table 4.1.  
 
 
Table 4.1 Settlements in Ondangwa and Outapi covered by the survey 
 
Urban council Settlements 
Number of 
respondents 
Share of 
respondents 
(in %) 
Status of the 
settlement 
Outapi Outapi proper 75 19.9 Formal 
Outapi Onhimbu 80 21.3 Informal 
Outapi Kasikili 7 1.9 Informal 
Ondangwa Oluno 23 6.1 Formal 
Ondangwa Ondangwa 16 4.3 Formal 
Ondangwa Okangwena 36 9.6 Informal 
Ondangwa Uupopo 26 6.9 Informal 
Ondangwa Omakulukuma 14 3.7 Informal 
Ondangwa Omashaka 83 22.1 Informal 
Ondangwa Ondiyala 16 4.3 Informal 
Total 376 100,0 - 
Source: CMI & SSD/UNAM (2004) 
 
 
The data presented in this chapter provides detailed information on the household characteristics of 
the residents, including size, education, employment status and position in the labour market, urban-
rural links, and housing in formal and informal settlements, respectively. Moreover, the socio-
economic profile provides information about citizens’ access to services, including electricity, 
sanitation, water and social amenities such as health services and schools. 
4.2 Ondangwa Town Council 
Ondangwa’s history goes back to the beginning of the last century as a Lutheran mission station, 
which was established in 1902. Finish missionaries have been in and around Ondangwa since then. 
Later on the central offices of the Ovambo Native Commissioner were based in Ondangwa. One of 
the more ambitious commissioners had plans to make the settlement a European dominated town. 
This almost happened when Ondangwa turned into a large military base of the South African 
Defense Force during the independence struggle, with the third largest airport in Namibia. At the 
time, much of the war was fought in Ovamboland, where SWAPO had a majority. However, dreams 
of becoming a ‘white’ town were dashed when the more important government offices moved to 
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Oshakati. The withdrawal of civil servants and soldiers arrested the development of the settlement 
as unemployment figures rose dramatically.  
The first Ondangwa Town Council was elected in 1992 in accordance with the Local 
Authority Act. The town was proclaimed in 1997, and became an autonomous town council in 1998. 
Ondangwa is located in the Oshana region, and functions as a commercial centre for the North 
Central Region (NCR). The railway line currently under construction is expected to make 
Ondangwa a multi-modal transport hub of the NCR, further underpinning its central role in the 
region as a business centre. The town is situated in the Cuvelai area and is not surrounded by 
oshanas.30  
The population of the town started to expand in early 1970s when the war between South 
Africa and SWAPO liberation movement escalated. There was a huge influx of people from rural 
areas. Today, about 40% of the town’s population live in informal settlements.31 Currently there are 
eight well established informal settlements in Ondangwa. These are Omwandi, Uupopo, Onguta, 
Omashaka, Omakulukuma, Omahene, Ondiyala, Heka and Okangwena. Our survey covers five of 
these (see Table 4.1), namely Okangwena, Uupopo, Omakulukuma, Omashaka and Ondiyala, of 
which Uupopo is the largest.  
The type of dwellings found currently in the informal settlements has changed from 
predominantly iron shacks before independence to a combination of iron shacks and brick houses 
after independence. Most of the informal settlements in Ondangwa are loosely managed by 
Informal Settlement Committees on a voluntary basis. All committee members are elected, and their 
position often linked to the community needs. For example, Okangwena Informal Settlement 
Committee is composed of a chairperson, a secretary, two advisors, two health officers, garbage and 
refuse removal representatives, and one waterborne community toilets caretaker. 
The Informal Settlement Committees are used by the town council as a link between the 
communities and the local authority. Their functions include among others: aid distribution in 
periods of drought, organising community meetings on behalf of the town council officials, dispute 
mediation between community members, and managing the existing services such as water points 
and community waterborne toilet facilities. Potable water is generally accessible, but access to basic 
sanitation facilities remains the main challenge for the town council. This problem is acute for the 
majority of poor households in the informal settlements. In Uupopo, for example, very few 
households have a pit latrine and the oshanas are used as toilets during the nights.  
4.2.1 Demographic profile 
The 2001 Population and Housing Census reports the total population of Ondangwa at 10,900 
almost equally distributed between men and women (RoN, 2003:21).32 The average household size 
in the Oshana region is 5.4 persons, which include both rural and urban populations (ibid. 44). In 
our citizen survey, the 214 respondents in Ondangwa report 968 household members. This gives an 
average of 4.5 members per household, which is slightly lower than in the census. Of these 968 
household members 54% are female and 46% male.33 Table 4.2 shows that our sample of household 
members is skewed towards young people. Moreover, a relatively higher share of male household 
members is below school age (0 to 6 years). There are also more female than male household 
members in the age group 26 to 35. 
 
                                                     
30 Oshanas are shallow, often vegetated, interconnected channels pans with very low gradients in which water 
accumulates, moves or stagnates, depending on the amount of rain and amount of water from Bie Platteau of 
Angola in a given season.  
31 GTZ, SDPP-Service Delivery Promotion Project, Namibia. http://www.gtz.de/sdpp/english/ondangwa.html  
32 See the discussion of the population size in footnote 1. 
33 The gender of 3 household members in Ondangwa is not reported in the survey data. 
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Table 4.2 Ondangwa: Composition of households by age and gender 
(% of household members by column) 
 
Gender 
Age in 
categories Male Female Answer missing 
Total 
0-6 18.8 11.3 33.3 14.8 
7-15 17.2 19.1 - 18.2 
16-25 17.7 23.1 33.3 20.7 
26-35 20.6 28.2 33.3 24.8 
36-50 18.6 14.3 - 16.2 
51-98 5.9 2.5 - 4.0 
Answer missing 1.1 1.5 - 1.3 
N 441 524 3 968 
 
 
Of the 214 respondents in Ondangwa, 175 live in informal settlements. The survey data reveals that 
just over half of the households have 3-5 members, and the share of households of that size is larger 
in the informal compared to the formal settlements (Table 4.3). In the formal settlements, the spread 
of household size is more evenly divided between smaller, medium and larger families. Male and 
female headed households in the informal settlements, on the other hand, show very little variation 
in size. These data correspond to those presented by Tvedten & Pomuti (1994:27) for the informal 
settlements in Oshakati, which showed a slightly smaller share of households with 3-5 members 
(45%), equal for smaller and larger families. Thus, the share of very large households in Oshakati in 
1994 was (7%), which is more than twice as high as the comparable figure in Ondangwa’s informal 
settlements 10 years later. 
 
 
Table 4.3 Ondangwa: Household size, formal and informal settlements/gender 
(% of respondents by column) 
 
Status of settlement Household size 
in categories Formal Informal Total 
1-2 28.2 18.3 20.1 
3-5 35.9 54.9 51.4 
6-9 30.8 24 25.2 
10-20 5.1 2.9 3.3 
N 39 175 214 
 
 
116 respondents in Ondangwa report being head of their respective households. Among these, there 
are a large number of female headed households (FHH) both in the formal and the informal 
settlements (Table 4.4). In the informal settlements women headed households are in majority 
(57%), while they in the formal settlements make up close to half of the households (45%).34 This is 
substantially higher than the share of FHH (21.5%) recorded in a survey of the Oshakati/Ondangwa 
Nexus in 1992 (Pendleton et al., 1993), and the FHH-share (27%) recorded in the National Census 
for informal settlements in Oshakati (NPC 1994:xiv). However, Tvedten & Pomuti (1994:22) 
                                                     
34 A survey of households in the informal settlements in Ondangwa, conducted by the Town Council in 2003, 
revealed slightly lower figures for FHH in two of the larger informal settlements: 42% in Omashaka, a newer 
settlement, and 48% in Okangwena, an established informal settlement. 
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suggest that the share of female headed households is likely to be deflated in national official 
statistics. They argue that many women in informal settlements stay with men as cohabitants, and 
consequently acknowledge the man as the head of household, particularly if he is employed, even 
though he is not the rightful owner of the dwelling.        
 
 
Table 4.4 Male and female headed households in Ondangwa 
(% of respondents by column) 
 
Status of settlement 
Description Formal Informal Total 
Male 55.0 42.7 44.8 
 Female 45.0 57.3 55.2 
    N 20 96 116 
 
Table 4.5 shows that more than half of the respondents in Ondangwa, both in the formal and in the 
informal settlements describe their marital status as single. Moreover, cohabitation is more popular 
in the informal settlements, while marriage is more common among respondents living in the formal 
settlements. 
 
 
Table 4.5 Ondangwa: Martial status in formal and informal settlements 
(% of household members by column) 
 
Gender 
Marital status 
Male Female Answer missing 
Total 
Single 50.0 52.7 - 51.4 
Married 31.5 29.1 - 30.3 
Cohabiting 7.4 7.3 - 7.3 
Divorced/separated 1.9 1.8 - 1.8 
Too young 1.9 1.8 - 1.8 
Formal 
settlements 
Answer missing 7.4 7.3 - 7.3 
N 54 55 - 109 
Single 48.7 59.0 - 54.4 
Married 22.8 15.2 - 18.3 
Cohabiting 21.1 15.5 - 17.8 
Divorced/separated 2.6 4.5 - 3.7 
Widowed 1.3 3.2 - 2.4 
Too young 0.9 1.3 50.0 1.3 
Informal 
settlements 
Answer missing 2.6 1.3 50.0 2.0 
N 228 310 2 540 
Note: We have excluded household members that are deemed too young to marry, i.e. the age group 0-15, 
leaving a sub-sample of 649 persons. 
 
Tvedten’s and Pomuti’s material from 1994 (p. 20) suggests that in the informal settlements in 
Oshakati marriage was much more common (58%) than our study revealed in Ondangwa today. 
Moreover, cohabitation was considerably less common (only 4%) in Oshkatai in 1994 compared 
with our findings from Ondangwa in 2004. Moreover, while Tvedten & Pomuti (1994) suggest that 
female heads of household are more likely to be widowed or divorced while male heads of 
household are more likely to cohabit, our study finds that the differences between men and 
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women’s marital status in the informal settlements have evened out. However, men in Ondangwa 
appear to be more likely to cohabit while women are more likely to stay single. Perhaps single men 
like to cohabit with single women and acknowledge this, while women are more likely to declare 
being single and count the cohabiting husband as a boyfriend or another dependent, particularly 
when he is not working or contributing to the household. Hence, a woman in her 40’s described her 
cohabitating boyfriend as being “the one who does not contribute but finishes all the food first”.35  
Our study also reveals that only 7% of the household members aged between 16 and 25 are 
either married or cohabitating. As many as 83% report to be single parent households in this age 
group. The number of single parent households is also high in the age group 26-25 (54%). This 
indicates that youth marriages are not very common among the household members surveyed. 
It is also surprising that in Ondangwa the length of current relationships is almost the same 
in the formal and the informal settlements, with the exception that very short relationships are 
somewhat higher in the informal settlements. However, the assumption raised by Tvedten in the 
1990’s, that relationships in the informal settlements are more unstable than in formal settlements, 
does not necessarily hold for Ondangwa’s informal settlements today.  
 
 
Table 4.6 Ondangwa: Length of marriage or cohabitation (% of respondents by column) 
 
Status of settlement 
Description Formal Informal Total 
0-2 years 11.1 17.5 16.3 
3-5 years 33.3 30.0 30.6 
6-10 years 27.8 21.3 22.4 
11-20 years 16.7 22.5 21.4 
20-46 years 11.1 6.3 7.1 
 Answer missing - 2.5 2.0 
    N 18 80 98 
 
 
Almost half of the respondents have relationships which have lasted less than 5 years (Table 4.6). 
This is consistent with the view often repeated in the informal settlements, that many of the 
households are headed by women who ‘own’ the dwelling and rent the plot, and thus remain put, 
while the men who come to live with the women change. If we look at the reasons why men and 
women came to the town, however, we find that these do not differ much between men and women. 
The main difference in this respect is that men are more likely to have come to town to work, while 
women, although listing ‘search for work’ as the main reason, are also more likely to come to town 
to join a husband. Based on the experiences from other countries, we would have expected that 
women also moved to town in order to avoid difficult situations with husbands or parents in their 
rural areas. But none of the respondents in Ondangwa, neither men nor women, quoted this as one 
of their motivations. 
4.2.2 Education and position in the labour market 
Combining the data on the household members’ age and their highest level of education attained, 
education and age seems to be positively correlated until the age group 16 to 25 (Table 4.7). 
Thereafter this trend is reversing, i.e. higher shares of the currently young have progressed through 
to secondary school than the currently mature or old. The share of household members in 
Ondangwa that hold a university degree (diploma or degree) is only 3%. 
                                                     
35 Interview Uuopo, Ondangwa, 2 February 2004.  
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Table 4.7 Ondangwa: Age and education in the households 
(% of household members by column) 
 
Age in categories 
Description 0-6 7-15 16-25 26-35 36-50 51-98 
Answer 
missing Total 
None 88.8 2.8 2.0 3.3 5.7 15.4 15.4 16.6 
Primary 11.2 81.3 19.0 24.2 35.0 30.8 - 33.3 
Secondary - 15.3 75.0 62.1 44.6 30.8 53.8 42.9 
Diploma - - 2.5 4.2 7.6 - - 2.8 
Degree - - - 1.7 0.6 2.6 - 0.6 
Adult education - - - 1.3 1.9 2.6 7.7 0.8 
Do not know - - 1.0 1.7 4.5 15.4 23.1 2.3 
Answer missing - 0.6 0.5 1.7 - 2.6 - 0.7 
N  143 176 200 240 157 39 13 968 
 
Female household members are markedly more likely to have attained secondary school, both in the 
formal and the informal settlements, than men (Table 4.8). However, men are more likely to have 
attained primary school or university education (diploma or degree) than women in formal 
settlements. In the informal settlements very few household members have attained university-level 
education. 
 
Table 4.8 Ondangwa: Gender and education in formal and informal settlements  
(% of household members by column) 
 
Gender 
Highest level of education 
Male Female
Answer 
missing Total 
None - 3.8 - 1.9 
Primary 39.0 27.8 - 33.3 
Secondary 39.0 57.0 - 48.1 
Diploma 15.6 8.9 - 12.2 
Degree 3.9 1.3 - 2.6 
Adult education 1.3 - - 0.6 
Do not know - 1.3 - 0.6 
Formal 
settlement 
Answer missing 1.3 - - 0.6 
N 77 79 - 156 
None 5.7 3.9 - 4.6 
Primary 41.6 35.0 100.0 38.0 
Secondary 43.8 56.2 - 50.8 
Diploma 1.1 1.3 - 1.2 
Degree 0.4 0.3 - 0.3 
Adult education 0.7 1.3 - 1.0 
Do not know 6.0 1.0 - 3.1 
Informal 
settlement 
Answer missing 0.7 1.0 - 0.9 
N 281 386 2 669 
Note: We have excluded household members below school age, i.e. the age group 0-6, leaving a sub-sample 
of 825 individuals.  
 
CMI REPORT LOCAL GOVERNANCE, URBAN POVERTY AND SERVICE DELIVERY IN NAMIBIA R 2005: 12 
 29
Table 4.9 cross-tabulates the data on status in the labour market and age. More than 40% of the 
household members in the age group 16 to 25 are unemployed and are looking for work, compared 
to 30% of the household members in the age group 26 to 35 years. The average for the whole 
sample, independent of age, is 19%. Very few of the unemployed say that they are not looking for 
work. 
 
 
Table 4.9 Ondangwa: Position in the labour market by age  
(% of household members by column) 
 
Age in categories 
Description 0-6 7-15 16-25 26-35 36-50 51-98 
Answer 
missing Total 
Wage employee - - 13.0 36.7 52.2 33.3 23.1 21.9 
Self employed - - 3.0 14.6 20.4 7.7 - 7.9 
Activities in informal sector - - 5.5 15.4 14.6 5.1 7.7 7.6 
Unemployed, looking for work - 2.3 41.0 29.6 10.2 7.7 53.8 18.9 
Unemployed, not looking for work - 0.6 3.5 2.1 1.3 5.1 - 1.8 
Pensioner/retired - - - 0.4 - 38.5 7.7 1.8 
Disabled - - - - 0.6 2.6 - 0.2 
Scholar/student 11.2 93.8 33.5 0.8 0.6 - 7.7 26.0 
Too young 88.8 3.4 - - - - - 13.7 
Answer missing - - 0.5 0.4 - - - 0.2 
N  143 176 200 240 157 39 13 968 
 
 
Table 4.10 Ondangwa: Status in the labour market in formal and informal settlements  
(% of household members by column) 
 
Gender 
Status in labour market 
Male Female 
Answer 
missing Total 
Wage employee 64.8 45.5 - 55.0 
Self employed 3.7 10.9 - 7.3 
Activities in informal sector - 1.8 - 0.9 
Unemployed, looking for work 20.4 16.4 - 18.3 
Unemployed, not looking for work - 1.8 - 0.9 
Pensioner/retired 3.7 3.6 - 3.7 
Formal 
settlements 
Scholar/student 7.4 20.0 - 13.8 
N 54 55 - 109 
Wage employee 38.6 20.6 - 28.1 
Self employed 8.8 15.5 - 12.6 
Activities in informal sector 8.8 17.1 - 13.5 
Unemployed, looking for work 28.1 30.3 50.0 29.4 
Unemployed, not looking for work 1.8 3.5 - 2.8 
Pensioner/retired 3.5 1.6 - 2.4 
Disabled - 0.6 - 0.4 
Scholar/student 10.1 10.3 50.0 10.4 
Informal 
settlements 
Answer missing 0.4 0.3 - 0.4 
N 228 310 2 540 
Note: We have excluded the age group 0-15, leaving a sub-sample of 649 persons. 
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While as many as 55% in the surveyed formal settlements are wage employees, this applies for only 
28% in the informal settlements (Table 4.10). Moreover, almost none of the household members in 
the formal settlements are engaged in the informal sector or reported as unemployed and not 
looking for work. Both categories are much more frequently reported on household members in the 
informal settlements, and women are over-represented in both these groups. Men are over-
represented in wage employment and under-represented in self-employment in both formal and 
informal settlements. 
4.2.3 Urban-rural links  
The vast majority of respondents in Ondangwa (81%), as can be assumed by the historical 
circumstances, have moved there from a rural area. Only 6% were born in Ondangwa and 13% in 
other urban centres. Almost 80% of the respondents were between 16 and 35 years old when they 
immigrated to Ondangwa, and the majority (79%) have arrived since 1990.  
When Pendleton et al. conducted their 1992 survey in the Oshakati/Ondangwa nexus, 69% 
of their respondents, both peri-urban and urban settlers, named the search for employment as their 
main reason for immigration. The second most important reason was what the survey named 
‘Family reasons’ (11%) followed by the war situation (8%) and looking for land (7%). Also in 
2004, search for employment was cited as the most important reason for migrating to the town 
(73%). As many as 80% of the men gave this answer (Table 4.11). With the cessation of war, 
joining relatives, attending school, and marriage, particularly for women, have increased.  
 
 
Table 4.11 Ondangwa: Reasons for immigration to the town (in % of respondents by column) 
 
Gender 
Description Male Female Total 
To find work 80.4 70.5 73.4 
To join relatives 19.6 22.1 21.4 
Attached to town life 13.7 15.6 15.0 
To attend school 11.8 11.5 11.6 
Got married (partner lives here) 2.0 9.8 7.5 
Medical reasons (health care) - 2.5 1.7 
Drought - 1.6 1.2 
Other 9.8 14.8 13.3 
N 51 122 173 
Note:  The respondents may report on several alternatives. 
 
 
The respondents’ relationship to their home village is very similar among formal and informal 
settlement dwellers. As many as 72% and 76%, respectively, say they visit their native village 
regularly, while 24% and 22% of either category visit it occasionally. A mere 2% admitted to never 
visiting their ‘home’ village, all of them residents in informal settlements. We had expected that 
informal settlement dwellers, because of the transient and often makeshift nature of their 
surroundings and their ‘homes’ would have stronger links to rural areas, but this appears less 
obvious than we assumed. Relationships to rural native homes are strong for both formal and 
informal settlement dwellers. However, almost 73% of the formal settlement dwellers considered 
Ondangwa their ‘home’ while 63% of the informal settlement dwellers shared this sentiment. 
Almost 40% of the latter category considered their stay in Ondangwa temporary. 
The nature of the relationship to rural homes is almost the same for formal and informal 
residents, with two marked differences (Table 4.12). A larger share of the informal settlement 
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dwellers maintains fields there regularly (90% against 79%). However, the share of formal 
settlement dwellers building homes in their rural areas is almost twice as high as for informal 
settlement dwellers (21% against almost 14%). Men and women ‘s relationship to rural homes does 
not suggest a marked difference in homestead building, but a larger share of women than men 
maintain fields in their rural homes, keep children there and receive produce from there, suggesting 
that they maintain closer links.  
 
 
Table 4.12 Ondangwa: Nature of relationship to native village (in % of respondents by column) 
 
Status of settlement 
Description Formal Informal Total 
Maintain fields regularly 78.8 90.0 87.9 
Children/parents live there 81.8 80.0 80.3 
Bring remittances regularly 51.5 52.1 52.0 
Receive produce regularly 24.2 20.7 21.4 
Building homestead there 21.2 13.6 15.0 
Other 3.0 2.9 2.9 
N 33 140 173 
Gender 
Description Male Female Total 
Maintain fields regularly 78.4 91.8 87.9 
Children/parents live there 72.5 83.6 80.3 
Bring remittances regularly 51.0 52.5 52.0 
Receive produce regularly 11.8 25.4 21.4 
Building homestead there 15.7 14.8 15.0 
Other - 4.1 2.9 
N 51 122 173 
Note:  The respondents may report on several alternatives. 
 
 
The survey also indicates that men and women in both formal and informal settlements regularly 
send remittances to rural ‘homes’ (around 50% of the respondents). This suggests that rural areas do 
benefit from their relatives in urban areas, even if they live in informal settlements and are generally 
poor or have only limited resources. In fact, as many as 64% of the formal and almost 89% of the 
informal settlement dwellers in our sample judged their household consumption to be less than 
adequate. Only 10% of the informal settlement dwellers considered their actual needs to be covered. 
The corresponding figure for the formal settlements is 36%. In Ondangwa, remittances to rural 
areas featured amongst the most frequent and important monthly expenditure items for both formal 
and informal settlement dwellers (ranked as 4th and 5th priorities respectively, after food, water, 
school fees and transport).  
4.2.4 Housing 
Roughly half the dwellings are brick and the other half iron shacks (Table 4.13).36 However, as 
excepted, formal settlements have almost only brick buildings (92%), while informal settlements 
are divided between iron shacks (55%) and brick buildings (40%). This present picture from 
Ondangwa is slightly different from the one described for Oshakati ten years ago by Tvedten & 
Pomuti (1994). In Oshakati’s informal settlements, 64% of the informal settlement dwellers lived in 
                                                     
36 The other category comprises traditional dwellings and combinations of shack, brick and traditional. 
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iron shacks in 1994 (ibid. 33). In the Oshakati/Ondangwa nexus area, comprising formal and 
informal as well as urban and peri-urban areas, iron shacks comprised 55% of the dwellings in 1992 
(Pendleton et al 1993). 
 
 
Table 4.13 Ondangwa: Type of housing (in % of respondents by column) 
 
Status of settlement 
Type of dwelling Formal Informal Total 
Iron shack 5.1 55.4 46.3 
Brick building 92.3 40.0 49.5 
Other 2.6 4.6 4.2 
N 39 175 214 
 
 
A closer look at the two informal settlements in Ondangwa, the older Okangwena, part of which has 
recently been reserved for Build Together housing, and the much newer Omashaka, reveals that the 
number of shacks per settlement varies. While in Okangwena, 68% of the households live in brick 
buildings, the share of brick buildings in Omashaka is only 19%. Since traditional houses are no 
longer of any importance in urban areas, the remaining families live in iron shacks. 
However, while there is a general perception that female heads of household are poorer and 
are less likely to be in formal employment, this is not reflected in their housing standards: In 
Okangwena, almost 49% of the brick houses were owned or headed by women. This means that 
69% of all female heads of households have some sort of a brick house. In Omashaka where 
housing standards are generally much lower, women also owned 35% of the few brick houses.37 
According to our survey data, the sources of finance for brick houses (Table 4.14), come 
predominantly from the owners’ own pockets (77%). Shack Dwellers Federation (SDF) and ‘Build 
Together’ loans financed only 12% of the brick houses in Ondangwa. Formal bank/building society 
loans make up another 11% of the financing sources. However, there are substantial differences 
between the formal and the informal settlements in this respect (Table 4.14). While almost 84% of 
the households in the informal settlements have funded their brick houses from ‘own’ sources, the 
corresponding figure for households in the formal settlements is 60%. Moreover, while 30% of the 
households in the formal settlements have received loans from banks or building societies, less than 
4% of the households in the informal settlements have received such loans.  Finally, a larger share 
of women (81%) have financed their brick houses from ‘own’ sources than men (68%).  
Table 4.14 shows that the source of financing for brick dwelling comes predominantly from 
own resources in the informal settlements, while loans from  ‘Build Together’ play a small  and 
loans from the Shack Dwellers Federation only a miniscule role. Furthermore, women appear to use 
own resources for brick buildings more often than men. Women also appear to receive loans from 
both the SDF and the ‘Build Together’. This coincides with information received from SDF, that its 
members are almost exclusively women: ‘Men do not want to be associated with poverty, so they 
stay away.’ The majority of loan takers of ‘Build Together’ loans in Ondangwa are also women 
(104 women against 55 men).38  
 
                                                     
37 Data from the Ondangwa Town Council, 2003. The town council’s survey listed all households in the 
settlements. 
38 Information from Ondangwa Town Council, Build Together section, February 2004.  
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Table 4.14 Ondangwa: Source of finance for brick buildings  
(in %, the respondents may have funding from several sources) 
 
Status of settlement Source of finance brick dwelling 
Formal Informal
Total 
Own resources 60.0 83.6 77.3 
Shack dweller association loan - 3.6 2.7 
Build together loan 5.0 10.9 9.3 
Bank/building society loan 30.0 3.6 10.7 
Financial assistance from relative/friend - 3.6 2.7 
Financial assistance from employer 15.0 - 4.0 
Other 10.0 5.5 6.7 
N 20 55 75 
Gender Source of finance brick dwelling 
Male Female
Total 
Own resources 68.2 81.1 77.3 
Shack dweller association loan - 3.8 2.7 
Build together loan - 13.2 9.3 
Bank/building society loan 18.2 7.5 10.7 
Financial assistance from relative/friend - 3.8 2.7 
Financial assistance from employer 4.5 3.8 4.0 
Other 13.6 3.8 6.7 
N 22 53 75 
 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the desire to upgrade a shack to a brick building is greatest in the informal 
settlements. However, while half of all the formal settlement home owners say that an extension of 
their brick building is a priority, the corresponding figure is 27% in the informal settlements. 
Importantly, but not very surprisingly, only 14% of the homeowners in the informal settlements are 
happy with their housing (compared to almost 23% in the formal settlements). Interesting, however, 
is that when the data is broken down by gender, a larger share of men (40%) rather than women 
(29%) are willing to upgrade their shacks to permanent structures (Table 4.15). 
 
 
Table 4.15 Ondangwa: Willingness to improve housing by gender  
(in % of respondents by column) 
 
Gender Description 
Male Female
Total 
Add rooms to my shack 11.5 9.2 9.9 
Upgrade to a brick building 40.4 29.4 32.9 
Add room to my brick building 25.0 33.0 30.4 
No, I am happy 15.4 15.6 15.5 
Other 5.8 11.0 9.3 
Answer missing 1.9 1.8 1.9 
N 52 109 161 
 
 
The observation that residents in Ondangwa’s informal settlements are willing and able to invest in 
improved housing might appear surprising since the rights to their plots have diminished as a result 
of the transfer of responsibility for plot allocation from the traditional authorities to the town 
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council (see chapter 3). As shown in table 4.16, almost all plots allocated before 1989 were acquired 
from the traditional authorities and previous holders. However, plots acquired after 1990 have 
increasingly been allocated by the town council, and the persons occupying them rarely hold any 
rights to the plot beyond renting it against a monthly plot rent.  
 
Table 4.16 Ondangwa: Mode of plot occupation by year (in % of respondents by column) 
 
Year plot occupied, by categories 
Acquisition of plot by 
categories 
1964-
1989 
1990-
1999 
2000-
2004 
Answer 
missing Total 
From the council - 54.5 78.7 50.0 56.5 
From the traditional authority 92.6 30.9 6.7 25.0 29.8 
Bought from previous holder 3.7 7.3 - - 3.1 
Inherited from relatives 3.7 1.8 8.0 - 5.0 
Other - 5.5 6.7 - 5.0 
Answer missing - - - 25.0 0.6 
N 27 55 75 4 161 
 
 
The willingness to invest in land rented from the council is explicable only in the context of 
understanding of rights to plots. Actually, 71% of the respondents in Ondangwa believe that they 
have rights to their plot, of whom 90% believe that this right includes the right to pass the plot over 
to relatives and 76% believe that they can also sell it. While this is true for residents in the formal 
settlements, it is not so for informal settlement dwellers, whose reference point seems to be their 
understanding of traditional rights held under the Traditional Authority rules (which did, however, 
not include the right to sell and mortgage plots). Hence, there appears to be widespread confusion 
about title deeds and land rights, which might have come about by the change from the traditional 
authority to town council. 
4.2.5 Service delivery 
The following table reports the share of households that have access to each of the listed services. 
. 
Table 4.17 Ondangwa: The households’ access to services  
(in %; the respondents may report on all services) 
 
Status of settlement Type of service 
Formal Informal Total 
Water 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Communal toilets 84.6 56.0 61.2 
Garbage disposal 79.5 53.7 58.4 
Electricity 87.2 14.9 28.0 
Sewage 79.5 15.4 27.1 
N 39 175 214 
 
While all the respondents say their households have access to water (in one form on another), only 
61% say they have access to electricity and 27% to sewage. The largest discrepancy in service 
delivery between the formal and the informal settlements in Ondangwa is for electricity, which is 
available for 87% of the households surveyed in the formal settlements, but only for 15% of the 
informal settlement dwellers. Sewage provision is the other service which shows a significant 
discrepancy between formal and informal settlements..  
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Table 4.18 reports the satisfaction with services and whether people have seen 
improvements in these services during the last three years. The results are ranked according to the 
improvement priority assigned by the respondents (i.e. the share of respondents who prioritise 
further improvement in each service; respondents could only select one). The top prioritised 
services to improve, according to the respondents in Ondangwa, are schools, health services and 
water supply. These are also the services that have the highest ‘satisfaction rates’ and for which 
most respondents have seen an improvement in recent years.   
 
Table 4.18 Ondangwa: Satisfaction with service delivery (in % of the respondents) 
 
Service delivery - Ondangwa Satisfied Improved
Improvement 
priority
Schools 36.9 52.3 36.9
Health services 33.2 40.2 15.4
Water supply 32.7 36.0 12.1
Electricity supply 17.3 24.3 9.3
Street lighting 14.5 25.7 8.4
Crime prevention 9.3 14.5 4.2
Road/streets 8.4 16.4 3.3
Market place 10.3 15.9 1.4
Refuse removal 14.0 13.6 1.4
Storm water drainage 0.9 1.4 1.4
Toilets/sanitation 15.9 12.6 1.4
Answer missing - - 4.7
N 214 214 214
‘Satisfied’ and ‘Improved’: Respondents report on all services 
‘Improvement priority’: Respondents specify only one service 
4.3 Outapi Town Council 
Outapi is the regional centre of the predominantly rural populated Omusati region.39 According to 
the 2001 Population and Housing Census, the total population of Outapi is 2,640 equally distributed 
between men and women (RoN, 2003:21).40 It is one of the fastest growing urban centres in 
Namibia. About 50% of the population live in two informal settlements. The town was promulgated 
in 1997, and received autonomy from the central government in July 2002 (Outapi TC, 2003:13). 
The town has been selected by the Ministry of Regional and Local Government and Housing 
(MRLGH) to spearhead the implementation of Namibia’s decentralisation policies. 
4.3.1 Demographic profile 
The average household size is estimated at 5.9 persons in the Omusati region (RoN, 2003:44). In 
our survey, the 162 respondents in Outapi town council reported 714 household members, which 
give an average of 4.4 persons per household (Table 4.19). This figure is lower than in the census, 
but the census covers the whole region, both rural and urban areas. In general, the average rural 
                                                     
39 According to the Census 2001, the Omusati Region has a population of 228,842 (RoN, 2003:19). The 
name ‘Omusati’ is an Oshiwambo word which means ‘mopane tree’. These trees used to dominate the 
landscape during the 1960s. However, as the rural population increased and more land for mahangu (pearl 
millet) was required, the number of mopane trees decreased.   
40 See discussion of the population size in footnote 1. 
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household is larger than the average urban. Of the 714 household members in our sample, 44% are 
male and 56% female,41 which corresponds well with the 2001 Census. 
 
Table 4.19 Outapi: Composition of households by age and gender  
(in % of household members by column) 
 
Gender 
Description Male Female 
Answer 
missing Total 
0-6 12.7 13.6 - 13.2 
7-15 16.8 16.1 - 16.4 
16-25 25.0 29.0 100.0 27.3 
26-35 23.1 26.4 - 24.9 
36-50 14.9 13.6 - 14.1 
51-98 6.3 1.3 - 3.5 
Answer missing 1.3 - - 0.6 
N 316 397 1 714 
 
 
From table 4.20, we see that Outapi has more female headed households (FHH) in the formal 
settlements (51%) while male headed households (MHH) predominate in the informal settlements 
(56%). In Ondangwa the situation was reversed (see section 4.2.1). Generally, we would expect the 
number of FHH to be smaller in the formal settlements. 
 
 
Table 4.20 Outapi: Male and female headed households (in % of respondents) 
 
Status of settlement Description 
Formal Informal Total 
Male 48.9 56.3 52.6 
Female 51.1 43.8 47.4 
N 47 48 95 
 
 
Table 4.21 Outapi: Household size in formal and informal settlements  
(in % of household members) 
 
Status of settlement Description 
Formal Informal Total 
1-2 21.3 32.2 27.2 
3-5 48.0 47.1 47.5 
6-9 29.3 16.1 22.2 
10-20 1.3 4.6 3.1 
N 75 87 162 
 
 
In Outapi, a larger share of the households in the informal settlements tends to be either very small 
or very large unlike in the formal settlements where a larger share of the households has 6-9 
members (Table 4.21). Almost half of all households in both the formal and the informal 
                                                     
41 The gender of 1 household member is not reported in the survey data. 
CMI REPORT LOCAL GOVERNANCE, URBAN POVERTY AND SERVICE DELIVERY IN NAMIBIA R 2005: 12 
 37
settlements have 3-5 members. When we look at male and female headed households in the 
informal settlements only, we observe that about 91% of the female headed households have 
between 1 and 5 members, compared to 67% of the male headed households (Table 4.22). 
Moreover, 33% of the male headed households have 6-9 members compared to 5% of the FHH. 
This is quite different from Ondangwa where there are very few differences between male and 
female-headed households in the informal settlements, and much fewer households have 1-2 
members only.   
 
Table 4.22 Outapi: Household size in MHH/FHH in informal settlement only  
(in % of household members) 
 
Gender Household size 
in categories Male Female 
Total 
1-2 40.7 47.6 43.8 
3-5 25.9 42.9 33.3 
6-9 33.3 4.8 20.8 
10-20 - 4.8 2.1 
N 27 21 48 
 
Table 4.19 showed that our sample of household members is skewed towards young people (0-25 
years) with little variation between men and women. Moreover, about half of the men and women 
of marriageable age in Outapi’s informal settlements are single. 
Only 4% of the household members in the age group 16 to 25 years are either married or 
cohabitating. This indicates that youth marriages are not very common among the household 
members surveyed in Outapi. In both the formal and the informal settlements, women are clearly 
over-represented in the groups of single, divorced and widowed (Table 4.23). 
 
Table 4.23 Outapi: Marital status (in % of household members) 
 
Gender 
Marital status 
Male Female Answer missing 
Total 
Single 66.3 77.5 100.0 73.2 
Married 28.3 16.2 - 20.9 
Cohabiting 3.3 2.8 - 3.0 
Divorced/separated - 0.7 - 0.4 
Formal 
settlements 
Widowed 2.2 2.8 - 2.6 
N 92 142 1 235 
Single 65.6 70.8 - 68.3 
Married 20.6 13.9 - 17.2 
Cohabiting 11.5 10.9 - 11.2 
Divorced/separated 0.8 1.5 - 1.1 
Widowed 0.8 2.2 - 1.5 
Informal 
settlements 
Do not know 0.8 0.7 - 0.7 
N 131 137 - 268 
Note: we have excluded household members that are deemed too young to marry, i.e. the age group 0-15, 
leaving a sub-sample of 503 persons. 
 
According to our respondents (Table 4.24), the majority of relationships in Outapi’s informal 
settlements are between 3 and 10 years, while in the formal settlements relationships between 10 
and 20 years are more frequent. However, overall there are no marked differences in the length of 
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time partners stay together across settlements. In Ondangwa (see section 4.2.1), the duration of 
current relationships of the respondents worked the other way around, with the informal settlement 
dwellers attesting to  frequently either shorter  or longer relationships. 
 
 
Table 4.24 Outapi: Length of current relationship (in % of the respondents by column) 
 
Status of settlement Description 
Formal Informal Total 
0-2 years 10.7 9.4 10.0 
3-5 years 25.0 31.3 28.3 
6-10 years 28.6 34.4 31.7 
11-20 years 28.6 15.6 21.7 
20-46 years 7.1 9.4 8.3 
N 28 32 60 
4.3.2 Education and position in the labour market 
Combining the data on household members’ age and the highest level of education attained, the two 
seems to be positively related with respect to secondary school education (Table 4.25). A larger 
share of the age group 16-25 years has secondary school than the older age groups. However, with 
respect to university education (diploma and degree), the age group 36-50 years, is the relatively 
best educated. The share of household members in Outapi that hold a university degree is 7.5% 
(diploma or a degree).  
 
 
Table 4.25 Outapi: Age and education within households (in % of household members) 
 
Age in categories 
Description 0-6 7-15 16-25 26-35 36-50 51-98 
Answer 
missing Total 
None 87.2 0.9 4.1 2.2 3.0 16.0 - 14.3 
Primary 11.7 83.8 20.0 24.7 34.7 44.0 50.0 33.6 
Secondary - 10.3 67.2 56.2 42.6 12.0 50.0 40.8 
Diploma - - 3.6 12.4 14.9 8.0 - 6.4 
Degree - - - 2.2 4.0 - - 1.1 
Adult education - - - - - 8.0 - 0.3 
Do not know - - 0.5 - - - - 0.1 
Answer missing 1.1 5.1 4.6 2.2 1.0 12.0 - 3.4 
N 94 117 195 178 101 25 4 714 
 
 
Female household members in Outapi are markedly more likely than men to have attained 
secondary school, both in the formal and the informal settlements (Table 4.27).  
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Table 4.26 Outapi: Level of education in formal and informal settlements  
(in % of household members) 
 
Gender 
Highest level of education 
Male Female Answer missing 
Total 
None 0.8 - - 0.3 
Primary 37.8 26.7  31.2 
Secondary 41.7 58.9 100.0 51.9 
Diploma 16.5 11.1 - 13.3 
Degree 2.4 2.8 - 2.6 
Adult education 0.8 - - 0.3 
Formal 
settlement 
Answer missing - 0.6 - 0.3 
N 127 180 1 308 
None 5.4 6.7 - 6.1 
Primary 47.0 38.7 - 42.6 
Secondary 38.9 44.8 - 42.0 
Diploma 1.3 1.8 - 1.6 
Adult education 0.7 - - 0.3 
Do not know 0.7 - - 0.3 
Informal 
settlement 
Answer missing 6.0 8.0 - 7.1 
N 149 163 - 312 
Note: We have excluded household members below school age, i.e. the age group 0-6, leaving a sub-sample 
of 620 persons.  
 
 
The total share of unemployed who are looking for work in Outapi is 9%, but highest for household 
members aged 16 to 35 years (over 16%). Almost 65% of the respondents in the age group 35-50 
years are wage employees, compared to only 17% for the age group 16-25 years (Table 4.27).  
 
Table 4.27 Outapi: Labour market status (in % of household members) 
 
Age in categories 
Description 0-6 7-15 16-25 26-35 36-50 51-98 
Answer 
missing Total 
Wage employee - - 17.4 40.4 64.4 44.0 50.0 25.8 
Self employed - - 8.7 12.4 17.8 8.0 25.0 8.4 
Activities in informal sector - - 9.2 18.5 10.9 8.0 - 9.0 
Unemployed, looking for work - - 16.4 16.9 1.0 4.0 25.0 9.1 
Unemployed, not looking for work - - 5.1 7.9 4.0 4.0 - 4.1 
Pensioner/retired - - - - - 24.0 - 0.8 
Disabled - 0.9 1.0  1.0 4.0 - 0.7 
Scholar/student 11.7 94.0 37.9 2.2 1.0 - - 28.0 
Too young 88.3 1.7 0.5 - - - - 12.0 
Answer missing - 3.4 3.6 1.7 - 4.0 - 2.1 
N 94 117 195 178 101 25 4 714 
 
Not surprisingly, the majority of household members in the formal settlements (51%) are wage 
employees, compared to only 24% in the informal settlements (Table 4.28). In particular, the share 
of wage employees among female household members is higher in the formal settlements (45%) 
than in the informal ones (18%). 
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Table 4.28 Outapi: Labour market status in formal and informal settlements 
(in % of household members) 
 
Gender 
Status in labour market 
Male Female 
Answer 
missing Total 
Wage employee 58.7 45.1 100.0 50.6 
Self employed 7.6 2.1 - 4.3 
Activities in informal sector 2.2 9.9 - 6.8 
Unemployed, looking for work 6.5 10.6 - 8.9 
Unemployed, not looking for work 4.3 4.9 - 4.7 
Pensioner/retired 3.3 - - 1.3 
Disabled 1.1 - - 0.4 
Scholar/student 16.3 26.8 - 22.6 
Formal 
settlements 
Too young - 0.7 - 0.4 
N 92 142 1 235 
Wage employee 30.5 18.2 - 24.3 
Self employed 21.4 16.1 - 18.7 
Activities in informal sector 11.5 24.1 - 17.9 
Unemployed, looking for work 16.0 16.8 - 16.4 
Unemployed, not looking for work 4.6 8.8 - 6.7 
Pensioner/retired 1.5 0.7 - 1.1 
Disabled 1.5 0.7 - 1.1 
Scholar/student 9.9 9.5 - 9.7 
Informal 
settlements 
Answer missing 3.1 5.1 - 4.1 
N 131 137 - 268 
Note: We have excluded the age group 0-15, leaving a sub-sample of 503 persons. 
4.3.3 Urban-rural links  
As in Ondangwa, the vast majority of residents in Outapi (86%) moved there from a rural area. The 
percentage of those who moved in from other urban centres also levels with Ondangwa. However, 
although the number of those born in urban centres is low for both councils, Outapi as the younger 
urban centre has correspondingly fewer residents who were born there. The reasons for immigrating 
to Outapi are also somewhat different to those in Ondangwa (Table 4.29). 
 
 
Table 4.29 Outapi: Reasons for immigrating to town (in % of the respondents by column) 
 
Gender 
Description Male Female Total 
To find work 47.1 53.9 51.4 
To join relatives 7.8 16.9 13.6 
Attached to town life 9.8 9.0 9.3 
Got married (partner lives here) - 11.2 7.1 
To attend school 3.9 5.6 5.0 
Problems in marriage/parents 2.0 - 0.7 
Other 31.4 9.0 17.1 
N 51 89 140 
Note: The respondents may report several alternatives 
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Relatively fewer Outapi residents immigrated in search of employment, even though this is still the 
main reason given for both formal and informal settlement dwellers (51% in Outapi against 73% in 
Ondangwa). Joining relatives and attending school were important reasons for the Ondangwa 
residents to immigrate, but they are much less important in Outapi. Only 19% of the respondents 
gave these reasons in Outapi against 33% in Ondangwa. Gender differentials are also insignificant: 
women are somewhat more likely to have immigrated in search of work, to join relatives or to get 
married (none of the male respondents came to Outapi to join a partner). If finding work only 
motivated half the population of Outapi to leave the rural areas, and other reasons do not feature 
strongly, there must be other motivations for immigration than those listed in the survey. An 
indication of this is that 31% of the male respondents report ‘other reasons’ for immigration than 
the alternatives mentioned.  
Data on the nature of the relationship Outapi’s residents have to their rural village is equally 
different, compared to the data from Ondangwa (Table 4.30).  
 
 
Table 4.30 Outapi: Relationship to native village (in % of the respondents) 
 
Status of settlement Description 
Formal Informal
Total 
Yes, I visit it regularly 72.4 57.3 63.6 
Yes, I visit it occasionally 20.7 35.4 29.3 
No, never visit it 5.2 4.9 5.0 
Answer missing 1.7 2.4 2.1 
N 58 82 140 
Note: The respondents may report several alternatives 
 
 
What is surprising in Outapi is that while amongst the formal settlement dwellers 72% visit their 
rural homes regularly (which equals the figure for Ondangwa), the informal settlement dwellers 
visit their native villages to a lesser extent (Table 4.30). Only 57% visited regularly (against 76% in 
Ondangwa), but they prefer to go there occasionally (35% in Outapi against 22 % in Ondangwa). 
The share of those who claim to have no contact to rural homes is also higher in Outapi (5% overall, 
against almost 2% in Ondangwa).  
With respect to the nature of the respondents’ relationship to their rural homes, we find 
further remarkable differences between Outapi and Ondangwa (Table 4.31).  
It is striking that only 46% of the respondents in Outapi maintain fields regularly in their native 
village (Table 4.31). There are no marked differences between formal and informal residents, while 
there is a slight difference between male and female respondents in that women maintain fields 
more regularly. That women are more likely to maintain fields follows the trend in Ondangwa, yet 
the share who do so is substantially smaller: only half of all women maintain fields in Outapi (as 
compared to 92% in Ondangwa). Likewise the share of respondents who have children/parents in 
rural areas is only a third of the comparable figure in Ondangwa.  
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Table 4.31 Outapi: Nature of the relationship to rural home  
(in %; the respondents may report several alternatives) 
 
Status of settlement Description 
Formal Informal Total 
Maintain fields regularly 46.6 46.3 46.4 
Bring remittances regularly 58.6 24.4 38.6 
Children/parents live there 37.9 26.8 31.4 
Receive produce regularly 19.0 14.6 16.4 
Building homestead there 6.9 1.2 3.6 
Other 3.4 3.7 3.6 
N 58 82 140 
Gender Description 
Male Female Total 
Maintain fields regularly 39.2 50.6 46.4 
Bring remittances regularly 52.9 30.3 38.6 
Children/parents live there 27.5 33.7 31.4 
Receive produce regularly 21.6 13.5 16.4 
Building homestead there 5.9 2.2 3.6 
Other 3.9 3.4 3.6 
N 51 89 140 
 
 
Remittances to rural areas are sent from the formal settlement dwellers of Outapi, which also is the 
case for Ondangwa (59% against 52%). Only 24% of the respondents in Outapi’s informal 
settlements, however, send remittances to their rural homes regularly, with men being overall well 
ahead of women (53% of men against 30% of women). Comparable figures in Ondangwa were 52% 
overall, no matter if the settlement is formal or informal or the respondents male or female. 
Likewise, the benefits from rural contacts, mainly agricultural produce, are much less common in 
Outapi. Only 16% of the respondents in Outapi said that they receive produce from rural areas, and 
this is more common among the formal settlement dwellers and male respondents compared to the 
informal settlement dwellers and women. In Ondangwa, however, produce from rural areas favours 
women and both formal and informal settlement dwellers alike. Also, in aggregate a smaller share 
(in %) of Outapi residents are building homes in their rural village ( less than 4% in Outapi against 
15% in Ondangwa).  
These findings indicate that residents in Outapi are more rooted in town. However, the 
response to the question on whether or not people consider Outapi their home indicates that the 
relationship to rural areas appears stronger in Outapi compared to Ondangwa (Table 4.32).   
 
 
Table 4.32 Outapi: Is town home? (in % of respondents by column) 
 
Status of settlement 
Description Formal Informal Total 
Yes, it is home for me 60.3 58.5 59.3 
No, I am here only temporarily 39.7 41.5 40.7 
N 58 82 140 
 
 
In Outapi, the formal settlement dwellers were more likely to designate their stay as temporary 
(41%), compared to their counterparts in Ondangwa (27%). Moreover the responses in formal and 
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informal settlements are almost the same, suggesting that in Outapi the assumption that formal 
settlements equal permanency, while informal settlement signifies a transitory state does not 
necessarily hold.  
4.3.4 Housing 
Although the informal settlements in Outapi may not give the impression of housing largely 
permanent town dwellers, its residents live predominantly in permanent brick houses (Table 4.33).42  
 
Table 4.33 Outapi: Type of dwelling in formal/informal settlements 
(in % of respondents by column) 
 
Status of settlement Description 
Formal Informal Total 
Iron shack 5.3 25.3 16.0 
Brick building 92.0 66.7 78.4 
Other 2.7 8.0 5.6 
N 75 87 162 
 
While the distribution of various housing types corresponds almost exactly with Ondangwa in the 
formal settlements, this is not the case for the informal settlements. In Outapi, only 25% of the 
informal settlement dwellers live in iron shacks (compared to 55% in Ondangwa). The large number 
of brick buildings in the informal settlements is not due to loans from the SDF or Build Together 
(Table 4.34). In fact these organisations do not feature at all in the informal settlements. Instead 
they have financed 30% of the houses in Outapi’s formal settlements (compared to only 5% in 
Ondangwa’s formal settlements, and 15% in the informal settlements). Brick houses in Outapi’s 
informal settlements are financed almost exclusively by own resources (96%).  
 
Table 4.34 Outapi: Source of finance for brick dwelling  
(in %; the respondents may report several financial sources) 
 
Status of settlement Source of finance brick dwelling 
Formal Informal 
Total 
Own resources 24.0 95.5 57.4 
Shack dweller association loan 2.0 - 1.1 
Build together loan 28.0 - 14.9 
Bank/building society loan 32.0 - 17.0 
Financial assistance from employer 12.0 - 6.4 
Other 4.0 2.3 3.2 
N 50 44 94 
Gender Source of finance brick dwelling 
Male Female 
Total 
Own resources 54.3 59.3 57.4 
Shack dweller association loan - 1.7 1.1 
Build together loan 8.6 18.6 14.9 
Bank/building society loan 17.1 16.9 17.0 
Financial assistance from employer 11.4 3.4 6.4 
Other 5.7 1.7 3.2 
N 35 59 94 
                                                     
42 The other category comprises traditional dwellings and combinations of shack, brick and traditional. 
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In Outapi, as is the case in Ondangwa, loans of the Shack Dwellers Federation are taken by women 
only, and women also make up the majority of ‘Build Together’ clients (Table 4.34). Surprisingly, 
there is no difference between male and female use of commercial loans, contrary to Ondangwa 
where the bulk of the commercial housing loans are taken by men.  
A larger share of Outapi residents are happy with their housing than is the case in 
Ondangwa (25% in Outapi against 16% in Ondangwa). The share of respondents who wish to 
engage in various upgrading projects is therefore correspondingly smaller. Looking at gender 
differences with regard to the desire to upgrade, we note that women are more likely than men to 
improve brick buildings (59% amongst women against 41% among men). In Ondangwa, we do not 
observe similar gender gaps. 
In both Ondangwa and Outapi the same proportion of the respondents consider that 
household consumption relative to need is not adequate, and only about 1% of the residents in 
formal and informal settlements are satisfied with their resources. Moreover, home improvements 
do not feature on the respondents’ lists of important expenditures. For the respondents in Outapi, the 
most important (and significant) monthly expenditures were food, water, electricity and 
site/property rent. Apart from food and water, these were ranked lower by the respondents in 
Ondangwa.  
 
 
Table 4.35 Outapi: Acquisition of plot by year (in % of respondents by column) 
 
Year plot occupied, in categories 
Acquisition of plot, in 
categories 1964-
1989 
1990-
1999 
2000-
2004 
Answer 
missing 
Total 
From the council - 27.6 75.7 50.0 37.3 
From the traditional authority 92.0 62.1 10.8 16.7 50.8 
Bought from previous holder  3.4 10.8 - 4.8 
Inherited from relatives 4.0 1.7 2.7 - 2.4 
Other - 3.4 - - 1.6 
Answer missing 4.0 1.7 - 33.3 3.2 
N 25 58 37 6 126 
 
Outapi’s better housing standards, also in the informal settlements, is not matched by a clear 
understanding of their rights to plots with 70% of the formal and 79% of the informal settlement 
dwellers thinking they have such rights. However, substantially fewer residents in the informal 
settlements in Outapi compared to those in Ondangwa think that these rights include rights of 
selling their plot or passing it on to relatives (45% in Outapi and 54% in Ondangwa, respectively). 
Given that Outapi town council has been in existence a shorter time (Table 4.35), half of all the 
respondents acquired their plots from the traditional authorities (in Ondangwa the comparable 
figure is 30%), predominantly between 1990 and 1999 (62% in Outapi compared to 31% in 
Ondangwa). Moreover, unlike in Ondangwa where overall plot occupation has consecutively 
increased over the years, and peaked between 2000 and 2004, the reverse trend seems to be the case 
for Outapi from 1990 onward. This suggests either an unwillingness to acquire plots from the town 
council or a shortage of plots the council has been able to allocate. This trend is remarkable, 
considering that Outapi is the fastest growing town in the North.43   
                                                     
43 This may also be a result of non-random sampling, i.e. an over-representation of dwellings bought prior to 
1999. 
CMI REPORT LOCAL GOVERNANCE, URBAN POVERTY AND SERVICE DELIVERY IN NAMIBIA R 2005: 12 
 45
4.3.5 Service delivery 
Almost all the respondents in Outapi have access to water (Table 4.36). The coverage of electricity 
is also relatively well developed (70%), while various sanitation services (garbage disposal, sewage 
and communal toilets) are less covered, particularly in the informal settlements. The biggest 
difference to the Ondangwa data is that in Outapi more than 50% of the informal settlement 
dwellers have access to electricity (compared to only 15% in Ondangwa, see Table 4.17). However, 
the Ondangwa informal settlement dwellers reported better access to garbage disposal (54%), 
somewhat better access to communal toilets (57%) and sewage (15%). 
 
 
Table 4.36 Outapi: Services available to households by settlement type  
(in % of respondents by column) 
Status of settlement Type of service 
Formal Informal
Total 
Water 98.7 100.0 99.4 
Electricity 88.0 55.2 70.4 
Garbage disposal 89.3 24.1 54.3 
Sewage 81.3 4.6 40.1 
Communal toilets 5.3 43.7 25.9 
N 75 87 162 
 
The share of all respondents who are satisfied with each of the listed services or who have seen 
improvements in these services in recent years is presented in Table 4.37. The results are ranked 
according to the improvement priority assigned by the respondents (i.e. the share of respondents 
who prioritise further improvement in each service; the respondents could only select one). The top 
three services to improve are water, electricity supply and health services. Interestingly, these are 
the same services that also have the highest satisfaction rates and most respondents have seen an 
improvement in these. This underscores the importance of these three services, as perceived by the 
respondents. 
 
Table 4.37 Outapi: Satisfaction with service delivery (in % of respondents)  
 
Service delivery Satisfied Improved Improvement priority
Water supply 43.8 51.2 29.0
Electricity supply 41.4 40.7 14.8
Health services 34.0 40.1 13.6
Crime prevention 21.0 34.0 8.6
Schools 16.7 22.2 8.0
Refuse removal 23.5 22.2 6.2
Street lighting 4.9 11.1 4.3
Road/streets 1.2 6.8 2.5
Market place 4.3 5.6 1.9
Storm water drainage 1.9 0.6 1.2
Toilets/sanitation 11.1 11.1 1.2
Answer missing - - 8.6
N 162 162 162
“Satisfied” and “Improved”: Respondents report on all services 
“Improvement priority”: Respondents specify only one service. 
The results are ranked according to the improvement priority assigned by the respondents 
(i.e. the share of respondents who prioritise further improvement in each service).  
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4.4 Summary 
The tables below summarise the socio-economic characteristics of the two case councils, 
differentiated for formal and informal settlements, on three aspects: prioritised top five services for 
further improvement, immigration, and housing. In Ondangwa (Table 4.38), schools are the service 
for which most respondents would value further improvements (37%). This compares to only 8% of 
the respondents in Outapi (Table 4.39). Health services, water and electricity supply are all areas the 
respondents in both councils find highly important to improve. 
 
 
Table 4.38 Ondangwa: Summary statistics (in % of respondents) 
 
Status of settlement Ondangwa 
Formal Informal
Total 
School 35.9 37.1 36.9 
Health services 17.9 14.9 15.4 
Water supply 12.8 12.0 12.1 
Electricity supply 7.7 9.7 9.3 
Service 
improvement 
priority # 
Street lighting 7.7 8.6 8.4 
Moved to find work 66.7 75.0 73.4 Immigration** 
Return to maintain fields regularly 78.8 90.0 87.9 
Live in brick building 92.3 40.0 49.5 Housing 
Financed brick by own resources++ 60.0 83.6 77.3 
N 39 175 214 
# respondents report only one service they would like to see improvements in 
** percentage refers to respondents who immigrated from a rural area (N=173) 
++ percentage refers to respondents who own brick dwelling (N=75) 
 
We also see that the respondents who have immigrated to Ondangwa are more likely to have 
migrated in search for work than immigrants to Outapi. Immigrants to Ondangwa are also relatively 
more likely to return to the rural areas regularly, to maintain fields there, respondents in the 
informal settlements more so than those in the formal ones. 
With regard to housing, a higher share of the respondents in Outapi lives in brick buildings. 
Almost all the respondents in the formal settlements in both councils live in brick buildings. 
Financing of brick buildings in the informal settlements is almost exclusively from own resources. 
Own resources is also a more common financing option among the respondents in the formal 
settlements in Ondangwa than in formal Outapi. 
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Table 4.39 Outapi: Summary statistics (in % of respondents) 
 
Status of settlement Outapi 
Formal Informal
Total 
Water supply 25.3 32.2 29.0 
Electricity supply 12.0 17.2 14.8 
Health services 10.7 16.1 13.6 
Crime prevention 13.3 4.6 8.6 
Service 
improvement 
priority # 
School 8.0 8.0 8.0 
Moved to find work 51.7 51.2 51.4 Immigration* 
Return to maintain fields regularly 46.6 46.3 46.4 
Live in brick building 92.0 66.7 78.4 Housing 
Financed brick by own resources+ 24.0 95.5 57.4 
N 75 87 162 
# respondents report only one service they would like to see improvements in 
* percentage refers to respondents who immigrated from a rural area (N=140) 
+ percentage refers to respondents who own brick dwelling (N=94)  
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5 Service delivery: Challenges from the councils’ 
perspectives 
This chapter addresses the challenges facing Ondangwa and Outapi with respect to pro-poor service 
delivery as perceived by the town councils. What are the priorities and strategies of the councils to 
improve services, and to what extent do these strategies reflect the realities facing the councils with 
respect to financial and human resource constraints? How do poor residents feature in the councils’ 
strategic plans?  
The analysis is based on primary and secondary data collected during fieldwork in 
Ondagwa and Outapi in January and February 2004. This includes comprehensive interviews with 
council staff and councillors. Moreover, the councils’ strategic plans and financial accounts have 
been analysed, as well as relevant reports acquired from the central government. During 2004, the 
research team also had meetings with key stakeholders at the central level, including the Deputy 
Minister and senior officials in the MRLGH.  
5.1 Ondangwa Town Council 
5.1.1 Visions   
The visions, strategies and priorities of the Ondangwa Town Council are stated in its Strategic Plan 
2003-2008 (Ondangwa TC, 2003). The vision statement adopted by the council is (p. 8): 
 
As the gateway to the North and beyond, Ondangwa provides all amenities and 
services of a commercial and transport hub. The maximization of benefits from its 
strategic location creates a modern town poised for investments, tourism and 
employment creation. 
 
To achieve this vision, the council has adopted the following mission statements: 
 
Ondangwa Town Council will strive to enhance the living conditions for all its 
residents and provide services in a demand oriented fashion. In doing so it will 
constantly improve on the creation of an enabling environment and facilitate 
equitable development by co-operating and collaborating with its residents and 
stakeholders. 
 
The town council faces severe constraints. In the Strategic Plan these are identified in broad terms 
(p. 32), and include general planning and monitoring capacity, financial management, and technical 
expertise to design and maintain infrastructure projects. Hence, according to members of the 
council’s management team and elected councillors the main problems in Ondangwa are related to 
(i) poor planning and monitoring capacity of the council staff (i.e. human capital); (ii) limited local 
government finances; and (iii) widespread unemployment in the council which constraints the 
enhancement of cost sharing mechanisms for service delivery.  
5.1.2 Planning 
Limited planning capacity, lack of relevant data, etc. represent major constraints for the 
implementation of the strategic plan (Ondangwa TC, 2003). Hence, according to the plan (p. 11), 
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‘[p]resently, Ondangwa knows too little about the household characteristics of its residents, types of 
businesses and trends in the lives of its population…’. For instance, no poverty profile is yet 
available for Ondangwa. The strategic plan refers in general terms to poor people as ‘mainly elderly 
and people living with disabilities who rely on national pensions, poor foster families, female and 
orphan headed households, orphans and vulnerable children and unemployed young people’ (ibid. 
p. 29).  
Furthermore, ‘there is too little knowledge about the need for infrastructure investments, 
access to electricity, sanitation, water and social amenities’ (ibid). In general, data on availability, 
coverage and affordability of services is lacking. In the same vein demand for service levels and 
affordability are based on assumptions and guess work. Consequently, a key challenge that has been 
identified is the lack of local authority preparedness for planning and robust decision making. 
Planning is often based on the council management team’s and the councillors’ ‘impressions of the 
town’s development needs’, and is often guided by political parameters rather than facts. Limited 
internal planning capacity has opened up a market for private consultants. Hence, town planning 
and land surveys in Ondangwa are to a large extent outsourced to expensive external consultants. 
This situation is, unfortunately, not unique for Ondangwa, but reflects the reality in many of the 
newly established councils in Namibia (see MRLGH, 2004b). 
There are several examples on how the council’s approach towards the development of the 
informal settlements has had long term negative impacts on the relations between the council and 
the poorer communities. One example is the sewage lines in parts of Uupopo and Ondangwa, which 
were installed some years ago with funding from the GTZ programme, SWAMP (Sustainable 
Sanitation and Water Management Project). People in the informal settlements in Uupopo and 
Okangwena have different recollections how the decision to build the sewage lines were arrived at. 
Some admit that the council and GTZ had informative meetings with the population where the idea 
of private flush toilets in Uupopo and public flush toilets in Okangwena was put to the community. 
They accepted, even welcomed ‘being given flush toilets’ since many had no toilets at all. 
Apparently, however, people were not informed about the charges imposed on private connections 
in the one and the charges for the use of public toilets in the other case. Some people explained that 
residents just did not consider the costs and were shocked when they could not afford the service at 
all. Others maintained that proper consultation never took place with the local population. They 
alleged that the sewage was the beginning of an up-grading project, where the sewage line was to 
make people upgrade their shacks to brick houses with flush toilets with the aim of formalising the 
informal settlements.  
Incidentally, only three households were able or willing to connect to the sewage line in 
Uupopo, because as the council now admits: ‘Sewage is just not a feasible service for the informal 
settlements’. Even the public toilets in Okangwena fell all but one into disrepair, because the care-
takers cut corners and costs, and customers unable to raise the N$1 for each use stayed away. 
Moreover, the public toilets also contain a shower section, which turned out to be popular in the hot, 
dry season, when residents not only took long showers but also did their laundry there. But the fee 
did not even cover the cost of the water used, since no restrictions were in place on consumption. 
The service has thus not benefited many residents. In fact, many are charged for sewage even 
though they are not connected, but just happen to have a plot next to the sewage line. 
The SWAMP-project has caused other problems, too. Further extension of the sewage 
system has been cancelled.44 Thus, the sewage project was a very discouraging experience, which to 
some extent has blocked further development of services in the informal settlements. The 
experience also affected the way the council and the central government view the financing of 
capital projects in informal settlements in Ondangwa.45 However, according to the Community 
Development Officer,46 the Town Council will consider the possibility of installing VIP-toilets in 
                                                     
44 Interview with the Council Engineer, 20 January 2004. 
45 Interview, Ondangwa TC, 20 January 2004 
46 Interview, Ondangwa TC, 21 January 2004. 
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the informal settlements, but has thus far not carried out a survey of residents’ income levels and 
their ability to pay for the toilets. The Shack Dweller’s Federation of Namibia (Northern Region) 
also argue that people in the informal settlements do not need a sewage system, since sewage 
implies extra costs to build and maintain toilets, plus added water costs to flush.47 Informal 
settlement dwellers need toilets which require minimum maintenance and which minimise the use 
of water.  
5.1.3 Human resources management and governance 
Turnover of staff is apparently not a problem for the council.48 The main  human resource problem, 
however, is shortage of qualified staff. This situation is likely to continue for a while. For instance, 
the organisational structure of the council, which was implemented from January 2003 was 
developed to fit the staffing that was in place then, rather than fit the needs of the town council.49 
There is, in particular, a need for improving the management skills of the CMT. The 
communication flow and dialogue within the council among members of the CMT and between the 
CMT and elected councillors are not optimal. First, internal communications within the CMT need 
to be improved. This applies particularly to the co-ordination between the planning officer and the 
community development officer to avoid duplication and misunderstandings in their separate 
dealings with the communities. Second, the demarcation of powers, roles, functions and duties 
between councillors and the administrative staff is largely blurred. Hence, elected councillors in 
some instances act as executives and thus unduly intervene in the day-to-day operations of the 
CMT. There is thus an urgent need for clarification of the roles and functions of each staff member 
and the councillors. This is also reported as a main problem in the Ministry’s own assessment of 
capacity constraints in Ondangwa TC (MRLGH, 2004b).  
The finance and technical departments seriously lack skilled staff. For instance, the Finance 
Department has only one staff member with a diploma. This lack of skills is reflected in the finance 
reports, which councillors often find hard to understand and make sense of. Even the Town Clerk 
and the CMT say they have problems with these reports. The financial reporting needs to be 
improved in order to make reports accessible to all TC staff and the public, who at present have 
limited access to budgets and accounts. There is also shortage of technical staff, such as planners, 
engineers, plumbers, mechanics, etc. As a consequence, town planning and land surveying are to a 
large extent outsourced to private consultancy firms. This practice makes town planning and 
consequently the development of formalised residential and business areas very expensive and often 
long drawn out, since the expertise available in Namibia in the private sector is also limited.  
In principle, the decentralisation policy encourages grassroots participation in the planning 
processes. In practice, however, stakeholders are rarely invited to participate in Ondangwa TC. 
According to senior council staff the limited participation of informal settlement dwellers, for 
example, is due to ‘poor education and poverty’.50 In fact the council’s strategic plan (p. 20) refers 
to complaints by the community about poor communications between residents and the council, and 
notes a situation of mistrust on the part of residents. The plan adds, however, that complaints by 
residents are often based on ‘unfounded accusations’ (ibid). This contrasts with the perceptions of 
the residents living in the informal settlements, who feel that on the rare occasions when the council 
holds meetings in the informal settlements, their members already have a decided agenda and that 
they use the occasion merely to inform the affected population about those decisions, rather than 
seek dialogue (see chapter 6.1.5). Discussions between the council and citizens in the informal 
settlements are thus rather one-sided affairs, which do not give informal settlement dwellers a voice 
                                                     
47 Interview, Oshakati, 21 January 2004. 
48 Interview with the Acting Town Clerk, Ondangwa TC, 20 January 2004.  
49 Interview, senior council officer, Ondangwa TC, 20 January 2004.  
50 Interview, Ondangwa Town Council, 20 January 2005. 
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to question or even change decisions or plans. This lack of  voice contributes to the noted distrust 
between council staff and people living in the informal areas.  
Many residents in the informal settlements expressed a deep distrust in the local councillors, 
who were dismissed as being just interested in their political position (see section 6.1.5). Local 
councillors in Namibia are elected on the basis of a party list system. While this facilitates the 
application of gender quota, which by law is applied in local government elections, people 
effectively have no choice with regard to the persons actually elected to office beyond their party 
affiliation. Often people do not personally know the councillors. Moreover, the list system means 
that councillors are not tied to any constituencies, and are thus even more elusive. Regional 
councillors, by contrast, were considered more trustworthy, since they were perceived not to be 
directly connected to the council, but rather above the council and overseeing it. Regional 
councillors are also voted for directly from a candidate’s list and are therefore more likely to 
represent know entities. People interviewed claimed that they therefore had more confidence in the 
regional councillors to listen and act upon complaints about the council in their favour, than they 
would in local government councillors. The relationship between regional and local councillors is, 
however, also characterised by limited communication and dialogue. Both local and regional 
councillors interviewed admitted that there existed distrust between them   
By contrast, the council is exposed to substantial pressure by and influence from the formal 
settlements when plans are developed and priorities made, because  residents here are more 
educated, are more secure in their residential rights and therefore have (and are allowed) a stronger 
and more critical voice.51 Thus, even though the needs for service improvements are much more 
urgent in informal settlements, the council’s attention is focused largely on formal settlements.52 
The pressure from the business community to develop and expand the formal settlements is not 
surprising, given that 3 out of 7 local government councillors are businesspeople. Thus, the Council 
Management Team (CMT) has monthly meetings with the business community, but only rarely 
meets informal settlement dwellers. In fact, business interests overshadow the future of informal 
settlements in Ondangwa as they are located in prime business areas along the main road and close 
to the centre, which the business community and the council both wish to formalise to open it up for 
development.   
In spite of these constraints, the survey indicates that citizens in both formal and informal 
settlements have a relatively high level of trust in the town council‘s ability to spend their tax 
money in the interest of the community compared to other public institutions (see Table 5.1). More 
than 46% of the respondents in the formal settlements believed the town council to be the institution 
best capable to spend tax money and revenues in the interest of the community. The corresponding 
figure for informal settlements is 39%. In comparison, less than 25% of the respondents felt that the 
central government would operate in the interest of the community. The trust in the settlement 
committees, while generally strong in Ondangwa’s informal settlements, is relatively low in this 
regard, but higher in the informal compared to the formal settlements.  
 
 
                                                     
51 Interview with the Acting Town Clerk, Ondangwa, 20 January 2004. 
52 Interview, Ondangwa TC, 20 January 2004. 
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Table 5.1 Ondangwa: Citizens’ trust in public institutions in  
(in % of the respondents by column) 
 
Status of settlement Which institution will use money paid in 
tax or service charges in the interest of the 
community? Formal Informal
Total 
The town council 46.2 38.9 40.2 
The central government 20.5 25.1 24.3 
The settlement committee 12.8 18.9 17.8 
The regional government 7.7 6.3 6.5 
The traditional authorities 2.6 2.9 2.8 
The service provider 2.6 1.1 1.4 
Other 2.6 1.1 1.4 
Do not know 2.6 2.9 2.8 
 
Answer missing 2.6 2.9 2.8 
     N 39 175 214 
 
 
Still, corruption is perceived to be a problem in the council. According to the CMT and the Mayor, 
this problem occurs particularly in connection with the sale of land plots (erven).53 But thus far no 
one in the council has been fired due to misconduct. Ordinary citizens also refer to corruption as a 
problem in Ondangwa. As many as 54% of the respondents thought corruption to be a serious 
problem, compared to only 26% in Outapi (Table 5.2).  
 
 
Table 5.2 Seriousness of corruption in Ondangwa and Outapi 
(in % of the respondents in each council)  
 
Urban council Do you think corruption in this town council 
is a serious problem? Outapi Ondangwa 
Yes, it is a serious problem 25,9 53,7 
It is a problem, but not very serious 17,9 10,7 
No, it is not a problem in this council 24,7 7,9 
Do not know 30,2 27,1 
Answer missing 1,2 0,5 
N 162 214 
 
 
In fact, more than 16% of the respondents in Ondangwa believe that corruption has increased over 
the last two years (Table 5.3). The corresponding figure for Outapi is 12%. Moreover, almost 30% 
of the respondents in Ondangwa feel that the level of corruption has remained unchanged over the 
past two years, compared to 42% of the respondents in Outapi.  
 
 
                                                     
53 Interviews, Ondangwa, 19 January 2004. 
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Table 5.3 Changes in the level of corruption over time in Ondangwa and Outapi 
(in % of the respondents in each council)  
 
Urban council How is corruption now, compared to two 
years ago? Outapi Ondangwa 
Worse than before 11,7 16,4 
The same as before - no changes 42,0 29,9 
Less than before 9,3 9,3 
Do not know 36,4 40,2 
Answer missing 0,6 4,2 
N 162 214 
5.1.4 Traditional authorities and the town council 
The Ndonga Kingdom contains a district called Ondangwa, and within it one of the more important 
villages also has the same name. Ondangwa traditional village, which today roughly coincides with 
Uupopo consists of 3 sub-villages led by 3 sub-headmen. The sub-headmen were originally 
responsible for the day to day running of the settlements. Sub-headmen, as is the case with the 
whole authority structure up to the senior councillor of the King, are appointed by the management 
team of the Ndonga King, usually for life. A new headman is appointed only when the old one has 
passed away. Women can become sub-headmen, but they are not able to hold positions further up in 
the traditional hierarchy.  
The incorporation of areas into the town council which were previously held under 
traditional authority happened in the view of the traditional authorities without much consultation. 
Instead the council simply informed the Ndonga Kingdom of the areas where its headmen and sub-
headmen had to cede certain powers to the council. Sub-headmen still exist within the town borders. 
Their roles and responsibilities have, however, changed. They no longer allocate land or give 
permission for businesses, for slaughtering, and they thus no longer have an income from the 
allocation of land or from other fees within the town borders. Thus, the affected sub-headmen have 
a very reduced income base, particularly since they do not receive salaries. Yet, their position and 
functions still exist and the town council even relies on them for certain tasks. Traditional 
authorities still hear and administer some conflicts and they represent the people of their area in the 
structures of Ndonga Kingdom. In general, traditional authorities have lost out through the town 
development, since they have not been compensated for the loss of control and income. The town 
council and the traditional authorities, therefore, have a strained and one-sided relationship not least 
because there are no institutionalised meeting points between the two parties. Hence, the traditional 
authorities feel they are being made use of by the council without receiving anything in return.  
The traditional authorities have in the process lost much of their importance and appeal in 
the informal settlements. People seem to have lost confidence in the traditional authorities’ ability to 
act in their favour after experiencing over and over that they are powerless and need to refer most 
matters to the council. Therefore, relatively few respondents in the citizen survey (20%) say they 
attend the meetings of the traditional authorities (see section 6.1.5, Table 6.13). This is a dramatic 
change given that only a few years back, before Ondangwa was declared a town, traditional 
authorities administered the informal settlements and their residents. By contrast, as many as 63% 
of the respondents in the informal settlements say they attend the settlement committee meetings 
(Table 6.13). In fact settlement committees have taken over many of the functions of the traditional 
authorities in the informal settlements. 
Settlement committees were originally put in place by the town council as a medium of 
communication between the settlement and the town council itself. Unlike the traditional 
authorities, the committee members are elected by the residents of the respective settlements and 
they are able to resign or to be replaced if they prove to be unsatisfactory. In Uupopo, one of the 
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sub-headmen is an elected member of the settlement committee. The original terms of reference of 
the committee were to ‘look after things’, keeping the settlement tidy and liaising with the council. 
In the cause of time, the settlement committees in Ondangwa not only act as the conduit of 
information between the town council and the settlement, but they also involve themselves in 
negotiations and conflict resolutions. For instance, they may exert pressure on residents to honour 
debts, and thus refer cases brought to their attention to the police, the traditional authorities, or to 
the council. Moreover, they keep the settlement clean, encourage better health and hygiene and co-
ordinate other committees, such as for waste removal, neighbourhood watch, etc.  
The scope of the settlement committee has, thus, grown much larger than originally 
anticipated, and the tasks take up most of the time of the members. The settlement committee 
members believe that they should be remunerated for their efforts or receive some kind of 
allowance. More than 70% of the respondents in our survey in Ondagwa agreed with this. However, 
at present the settlement committees do not even receive reimbursements for transport costs, when 
the council calls the committee members for meetings. They are also upset because they perceive 
the meetings with the council to be biased, with the council calling for meetings if and when the 
council needs the settlement committee. By contrast, there is no mechanism for the settlement 
committee to call for meetings with the council.  
5.1.5 Finances and expenditures 
In principle, Namibian local authorities are supposed to be autonomous and self-sufficient (see 
chapter 2). In practice, however, many of the newly created towns, including Ondangwa, are not 
financially viable and run with substantial deficits (see MRLGH, 2004). Councillors and senior 
council staff consider lack of money as the major bottleneck for local government autonomy. 
Political autonomy is in place, but there is no financial autonomy. According to one councillor 
interviewed, ‘autonomy without money is just a political slogan’.54 
Revenues 
Figure 5.1 presents the average income per service in percent of total operating income of the 
council, compared to the corresponding average figures for a sample of 13 town councils in 
Namibia (MRLGH, 2004). The main own revenue sources in Ondangwa in FY 2002/03 came from 
the sales of water (29% of total own incomes) and assessment rates (22%). These shares are 
substantially higher than the average for town councils in the country. Moreover, incomes from 
sewerage and refuse removal (i.e. fees) are also relatively high by comparison. However, since 
Ondangwa has yet to receive dividends from the electricity distributing company NORED, income 
from the sale of electricity was zero in FY 2002/03. By comparison, the national average income 
from electricity sales amounts to 32% of the town councils’ total operational incomes.  
                                                     
54 Interview, Ondangwa, 19 January 2004. 
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Figure 5.1 Operating income by services in % of total operating incomes
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Source: MRLGH  (2004) 
Expenditures 
When comparing the composition of operating expenditures with the national average (composed of 
13 town councils), we also observe some striking differences (Figure 5.2). Hence, while the amount 
spent on salaries and wages for the council staff in Ondangwa represents 26% of total operating 
expenditures, the national average is 34%. However, when it comes to the purchase of bulk water, 
Ondangwa spends a substantially higher share of its operating expenditures on this item (25%) 
compared to the national average (16%). The table also shows that the council’s capital charges are 
0% of total expenditure, which reflects that Ondangwa TC has neither external nor internal loans as 
a financing source for the acquisition of property, equipment etc. (ibid. 86). 
 
CMI REPORT LOCAL GOVERNANCE, URBAN POVERTY AND SERVICE DELIVERY IN NAMIBIA R 2005: 12 
 56
Figure 5.2 Operating expenditure by category (in % of total)
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Source: MRLGH  (2004) 
 
 
Another striking feature of Ondangwa’s financial priorities is that capital expenditures represent 
28% of total expenditures, compared to the national average of 8% (Figure 5.2). Capital 
expenditures are largely funded from accumulated surpluses. Thus, the funds from reserves and 
special funds created over time, amount to N$ 5.9 million (MRLGH, 2004:87). But, although the 
council in FY 2002/03 has commenced to utilise accumulated surpluses to upgrade infrastructure, 
the continuation of this strategy will have to be terminated when these surpluses are fully utilised,  
and no new revenues sources are identified. 
Operating deficits and debts 
In FY 2002/03 Ondangwa town council generated an operating deficit of N$ 4.2 million (ibid. 83). 
Water alone as a trading service generated a loss of N$ 2 million, and electricity a net loss of N$ 1.6 
million. The net loss from electricity was caused by the fact that the council did not receive a 
dividend from NORED that year, while a lion’s share of the losses from the sale of water, was due 
to non-payment of charges by consumers and substantial and unaccounted leakages. According to 
the ministry responsible for local authorities, water losses are currently running at about N$ 100,000 
per month (MRLGH, 2004:83). Moreover, a large share of the outstanding debt owed to the council 
by various debtors, in particular consumers of trading services, are considered as ‘bad debt’, which 
will have to be written off. By end-May 2004, the outstanding debts amounted to more than N$ 8 
million. It is estimated that current outstanding consumer debtors have increased at a rate of N$ 
300,000 per month (ibid. 84). 
How is the debt problem dealt with? One councillor answered as follows: ‘Well, the deficit 
just grows and grows, until the Central Government comes in and covers it.’55 This view was 
supported by the council Treasurer, who said that the deficit is just kept running: ‘There are always 
                                                     
55 Interview, Ondangwa, 19 January 2004.  
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deficits in the council accounts.’ On the expenditure side, according to the Treasurer, the debt is 
partly due to overspending by (some) departments who do not understand budgeting, and partly due 
to non-payment of service charges by citizens. Hence, when the council introduced pre-paid 
telephone cards to be used by council staff, the telephone bill dropped significantly. Overspending 
on fuel and travel and subsistence allowances are also contributing to the deficits.  
On the revenue side of the budget, the main problems contributing to the deficits according 
to the Treasurer, are related to (i) the assessment rates of property, since the rates are not updated in 
accordance with property values; (ii) arrears in property taxes; (iii) arrears in the collection of water 
charges, which is partly due to citizens’ inability and/or unwillingness to pay, and partly due to 
water leakages; and (iv) lack of transparency in NORED’s information to the council on how many 
electricity units are sold, which complicates realistic budgeting.  
The establishment of NORED in 2002 appears to have benefited neither Ondangwa nor 
Outapi as yet. NORED has taken over the electricity supply of all local authorities in the Northern 
Region with the exception of Oshakati TC. All the participating councils, including Ondangwa and 
Outapi, are shareholders in NORED (MRLGH, 2004:25). Both councils complain, however, about 
the lack of transparency of NORED’s information to the councils. In addition, the councils are still 
responsible for the development of new electricity infrastructure. Hence, when new areas are 
developed and settlements are formalised, the councils will have to take the capital costs. NORED 
will thereafter take over the supply and receive the resulting incomes without having made any 
capital investments. Furthermore, no maintenance agreement between the local authority and 
NORED is in place. Hence, the council has to pay for expenditure such as replacement of street and 
traffic lights, while other maintenance is sometimes also carried out by the council due to a lack of 
response by NORED to complaints by consumers (ibid).  
According to information obtained from the council, NORED is required to pay a royalty of 
2 cents per kWh of electricity sold in each local authority. The basis for this royalty and when and 
how often it should be paid to the council is not clear. Moreover, according to MRLGH (2004:25), 
the present royalty rate, once it has been paid, will barely cover current maintenance costs borne by 
the council leaving neither income for investment in new electric infrastructure nor savings. Hence, 
the current agreement with NORED does not seem to benefit the council. 
Non-payment of service charges    
Illegal connections to water, electricity and other services reduce the revenue base of the service 
providers and the council alike. The council considers this to be a major problem, particularly in the 
informal settlements. According to council staff, illegal connections are partly related to the 
residents’ poor ability to pay, and partly to inadequate understanding why it is important to pay for 
services. Ability to pay is also perceived by citizens’ to be a major constraint, as reflected in the 
citizen survey (see chapter 4). The respondents’ major concern with respect to revenue collection in 
Ondangwa is that they cannot afford to pay taxes (Table 5.4).  The second most important problem 
in the mind of both formal and informal settlement dwellers is that council rates are too high, 
reflecting that affordability is indeed a major constraint. The perception that taxes are not spent on 
improving services was ranked as the third main problem or constraint.  
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Table 5.4 Ondangwa: Citizens’ perceptions of major problems in tax collection 
(in % of the respondents by column) 
 
Status of settlement What are the major problems in collecting taxes 
Formal Informal 
Total 
Cannot afford to pay Agree 53.8 54.9 54.7 
Too high rates Agree 48.7 55.4 54.2 
Tax money not spent on improving public services Agree 41.0 54.3 51.9 
Unwilling to pay until they receive better services Agree 43.6 49.1 48.1 
Too many taxes and charges Agree 41.0 45.7 44.9 
Town council is staff dishonest Agree 25.6 32.0 30.8 
Unwilling to pay Agree 20.5 31.4 29.4 
Collectors are dishonest Agree 17.9 29.7 27.6 
Local government politicians are dishonest Agree 17.9 29.7 27.6 
Regional councillors are dishonest Agree 12.8 29.7 26.6 
 
Collectors harass people Agree 7.7 24.6 21.5 
    N 39 175 214 
 
  
However, the citizen survey also suggests that most respondents understand the linkages between 
payment and service delivery fairly well (see Tables 5.5 and 5.6). The problem of non-compliance 
seems thus to be related to poor service delivery and distrust in the invoices sent by the council to 
consumers. For instance, many households in the informal settlements have switched to pre-paid 
water meters, since they then feel they are more in control of how much they pay for water actually 
consumed.  
The vast majority of the respondents (86%), disagreed with the notion that it is not 
necessary to pay council bills (Table 5.5). As many as 93% of the respondents disagreed with the 
statement that ‘non-payment was acceptable if one could get away with it’. Interestingly, a larger 
share of the respondents in the informal settlements (94%) disagreed compared to the formal 
settlements (85%).  
 
 
Table 5.5 Ondangwa: Citizens’ views on the necessity to pay council bills 
(in % of the respondents by column) 
 
Status of settlement Do you agree that it is not necessary 
to pay council bills? Formal Informal
Total 
Agree 10.3 11.4 11.2 
Neutral 2.6 1.1 1.4  
Disagree 84.6 86.3 86.0 
    N 39 175 214 
Note: The category “Strongly agree” merged with “Agree”; similarly for “Strongly disagree”  
and “Disagree”. The tables do not report the categories “Do not know” and “Answer missing”. 
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Table 5.6 Ondangwa: Citizens’ views on paying the bills or not 
(in % of the respondents by column) 
 
Status of settlement  Do you agree that you will not pay 
council bills if you can get away with it? Formal Informal
Total 
Agree 7.7 2.9 3.7 
Neutral 2.6 1.7 1.9  
Disagree 87.2 94.3 93.0 
    N 39 175 214 
Note: The category “Strongly agree” merged with “Agree”; similarly for “Strongly disagree”  
and “Disagree”. The tables do not report the categories “Do not know” and “Answer missing”. 
 
 
Non-compliance by citizens does not explain, however, the revenue shortfalls experienced by the 
council entirely. Water leakages and the subsequent loss of revenues, according to council staff 
interviewed, are also related to the fact that the council does not always know where water pipes are 
located and thus find it difficult to monitor leakages and illegal connections. This information gap is 
allegedly exploited by previous employees dating back to the apartheid era, who have better 
information about the location of water pipes and are thus able to access water illegally without fear 
of being discovered. Data on how much such illegal connections represent in revenue losses for the 
council is not available. However,  while the council considers this to be a major problem, one 
wonders why  the problem has not been properly addressed almost 15 years after independence, in 
locations that, in principle, should be relatively easy to monitor?   
When it comes to illegal connections and bypassing of electricity meters, NORED considers 
this to be a  widespread phenomenon in Ondangwa, particularly in Uupopo and Okangwena where  
informal ‘businesses’  sell by-passed electricity.56  In Omakugumi settlement (close to Uupopo), for 
example, a policeman supplied four people plus himself with illegally connected electricity. He 
charged his ‘customers’ N$ 200 per month.57 Hence, he made a profit of N$ 800 per month, plus the 
electricity he used and did not pay for himself. NORED also suspects that some of their own 
employees are involved in making illegal connections and supplying electricity to others. To 
address this problem, NORED has introduced an award system where those who report illegal 
connections and bypassing are awarded N$ 300 for each illegal connection revealed. Hence, 95% of 
the illegal connections during 2003 (273 people) were reported by ordinary citizens through this 
award system. When detected, the culprits have to pay a fine of N$ 2400 to NORED plus the costs 
of the electricity illegally consumed. Then he/she is disconnected. The reconnection fee in 2004 was 
set to N$ 130.  
5.2 Outapi Town Council 
5.2.1 Visions 
Outapi is a new town and therefore does not suffer the same constraints with respect to town 
planning and development as Ondangwa and other older towns in the North, which developed 
during the apartheid period, do. The town started from scratch in 1997. The visions, strategies and 
priorities of Outapi Town Council are reflected in its Strategic Plan 2003-2008 (Outapi TC, 2003). 
The vision statement adopted by the council is (p.10): 
 
                                                     
56 Interview, NORED-Oshakati, 22 January 2004. 
57 According to NORED, the illegal rates charged by citizens vary between N$ 60-200 per months.  
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Outapi is the jewel of towns in Northern Namibia. Situated in a unique, unspoiled, 
attractive and safe environment it is the preferred gateway to other destinations. 
With its many untapped opportunities for trade, commerce and industry it is poised 
for investments attraction, wealth and employment creation. 
 
In order to achieve these fairly ambitious visions, the council has adopted the following mission 
statement: 
 
As the capital of the Omusati region Outapi Town Council provides efficient and 
effective services to its residents and together with its stakeholders provides 
leadership in developing the town for the benefit of the entire region by building on 
its comparative advantages.   
 
The council has identified three strategic core areas for its strategic plan (p. 10): 
 
1. To build on the comparative advantages of Outapi and to address the untapped potential for 
economic growth and employment creations. 
2. To build a shared vision for the future of Outapi with residents and stakeholders and to 
achieve a high level of ‘buy-in’ and ‘can-do’ spirit for the town’s development. 
3. To enhance organisational, managerial (administrative), technical and financial capacities to 
manage Outapi and its challenges and opportunities and provide services in a client oriented 
fashion. 
 
The Strategic Plan identifies poverty as a growing problem in Outapi, reflected in the two 
expanding informal settlements (Outapi TC, 2003:26) and non-payment of service charges (ibid. p. 
21). Moreover, poor communication between the town council and citizens has been addressed as a 
major challenge (ibid. p. 20). Furthermore, the plan frankly states (p. 25) that ‘it is clear that the 
functions of the Local Authority cannot be fully realised in practice’ due to lack of funds, available 
skills and relevant data for planning purposes.  
5.2.2 Planning 
Limited administrative and managerial capacities combined with lack of relevant data represent 
major constraints for implementing the strategic plan in Outapi. For instance, resident surveys have 
yet to be carried out by the council and statistical data are missing (ibid. p. 25).58 There are therefore 
limited data on coverage and affordability of key services available. Consequently, as also seen in 
Ondangwa TC, planning is often based on guesswork and what is assumed to be the need of various 
groups of citizens, with only limited establishment of facts about actual needs and priorities.  
 
In contrast to what we observe in Ondangwa (see section 5.1.2), direct consultations with residents 
about plans and priorities do take place in Outapi. Three factors contribute to this:  
 
(1) Outapi is a much smaller and more transparent town than Ondangwa, where the council 
headquarter is more accessible to citizens, and vice versa. This might also explain why 
settlement committees have not gained importance in Outapi.59  
(2) (ii) The council management team seems to be aware of the importance of having good 
relations with the communities, as reflected in the Strategic Plan. Resources seem to 
have been provided to facilitate this communication.  
                                                     
58 To our knowledge, the survey conducted as part of this study is the first citizen survey providing detailed 
socio-economic data for Outapi TC.  
59 There are, however, committees for the informal markets in Outapi.  
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(3) (iii) Each councillor has been allocated a ward where he/she meets, informs and 
discusses plans with the residents. Meetings between the councillors and residents are 
held every quarter, and often take place within the communities. Initially, the meetings 
with communities did not involve the CMT, but this has now changed. According to the 
Town Clerk and the Mayor, the meetings are also well attended.60 Thus, in contrast to 
Ondangwa, the elected councillors are more visible and known by the citizens.  
 
These factors may partly explain why the residents of Outapi (Table 5.7) seem to have a higher 
level of trust in the town council compared to the residents of Ondangwa (Table 5.1). Hence, while 
almost 60% of the respondents in Outapi believe that the town council is the institution best capable 
to spending money paid in taxes and service charges in the interest of the community, the 
corresponding figure for Ondangwa is only 40%. There are only minor differences between the 
formal and informal settlements in Outapi on this issue. Also with respect to other factors, the 
differences between the formal and informal settlements are less visible in Outapi compared to 
Ondangwa. The informal settlements in Outapi are to a large extent serviced with water and 
electricity, and houses are more likely to be permanent, i.e. brick houses. But since some areas are 
not yet surveyed, they are referred to as ‘informal’. Poor roads and sanitation are considered by the 
council to be the main infrastructural problems in these settlements. According to the Mayor of 
Outapi61, formalisation of an area also implies removal of shacks, and the establishment of houses 
that ‘meet the town’s standard’, i.e. one house per plot of 300 m2 according to National Guidelines.  
 
Table 5.7 Outapi: Citizens’ trust in public institutions (in % of the respondents by column) 
 
Status of settlement Which institution will use money paid in 
tax or service charges in the interest of the 
community? Formal Informal
Total 
The town council 61.3 58.6 59.9 
The central government 13.3 8.0 10.5 
The service provider 5.3 14.9 10.5 
The settlement committee 2.7 6.9 4.9 
The regional government 6.7 3.4 4.9 
Other 4.0 1.1 2.5 
Do not know 5.3 5.7 5.6 
 
Answer missing 1.3 1.1 1.2 
    N 75 87 162 
 
One problem facing the implementation of the strategic plan is due to the fact that a number of 
traditional houses are located in some areas earmarked for specific purposes, e.g. commercial use. 
Before the residents of the traditional houses are moved, they must be compensated.62 However, this 
is expensive, and the council lacks the means to comply with the ruling. The town clerk questions 
the central government’s position that it will not contribute to the compensation cost of resettlement 
of informal areas, but instead expects the new town councils to raise the substantial funds.63 Indeed, 
only people who live in permanent structures built before the town was proclaimed have a claim for 
compensation. Thus, it was argued by Outapi TC staff that the central government apparently made 
a mistake when the town was proclaimed since not all the council’s area was formalised and, thus, 
serviced. Ongwadiwa TC, for example, which is often pointed out as a model TC, was fully 
serviced when it was proclaimed. 
                                                     
60 Interview, Outapi town council, 27 January 2004. 
61 Interview, Outapi, 27 January 2004. 
62 Interview with the Planning Officer, Outapi town council, 26 January 2004. 
63 Interview with the Town Clerk, Outapi town council, 23 January 2004.  
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5.2.3 Human resources management and governance  
The council employs 36 people, of whom 16 were seconded from the MRLGH in 2002 when the 
town was proclaimed.64 Still, there is a shortage of qualified staff in some departments. In January 
2004, the Urban Development and Planning Department had only one qualified building inspector. 
Moreover, the Operation and Maintenance Department lack some qualified staff. The CMT also 
argues that there is a need to employ a local economic development officer and a registry clerk in 
the Human Resources Department. However, according to the CMT, the Finance Department is 
relatively well staffed compared to many other town councils, with two trained accountants out of 
six staff members. In the short run, there is a need to strengthen the budgeting process (see also 
MRLGH, 2004b). At present the council has no internal auditor. Instead it relies on technical 
support from the MRLGH to pre-audit the annual financial statement before it is submitted to the 
Auditor General.  
As observed in Ondangwa (see section 5.1.3), the demarcation of roles and functions 
between elected councillors and the CMT is not clear. According to council staff several councillors 
do not sufficiently understand their roles and responsibilities, apparently because they lack formal 
education. This is reflected in ineffective and poorly attended council meetings. Moreover, 
councillors intervene in the day-to-day operations of the council, as reported from Ondangwa and 
other town councils in Namibia (MRLGH, 2004b). Accordingly, it is argued, there is a need for 
councillors to be trained when they are newly elected. Moreover, the Councillors’ Manual ought to 
be translated into the local language to make it accessible to all councillors.  
While cases of corruption have been reported, for instance in the Treasury, council staff 
claimed that this was not a major problem in Outapi. This is also reflected by the results of the 
citizen survey, with less than 26% of the respondents stating corruption as a problem in Outapi 
(Table 5.2). The corresponding figure for Ondangwa is 54 %.  
5.2.4 Traditional authorities and the town council 
As noted above, councillors in Outapi have shared out the town wards amongst themselves creating 
a quasi constituency set-up. This implies that residents of the informal (and also formal) settlements 
have been able to identify with certain councillors, even if they did not specifically vote for them. 
Perhaps for this reason, regional councillors carry relatively less weight in Outapi. Moreover, 
settlement committees are also of relatively lesser importance in Outapi than is the case in 
Ondangwa, where they are the favoured communication channels for informal settlement dwellers 
and have taken over functions from the traditional authorities. In Outapi by contrast, it has been the 
Town Council that has taken over tasks from the traditional authorities, leaving out the intermediary 
settlement committees. In fact, both the Town Council and the traditional authority meetings are 
more popular in Outapi than they are in Ondangwa. The more limited role of settlement committees 
might be due to the fact that Outapi is a younger town, where the council’s functions might not have 
been fully established and realised. Outapi Town Council appears, so far, more accessible to its 
citizens and does perhaps not require meditation in their relations to them.  
The problems between traditional authority structures and the town council, however, are as 
uneasy as they are in Ondangwa, even though the talk is of co-operation. Outapi used to be a village 
where the traditional authority was ‘the boss’, a situation that has been challenged by the Town 
Council. Hence, a council officer stated: “There is no headman in Outapi – the headman is the 
council!” There are, however, implicit conflicts between the council and traditional authorities. 
These are exemplified by the council’s accusation that traditional leaders ‘wilfully want to thwart 
the progress of the council’, allegedly proven by the fact that not all residents come to community 
meetings called by the council. Moreover, here as in Ondangwa, scheduled meetings between town 
                                                     
64 Interview, Head of Human Resources Department, Outapi TCV, 27 January 2004.  
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council and traditional authorities do not exist, and it is again mostly the town council that 
approaches the traditional authorities, rather than the other way round. 
The traditional authorities feel that they still have a major role to play in conflict resolution, 
however, also within the borders of the town. People know the traditional authorities and they still 
come and consult them about all matter of problems. Traditional authorities, however, are only able 
to assist people with problems that concern traditional matters.65 Beyond that members of the 
traditional authority cannot make decisions about the development of the town, because there is no 
law that can guide them in taking decisions over the town council’s land. They have to follow the 
laws of the town and are hemmed by the fact that they have to refer many cases concerning service 
delivery, for example, to the town council. The traditional authority members, however, act to some 
degree as middleman or brokers between the Town Council and citizens, such as when people must 
be persuaded to move in order to make way for town developments. This applies, of course, 
particularly to persons who reside in traditional structures on land that now is under the control of 
the town council.  
People see the traditional authority as an ally against the council in cases regarding payment 
for services or the quality of service delivery. For people who see the traditional authority as the 
authority of the people, the experience of being referred back to the council can shake their 
confidence. Hence, to improve and strengthen the trust relations between the council, traditional 
authorities and the residents, the council should consider engaging a member of the traditional 
authority within the council itself in order to interpret customary law and the attitudes of the people, 
and to provide a linkage between traditional authority and council. Regular, institutionalised 
meetings between the two bodies are essential for the creation of trust and partnership. 
5.2.5 Finances and expenditures 
Revenues 
As a newly established town council, Outapi receives a substantial operational subsidy from the 
central government (MRLGH, 2004:101).66 Water fees are the second largest income source, and 
accounted for almost 12% of total income in FY 2002/03 (see Figure 5.1). However, the importance 
of water as a revenue source is substantially lower than the national average (21% of total incomes) 
and much lower than in Ondagwa (29%). Incomes from refuse removal and sewage are also 
marginal compared to both Ondangwa and the national average.  
According to the council Treasurer67, the major challenges facing Outapi with respect to 
enhanced revenue generation are (i) the council’s narrow revenue base; (ii) citizens’ inability to pay 
for services due to poverty; and (iii) citizens’ unwillingness to pay or their non-compliance with 
rules and regulations. Generally, compliance is a problem when citizens experience that few 
services are returned for their tax and rate payments. It would thus seem to informal settlement 
dwellers that they pay for nothing, or they pay for the formal settlements, where they see services 
being provided. 
To enhance revenue collection, the council tried in the past to engage community leaders to 
collect site rates and hawker fees in informal settlements, where the delivery of bills is difficult 
because residents lack post boxes or firm addresses. The attempt failed because the community 
collectors received no payment and thus lacked incentives to collect. In 2003, the collection of site 
rates and business and hawkers fees in Unhimbu was outsourced to private collectors who were 
from the area. The Town Council hosted a meeting in Unhimbu asking the community to elect three 
                                                     
65 Interview, Outapi, 29 January 2004 
66 Two other newly established towns also receive operational subsidies from the central government, namely 
Eenhana and Opuwo. 
67 Interview, Outapi TC, 26 January 2004.  
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persons as debt collectors in their settlement. Three women were elected, who were known to be 
reliable and trustworthy.68 They had lists of households and fees outstanding and walked from 
house to house to demand payment against receipts. People with outstanding debts were allowed to 
pay in instalments if a once off payment appeared to be too large. Because there were no fixed times 
for collection the three women considered the work well since it was flexible and allowed them to 
get on with their domestic chores. They were paid 15% of the amount they collected.  
Initially the outsourced system of revenue collection was successful. During the first three 
months the women could collect up to N$ 1,500 each, which implied that they could each make 
N$225, a substantial salary for a few days work. Thereafter revenue collection dropped and it 
became increasingly difficult to collect the rates. Now they had to work every day, and still they 
collected only N$ 500 per month, if they were lucky. This not only meant that they worked more, 
but they also earned much less. They also faced other problems such as lack of security for the 
money they collected. According to the CMT, collection dropped because ratepayers perceived that 
there were no sanctions against tax defaulters, and the women lacked tangible back-up from the 
council when ratepayers resisted paying.69 Moreover, the income of the debt collectors might have 
been too small to create proper incentives for efficient collection. The women complained to the 
council about the increased workload and decline in salary, which left them close to destitute 
because they all felt unable to continue with their informal business activities, which formed the 
basis of their income prior to becoming debt collectors. But the council maintained that their salary 
depended on their effectiveness, without offering backup. Based on these experiences the council 
abolished the system of privatised debt collection. However, later in 2004 the three debt collectors 
of Unhimbu were engaged as supervisors of the Outapi open market. 
Further measures are required and should be encouraged to improve revenue collection and 
to reduce the extent of illegal connections, particularly with respect to water supply. However, it is 
unrealistic to expect that Outapi TC will become financially independent in the short to medium 
term. Without continued and increasing grants from the central government, the council is unlikely 
to sustain even its current level of service provision to the citizens.  
Expenditures 
The composition of Outapi’s expenditures is presented in Figure 5.2 above. As for Ondangwa, 
expenditures for salaries and wages are less than the national average. Interestingly, the share of 
expenditures for the purchase of water in bulk represents only 13% of total expenditures, as 
compared to the national average of 16% (and 25% for Ondangwa). Moreover, expenditures on 
maintenance and repairs of infrastructure and buildings are almost zero, compared to the national 
average of 5%. This raises concerns that existing infrastructure is not properly maintained. The net 
loss from sales of water may indicate poor maintenance of the water distribution system leading to 
substantial leakages. Capital charges represent only 3% of the total expenditures (as the council has 
a small external loan), far below the national average (7%), but higher than in Ondangwa (0%). 
Capital expenditures, however, represent 34% of total expenditures, compared to the national 
average of 8%. Outapi shares this feature with Ondangwa, and it probably reflects the council’s 
financial priorities.  
A recent study of local government finances and fiscal gaps commissioned by the ministry 
responsible for local authorities (MRLGH, 2004:104) concludes that ‘it appears that the Town 
Council does not have the financial capacity to improve services in the informal areas over a 
relatively long period of time’. The study also questions whether comprehensive services can be 
rendered on a sustainable basis in Outapi. Since the majority of residents who currently do not 
receive services are not in formal employment, the ability of the Town Council to recover the cost 
of extending services is doubtful. Furthermore, due to the existing high tariff structure and the fact 
                                                     
68 Interview, Outapi, 27 Janaury 2004. 
69 Interview with the CMT, Outapi TC, 23 January 2004. 
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that the number of households in formal settlements is less than the number of households in 
informal settlements, it is unlikely that the Town Council will be in a position to cross-subsidise 
impoverished consumers. 
Operating deficits and debts 
The operating deficit in FY 2002/03 was N$ 956,000. The lion’s share of the deficit derived from 
net losses from trading services, in particular from electricity and water. As for Ondangwa, NORED 
did not pay any dividend to Outapi in FY 2002/03 (see section 5.1.5). Sales of water also generated 
a substantial net loss, although incomes from water trading were higher than the national average 
(Figure 5.1).  
Non-payment of service charges  
Illegal connections to water supply are considered to be a problem by the council. Residents also 
noted that illegal electricity connections were common.70 Some electricians were said to make a 
living out of supplying illegal connections and stealing fuse boxes. The reason for the large number 
of illegal connections allegedly was that electricity used to be supplied free of charge and that 
people now refused to pay There seem to be only minor differences between formal and informal 
settlements with respect to illegal water and electricity connections. Accordingly, most of the 
houses which were cut-off from the council’s water supply due to illegal connections in 2003 were 
located in the formal settlements. This reflects to some extent the fact that in Outapi the problems 
surrounding water and electricity supplies appear not substantially different in formal and informal 
settlements, respectively. In Ondangwa, by contrast, the gap between formal and informal 
settlements is very large, to the disadvantage of the informal areas. This difference between the two 
case councils is mirrored in citizens’ perceptions of major problems in revenue collection. While 
inability to pay (affordability) and high rates were perceived to be the major problems in Ondangwa 
(Table 5.4), the majority of the respondents in Outapi (60%) said that the main problem was that 
revenues collected were not spent on improving services (Table 5.8). A higher share of the 
respondents in informal Outapi (63%) than in the formal areas (56%) gave this answer.   
 
Table 5.8 Outapi: Citizens’ perceptions of major problems in tax collection  
(in % of the respondents) 
 
Status of settlement What are the major problems in collecting taxes 
Formal Informal 
Total 
Tax money not spent on improving public services Agree 56.0 63.2 59.9 
Too many taxes and charges Agree 62.7 52.9 57.4 
Cannot afford to pay Agree 53.3 51.7 52.5 
Too high rates Agree 57.3 41.4 48.8 
Unwilling to pay until they receive better services Agree 30.7 55.2 43.8 
Unwilling to pay Agree 26.7 31.0 29.0 
Collectors are dishonest Agree 17.3 13.8 15.4 
Town council is staff dishonest Agree 13.3 14.9 14.2 
Collectors harass people Agree 9.3 13.8 11.7 
Local government politicians are dishonest Agree 8.0 10.3 9.3 
 
Regional councillors are dishonest Agree 6.7 10.3 8.6 
    N 75 87 162 
  
                                                     
70 Interviews, Unhimbu, 28 January 2004. 
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The majority of the respondents in Outapi (61%), although fewer than in Ondangwa (86%), 
disagreed with the notion that it is not necessary to pay council bills (Table 5.9). Similar views were 
expressed when asked if non-payment would be acceptable if one could get away with it (67%), 
compared to 93% in Ondangwa. However, respondents in informal Outapi stand out as those least 
likely to have views consistent with the majority of respondents. This might be due to the fact that 
relatively few of the respondents in informal Outapi reported receiving accounts from the council, 
but were more likely to make payments directly to debt collectors. Therefore, the views expressed 
here might reflect their perceptions of these collectors as much as their willingness to pay for 
services rendered. 
 
Table 5.9 Outapi: Citizens’ views on the necessity to pay council bills  
(in % of the respondents by column) 
 
Status of settlement Do you agree that it is not necessary 
to pay council bills? Formal Informal
Total 
Agree 10.7 37.9 25.3 
Neutral 9.3 8.0 8.6  
Disagree 77.3 46.0 60.5 
    N 75 87 162 
Note: The category “Strongly agree” merged with “Agree”; similarly for “Strongly disagree” and “Disagree”. 
The tables do not report the categories “Do not know” and “Answer missing”. 
 
Table 5.10 Outapi: Citizens’ views on paying the bills or not in Outapi 
(in % of the respondents by column) 
 
Status of settlement Do you agree that you will not pay 
council bills if you can get away with it? Formal Informal
Total 
Agree 9.3 23.0 16.7 
Neutral 8.0 10.3 9.3  
Disagree 80.0 56.3 67.3 
    N 75 87 162 
Note: The category “Strongly agree” merged with “Agree”; similarly for “Strongly disagree” and “Disagree”. 
The tables do not report the categories “Do not know” and “Answer missing”. 
5.3 Summary  
Limited planning capacity, combined with lack of relevant data and statistics represent major 
constraints for the implementation of the council plans in both Ondangwa and Outapi. In general, 
data on availability, coverage and affordability of services is lacking. For instance, no socio-
economic profiles are yet available in the two councils. Thus, there is limited knowledge about the 
needs for infrastructure investments, access to electricity, sanitation, water etc. Subsequently, a key 
weakness that has been identified is the lack of local authority preparedness for planning and robust 
decision-making. Although some direct consultations with residents about plans and priorities take 
place in Outapi, planning in both councils is still largely based on guesswork rather than established 
facts of citizens needs. This limited internal planning capacity has opened a market for private 
consultants. Hence, town planning and land surveys in both councils are to a large extent outsourced 
to external consultants, making surveying even more expensive than it would be, if council staff 
would be able to do the job. 
The roles and functions of councillors and council staff also need be delineated. The 
demarcation of powers, functions and duties are to date unclear. Political interventions of the 
councillors in the day-to-day operations of the councils are but one example of this. Moreover, the 
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functions of the regional councils are not very clear either. If the regional councils are meant to 
serve as a co-ordinating agency for the central ministries, this function should be spelled out. 
However, the financial resources currently available to regional councils are too small for any major 
investments. 
Lack of qualified personnel to take charge of implementation, maintenance of 
infrastructure, financial management and accounting is a major constraint Ondangwa and Outapi 
town councils have in common. Outapi, however, seems as yet to be in a slightly better position in 
this respect. Considering the inadequate financial resources at the disposal of the towns and the 
short supply of qualified engineers and accountants willing to work with the councils, one possible 
approach might be that adjoining towns jointly hire a small number of such personnel and share 
their services. There is a good case for provision of joint financial accounting, for instance, since the 
towns are in general of modest size.71 
In principle, Ondangwa and Outapi town councils are supposed to be autonomous and self-
sufficient bodies. In practice, however, neither council is as yet financially viable. Assessment rates 
and charges on local services, particularly water, comprise the major revenue sources. In both 
councils there is a potential to improve collection efficiency, for instance by outsourcing revenue 
collection. But, the mixed experiences from Outapi with privatised collection of site rates and fees 
in 2003, shows that further outsourcing requires proper planning, including training of the 
collectors. Moreover, some revenue sources might be less appropriate for outsourcing than others. 
To enhance citizens’ compliance, stronger links between payment of charges and service delivery 
are required.  
NORED has taken over the electricity supply of all local authorities in the Northern 
Region with the exception of Oshakati TC. However, the establishment of NORED in 2002 
seems to have benefited neither Ondangwa nor Outapi. Both councils complain about the 
lack of transparency of NORED’s information sharing with the councils. In addition, the 
councils are still responsible for the development of new electricity infrastructure. When 
new areas are developed and settlements are formalised, the councils will have to take the 
capital costs. Furthermore, no maintenance agreement between the local authorities and 
NORED is in place. The councils’ agreement with NORED thus needs to be re-negotiated. 
Finally, systematic monitoring of the financial performance of local authorities in Namibia 
is almost entirely missing. Although the town councils submit their budget to the MRLGH and their 
financial statements to the Auditor General, no government body maintains a database on local 
finances and expenditure allocations. To some extent this is due to lack of standardised accounting 
practices and computerisation. Yet, the potential benefit of establishing and maintaining such a 
database are likely to be substantial.   
                                                     
71 The current situation is not much different compared to the one observed by Kim (1993) more than a 
decade ago. 
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6 Service delivery: Challenges from the citizens’ 
perspectives 
This chapter examines challenges facing Ondangwa and Outapi with respect to service delivery as 
perceived by the citizens of the two town councils. What is the availability of key services in formal 
and informal settlements, respectively? How do poor people cope with inadequate service delivery? 
Moreover, what are the priorities of the residents with respect to improved service delivery, and 
how do these priorities compare with the councils’ strategies? Are there any differences in this 
respect between people living in Ondangwa and Outapi, and between residents of formal and 
informal settlements? How do we explain eventual differences?  
The analysis in this chapter is based on citizen surveys and interviews with residents, 
councillors and community-based organisations. The surveys in Ondangwa and Outapi were 
conducted in April 2004 and covered 376 respondents in ten different settlements, four of them 
formal and six informal (see section 4.1). In Ondangwa 18% of the respondents came from the two 
formal settlements, while the majority (82%) came from various informal settlements. Some of 
these informal settlements are well established, like Okangwena and Uupopo, while others are 
newer, such as Omashaka and Ondiyala. In Outapi, 46% of the respondents resided in the one 
formal settlement, the centre of Outapi, while the rest came from the two informal settlements, of 
whom the vast majority reside in Unhimbu. In addition to the survey material, we also interviewed a 
number of individuals, representatives of community-based organisations, local and traditional 
authorities and community based authority structures, such as settlement committees. Open-ended 
interviews took place between January and February 2004 with residents and community 
organisations working in Uupopo and Omashaka as well as in Unhimbu. In all three settlements the 
assistance of settlement committees to identify respondents who were considered representative of 
the settlement and its population structure was sought. In addition, residents were randomly and 
without inside guidance approached. No interviews were conducted with residents or organisations 
active in the formal settlements. 
6.1. Ondangwa 
6.1.1 The settlements  
The two oldest informal settlements, Uupopo and Okangwena were established during the boom 
area of Ondangwa in the 1970s. The characteristics of Uupopo reflect its origin as a settlement 
where SADF soldiers kept their wives and/or girlfriends, and where they spent their free time 
outside barrack life. Okangwena, however, was the settlement of service providers for the SADF 
staff. The supply of liquor (homebrewed and factory made) and cooked food, ukapana, and 
presumably prostitution, were main sources of income for the black population. Many rural women, 
attracted by the business potential of the soldiers, moved to Ondangwa. Since the formal 
settlements, under the apartheid laws, were forbidden to Africans who were not attached to the 
army, the informal settlements rose to prominence. This pattern has not changed until today. 
Uupopo and Okangwena are still centres for service provision. Located along the main road they 
draw a clientele also from the formal parts of town, civil servants, as well as passers-by. The 
majority of households in the two settlements sell either liquor and/or ukapana. In Uupopo business 
practically never closes, as local beer and spirits, together with the various foods are consumed 
around the clock. In Okangwena civil servants seek out informal eating places for their lunch break 
and early evening relaxation. Uupopo and Okangwena are, thus, lively places, where people meet 
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and relax. Its residents, however, face problems that their better off outside customers might not be 
aware of or care about. Some of these problems relate to the chronic lack of formal employment, 
limited informal employment possibilities, and unsatisfactory service provision from the council.   
Okangwena is divided into two areas, one where informal buildings predominate and 
another part, which has recently been allocated to Build Together project houses. The more informal 
part of the settlement borders on the main road and represents the original settlement. Many of the 
plots in this part of the settlement are registered in the name of women who have been long-term 
residents. Some have managed to upgrade shacks into brick houses, others have been content to 
remain in the shacks they moved into when they first came to town. Most of the women make a 
living from informal sector activities, selling local beer and spirits, which do not require 
refrigeration, while those who are connected to electricity and own a fridge are selling chilled soft 
drinks and bottled beer. Others also sell snacks, such as boiled eggs, fried fish and fat cakes, or local 
dishes. Some of these businesses have expanded into informal restaurants, with tables, waiters and 
extended menus. 
Uupopo is more mixed, with fewer female heads of household, more proper bars and shops, 
regular supermarkets, a grinding mill, a market and even a shop selling guns. But here too, the 
majority of the population survives on ‘selling something’. Often this is local beer and spirits, for 
which there is a seemingly never-ending demand, as well as ukapana. Even in cases where 
households have a main income from the formal sector, informal sector activities are used to 
supplement incomes. In both informal settlements cuca shops, where ‘something’ is sold, is the 
basis of income generation. 
 
Box 6.1: Beer, beer and beer again 
P’s wife brews local beer, and her business is thriving. Her courtyard is surrounded by a number 
of buildings made of corrugated iron, bits of wood and mud and straw, is always freshly raked. 
Improvised chairs and tables are arranged under trees in the shade, her daughters help, while the 
grand children play in the yard amongst the beer drinking customers. Her place is never empty. 
Even in the early morning customers demand her local brew to start the day with a buzz. Many of 
her customers are civil servants, police officers, soldiers who mingle with local dignitaries 
involved in the settlement committee, drunks and settlement ‘clowns’ who come to beg for free 
beer. P is an electrician and a tailor, trades he learned while in exile for over 20 years. But even 
though he does occasional business, his pension of N$ 250 is his main income.  
 
His wife’s Cuca shop/bar feeds the family of 13, including 5 grown-up children, 4 grandchildren 
and 2 relatives. The success of the business has allowed the family to connect to water and 
electricity. But income has not been enough to upgrade their collection of shacks to a brick 
building, one of the biggest dreams of P, aged 67. Even though his wife runs a successful ‘bar’, P. 
is off many evenings to drink at other popular ‘bars’.  
 
Source: Interviews, Uupopo, January/February 2004 
 
Some households, often female headed, manage to build brick housing and a stable informal 
business venture from almost nothing (see Box 6.1). Other households never manage to move 
beyond bare survival. And even successful entrepreneurs remain vulnerable to external shocks such 
as illness or death of the main bread-winner, loss of formal employment and the like, for which the 
commonly used survival strategies are not flexible enough. Such shocks particularly hit those who 
have taken on long-term loans, such as for housing, and those who lack family support. Many of the 
households that did manage to move above the average poor majority have done so slowly, 
consciously avoiding loans, by saving a little bit every day over years, which they invested into 
bricks, for the anticipated house.  
Success stories apart, the majority of the informal settlement dwellers live a precarious life 
where incomes are miniscule at best. Women are, some respondents suggested, better placed to 
make a living in the informal sector, because they can turn to beverage and food selling which does 
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not require great investments, yet bring small but steady incomes (see Box 6.2). Women are also 
less likely to squander money on beer, even though they might sell it to make a living. Men feel that 
the catering business is not appropriate for them. Other informal sector activities require training 
and/or capital investment. Welding and shoe, watch and car or bicycle repair businesses are 
mentioned as some of the activities open to men in the informal sector. But in any case demand for 
such services is generally lower than in the catering business. Worst of all, however, are the 
difficulties to obtain start up capital: “Without money, you cannot get money”, complained one 
welder.72 There are exceptions, however, because bars – as compared to running a business from the 
home – are conducted from separate buildings and are more likely to be run by men. Mr. J., in 
Uupopo, who is still a young man, but married with children, built a ‘bar’ with leftover wood in a 
popular ‘square’ in Uupopo, decorated it with small means and invested in a music system. He sells 
bottled beer very cheap and this together with the almost sophisticated ambiance has been able to 
attract many clients who aspire for a nice time, but who cannot afford to head to expensive discos 
and bars. J. is busy using his profits to build a brick house. He is also planning to connect to the 
sewer and install a flush toilet. 
 
Box 6.2: Boiled eggs are good business 
Mrs. B. sells boiled eggs to make some extra money. Her husband is a welder, who has a 
workshop in Okangwena. She buys a tray of 30 eggs for N$ 17 and after hard-boiling them she 
sells them for N$ 1 per piece. Thus she can make a profit N$ 13 since the salt she offers with the 
eggs is very cheap. People like to eat eggs when they drink beer. Her business, which is 
conducted very informally, carrying a tray around on the head, is very flexible and mobile and 
requires only very little investment. Moreover, it is not likely to be subject to hawker charges by 
the council. 
 
Source: Interviews Uupopo, January/February 2004. 
 
Although there are examples of enterprising men, it is mainly women, be they single or living with 
a partner, who effectively keep families afloat. Their partners are often appropriating part of the 
daily earnings for private consumption needs, such as alcohol and cigarettes (see Box 6.3). Women 
seem to represent the focal family points, while men tend to move between women, remaining 
dependent on their hosts’ goodwill to ‘keep them’. Because it is so hard to find men who contribute 
to the household, rather than depleting already scarce resources, many women choose to stay single 
or pool their resources with female relatives (see table 4.5). 
 
Box 6.3: The cycle of drinking boyfriends and beer selling women 
Most houses in Okangwena are registered in the name of women. Almost all households run 
informal cuca shops – selling both beers and cooked food from the house. This is often the only 
or at least main income in the settlement. The women own the beer places and the men, who 
hang out with the women drink the beer. There are also customers who ‘move around’, i.e. come 
from outside the settlement. However, it is also true that money circulates inside the 
community from women to their boyfriends who carry it to neighbour women who will make 
some money from selling them beer. Their boyfriend in turn will take some of that money to 
drink the beer bought from other women who gave money to their boyfriends. There are, thus, 
two inverse circles of cash flows.  
 
Women with informal businesses even go and drink in each other’s places just to help each 
other. Thus, if A realises that her friend is short of money, she visits her cuca shop and she 
drinks a coke just to increase her friend’s business, who at another time will reciprocate. There 
must be some value added in this exchange, but it is marginal. 
 
Source: Interview, Onkangwena, 21 January 2004. 
                                                     
72 Resident in Okangwena, Ondangwa, February 2004. 
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6.1.2 Availability of services and priorities  
Table 6.1 summarises the respondents’ perceived availability of services in Ondangwa’s formal and 
informal settlements. With the exception of water, service delivery is incomplete in both formal and 
informal settlements. The table shows that, not surprisingly, formal settlements are better supplied 
than informal settlements and that gaps are particularly large with regard to the availability of 
electricity and sewage (around 15% for both services in the informal settlements, against 80-87% in 
the formal settlements). However, there are also differences between and within informal 
settlements, which are not reflected in the table and which will be further explored in this chapter. 
 
Table 6.1 Availability of services in Ondangwa (in % of the respondents by column)  
 
Status of settlement 
Description Formal Informal Total 
Water 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Communal toilets 84.6 56.0 61.2 
Garbage disposal 79.5 53.7 58.4 
Electricity 87.2 14.9 28.0 
 Sewage 79.5 15.4 27.1 
N 39 175 214 
 
 
The newer informal settlements, for example, receive only water via pre-paid communal taps. In 
Okangwena and Uupopo services also include electricity, garbage removal as well as sewage and 
public toilets. However, even though these services are offered only few households have access to 
them, either because they do not function (public toilets), because connection or use is too costly 
(electricity and toilets), or because they are simply irrelevant (sewerage). Table 6.2 shows that 
electricity in the informal settlements is rated the second most important service (30%) after water 
(61%), both by women (31%) and men (28%). Moreover, electricity is also the service ranked 
second by the informal residents with respect to their willingness to pay for it (Table 6.3). Yet, the 
use of this commodity is particularly low in the informal settlements.  
 
Table 6.2 Ondangwa: Ranking services by importance (in % of the respondents by column) 
 
Status of settlement Service ranked most 
important Formal Informal Total 
Water 71.8 60.6 62.6 
Electricity 15.4 30.3 27.6 
Toilets 5.1 9.1 8.4 
Sewage 5.1 - 0.9 
 Garbage removal 2.6 - 0.5 
N 39 175 214 
 
 
Other services which are available are rated much lower in importance, both in the formal and 
informal settlements with the exception of toilet facilities for the informal settlement dwellers 
(ranked third most important by them). Sewerage, garbage removal and street lightning, however, 
where not rated at all. But, like electricity, only a small minority of the informal settlement dwellers 
are willing to pay for toilet facilities (3%), while those willing to pay for  services beyond that are 
very few indeed. 
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Table 6.3 Ondangwa: Willingness to pay for services (in % of the respondents by column) 
 
Status of settlement Service ranked most 
willing to pay for Formal Informal 
Total 
Water 64.1 52.0 54.2 
Electricity 28.2 42.3 39.7 
Sewage 5.1 - 0.9 
Toilets 2.6 2.9 2.8 
Garbage removal - 0.6 0.5 
Street lighting - 0.6 0.5 
 Answer missing - 1.7 1.4 
 N 39 175 214 
 
Interestingly, with respect to gender gaps in the ranking of services by importance and willingness 
to pay, our survey data does not convey any marked differences between men and women. Table 
6.4 shows that men are ranking water somewhat higher than women, who in turn rank electricity 
and toilets higher. The same applies for willingness to pay for services.  
 
Table 6.4 Ongangwa: Importance of service by gender (in % of the respondents by column) 
 
Gender Service ranked    
most important Male Female 
Total 
Water 64.2 59.0 60.6 
Electricity 28.3 31.1 30.3 
Sewerage - - - 
Toilets 7.5 9.8 9.1 
Garbage 
removal - - - 
 
Street lightening - - - 
N 53 122 175 
 
According to Table 6.5, the differences between men and women are minimal with women slightly 
more willing to pay for water and men for electricity. Women are also slightly more willing to pay 
for toilet facilities, garbage removal and street lightning. 
 
Table 6.5 Ondangwa: Willingness to pay for service by gender  
(in % of the respondents by column) 
 
Gender 
  Male Female 
Total 
Water 64.2 59.0 60.6 
Electricity 28.3 31.1 30.3 
Sewerage - - - 
Toilets 7.5 9.8 9.1 
Garbage removal - - - 
 
Street lightening - - - 
N 53 122 175 
 
Differences between the formal and the informal settlements also become apparent with regard to 
citizens’ estimation of satisfaction with council service delivery (Table 6.6). Overall satisfaction 
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with schools, health services and water supply are most pronounced, but do not exceed 37% of the 
respondents. Items such as crime prevention, road maintenance and storm water drainage elicited 
the least satisfaction from the survey population. While satisfaction with other services varies 
widely between informal and formal settlements, the latter, including refuse collection and market 
place provisions, found equally little satisfaction among residents in formal and informal 
settlements. The largest difference in satisfaction levels between formal and informal settlements 
exist for the provision of electricity and toilets as well as for water supply, where formal settlement 
dwellers are much more satisfied. Surprisingly, however, informal settlement dwellers rated schools 
and health services better than did formal settlement dwellers. This might reflect different 
expectations with respect to service delivery quality.   
 
Table 6.6 Ondangwa: Satisfaction with service delivery (formal/informal) 
 
 
Service 
 
 
Share of respondents feeling satisfied with services (%) 
 Formal        Informal Total 
Schools 33.3 37.7 36.9 
Health Service 23.1 35.4 33.2 
Water supply 56.4 27.4 32.7 
Electricity supply 48.7 10.3 17.3 
Toilets 46.2 9.1 15.9 
Street lights 28.2 11.4 14.5 
Refuse collection 12.8 14.3 14.0 
Market place 7.7 10.9 10.3 
Crime prevention 2.9 10.9 9.3 
Roads 7.7 8.6 8.4 
Storm water drain. 2.6 0.6 0.9 
6.1.3 Types of services provided and used in informal settlements  
In Okangwena, as already pointed out, the services provided are ruled by the formal/informal and 
old/new settlement divides. Formal settlements are favoured over informal settlements and older 
informal settlements receive better (or more) services than new ones. Informal settlements are often 
only supplied with a few communal water taps. Generally, we also find that the supply of services 
does not always match demand. There is, of course, a general demand for water, rated by citizens 
throughout as the most important service, and this is supplied to all areas. However, often the type 
of water supply does not meet demand. Communal taps with pre-paid access cards are the easiest 
and cheapest way to supply water to the informal settlements. But they do not necessarily represent 
the first choice of the residents who often prefer other water supply options.  
There is also a large gap between the availability of electricity and its use by households. 
Demand for electricity is high – and rated the most important service by the respondents after water. 
However, even in settlements where electricity is supplied, very few households can afford 
connection. This is not so much because they would not be able to pay for the electricity, which can 
be rationed and supplemented by other sources of energy, but because they are unable to raise the 
connection fees charged by NORED in a lump sum. On the other end of the scale large gaps 
between supply and demand exist with regard to the supply of sewerage. For example, in informal 
settlements households cannot benefit from such a service, because they do not have flush toilets. 
Public toilets, often not available, too expensive due to fees, or broken, and garbage refuse removal 
are deemed important services, for which there is a great unfulfilled demand particularly in informal 
settlements. However, despite the need, the informal settlement dwellers do not prioritise these 
services for payment. All other services, with the exception of schools and health services remain 
comparatively unimportant to Ondangwa’s township dwellers.  
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Water 
Water is rated by citizens as the most important service in terms of need and consumers’ 
willingness to pay. Delivery of water is also the main revenue base of the council. Table 6.7 gives a 
breakdown of the water services that are available for both formal and informal residents. While the 
majority of water connections in the formal settlements are private meters or prepaid private taps 
(69% and 15%, respectively), in the informal settlements  prepaid communal taps and shared 
private taps with a private meter dominate (48% and 32%, respectively). Piped water supply with 
private meters is not common in the informal settlements (15%), even though such supply is much 
desired. 
 
Table 6.7 Ondangwa: Water delivery in formal and informal settlements 
(in % of respondents by column) 
 
Status of settlement 
Description Formal Informal
Total 
Comm. tap - prepaid meter 7.7 48.0 40.7 
Comm. tap - no meter - 1.7 1.4 
Piped water - Comm. meter - 1.1 0.9 
Piped water - Private meter 69.2 15.4 25.2 
Piped water - prepaid 15.4 0.6 3.3 
Shared private tap - private meter 7.7 32.0 27.6 
Answer missing - 1.1 0.9 
N 39 175 214 
 
 
Residents in the informal settlements generally preferred the prepaid water system, since it offered 
opportunity to economise water consumption and to control expenses, avoiding situations were bills 
could not be paid and supplies be cut. To ensure a steady supply of water, of course, is - together 
with food - the most important item on the expenditure list. It is also the service which people are 
most willing to pay for. It is in everybody’s interest to keep the supply running. While prepaid cards 
help to ensure this, the communal tap system does not.  Communal taps frequently break down, 
often on account of misuse, such as the insertion of objects in the slots for the water cards. Repair 
work is long drawn out, often requiring spare parts, which are not available in the country. At the 
time of our research, Ondangwa Town Council ran 25 communal taps with pre-paid cards, of which 
10 did not work due to damages caused, allegedly by vandalism. 
Residents relying on communal taps complained that vandals are usually non-residents: 
“People are clever and know how to break the taps and get free water… and then it is broken for the 
others! And what are we to do when the communal tap does not work?”73  For residents broken 
communal taps are serious, since they face longer daily trips to the next functioning communal tap, 
or at worst are forced to use alternative water sources which might not be safe.  
In order to avoid heavy reliance on unreliable communal taps, residents of the informal 
settlements have been calling for private taps with the pre-paid system, a service that is at present 
only available in formal settlements. Lacking this option, some residents of the informal settlements 
instead have chosen to pool resources and share a private tap connection, even though it is not 
prepaid (see Box 6.4). In this system, three, four, or more households share one private tap 
connection, located in and ascribed to one of the participating households. Sharing the bill, that is 
paying equal shares of expenses related to the water used and/or the connection fees, defrays the 
cost of several single connections. And more importantly, it avoids disconnection due to non-
payment, since the owner of the tap is able to rely on the others to cover for him, since all parties 
                                                     
73 Resident in Uupopo, Ondangwa, February 2004. 
CMI REPORT LOCAL GOVERNANCE, URBAN POVERTY AND SERVICE DELIVERY IN NAMIBIA R 2005: 12 
 75
have an interest in keeping the supply running. Members in this arrangement that repeatedly fail to 
contribute to the water bills are eventually excluded. The concomitant loss of an assured water-
source represents an effective regulatory and enforcing mechanism.  
Apart from this residents have suggested that in order to avoid disconnection due to 
breakage and misuse by outsiders, communal taps should be assigned to specific households, who 
are then in charge of maintenance and protection of their water source. They argue that currently 
communal taps are just placed in the streets, accessible to everybody, and the responsibility of 
nobody. Assigning each tap to a few households might limit misuse by outsiders, by allowing the 
‘owners’ to limit access and enhance the sustainability and maintenance of the communal taps. 
However, placing services into the hand of the community is no guarantee to avoid misuse, as the 
story below of the communal toilets in Okangwena illustrates. 
However, half of the informal settlement households in Ongangwa continue to rely on 
communal water taps. The poorer households, where members are destitute and often lack the 
resources to even buy a prepaid water card, use the card of others (almost 16%), of whom 13% 
against payment and only 3% for free (see Table 6.8). Many use the pre-paid water cards of 
neighbours who are still able to buy it at the lower price of N$ 10, because the new price N$ 20 is 
unaffordable for many of the poor. About 11% of Ondangwa’s informal settlement dwellers 
reported not being able to afford water supply at all. While this might appear a small percentage, 
water is an essential good, and having no access has serious consequences. At worst it may lead to 
the use of unsafe water sources, at best relying on the goodwill of friendly neighbours (see Box 
6.5). Residents who have virtually no income, because they are sick or otherwise unable to make a 
living, are particularly at risk. In fact 16% of the informal settlement dwellers in our survey 
admitted to the use of alternative water sources, but the actual number might be much higher.  
 
 
Box 6.4: Shared ‘private’ taps in Uupopo 
This is a household of 16 members, living in a four-roomed shack. Only one member of the 
household, the husband, is in paid employment, while the others ‘just sit’. The respondent, the 
wife and mother, sells beer and ukapana from the house to supplement family income. The 
household is not connected to electricity and water. Instead it shares a private water 
connection with three other households. The four households use the tap and share the bill, 
when it comes. They do no find it problematic to share the bill equally, even if the amount of 
water each family uses is not measured. All four households use a lot of water since they are 
all engaged in the same business, i.e. beer brewing.  
 
When asked if it would not be more beneficial for the owner of the tap to keep the water for 
himself, thus perhaps reducing competition in the beer brewing business, the respondent 
explained that avoiding competition is not the issue at all. On the contrary, the idea is to 
ensure that all the households that share the tap can make an income so that they can 
contribute to the bill regularly.  The aim is to foster co-operation to ensure an uninterrupted 
water supply. It is a system of cost recovery that shares the burden amongst households, so 
that someone always can pay the bill and the participating households avoid being 
disconnected.  
 
Only strangers are asked by the owner to pay for water directly against measurement in 
buckets. Otherwise the desire is to encourage participating households to continue using the 
tap so that they will contribute to the bill and help avoid being cut off. If, however, they do not 
pay their part, they are expelled and need to find another water source, which might not be so 
reliable and/or close by.  
 
Source: Interview, Uupopo, January 2004. 
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Table 6.8 Ondangwa: Access to communal taps  
(% of respondents within the settlements) 
Status of settlement  
   Formal Informal Total  
 Accessing communal 
tap using? 
Your own access card 100.0 72.4 73.3 
    The card of a neighbour 
without payment  3.4 3.3 
    The card of a neighbour 
with payment  12.6 12.2 
    Answer missing  11.5 11.1 
  Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Rumours in Uupopo has it that residents use the rainy season flooded field in the middle of the 
settlement both to defecate and to collect water under cover of night. They would, however, not 
easily admit to such endangering behaviour. Residents admitted to using alternative water sources 
only when problems of water delivery, such as broken taps or cards or disrupted water supply occur 
(30%), or when they need to reduce cost or lack money or need to save money for other purposes 
(38%). Only one respondent admitted to using alternative water for drinking, however. More 
commonly respondents claimed to use alternative water sources for washing clothes and for 
irrigation only. 
 
Box 6.5: Mutual help among the destitute in Ondangwa 
E and M are living in neighbouring shacks, which are very basic one-room structures registered 
in their names. Both are widows in the late thirties and came to Uupopo some ten years ago, 
the one to join her mother, the other her husband. Between them they have 9 children, but only 
one lives with Emma. The others live with paternal grandparents in the rural areas and their 
upkeep is paid for by pensions or family contributions. M has a live-in partner, who, however, 
does not contribute to the household, instead being ‘the one who finishes all the food first’. E 
has no partner. 
 
E used to earn a small income from ‘selling stuff’, but she has been sick for a while. She cannot 
walk much, has gone thin and is treated for TB, and she has not been able to pursue her 
business activities. Without income she is dependent on others. She begs for food, soap and 
sometimes money from a small circle of friends. She is most dependent on M, who also looked 
after her when she was too sick to move. M shares everything with her: the N$ 100/month M 
earns looking after the toddler of a neighbour, who works during the day; her pre-paid water 
card; and also her food. 
 
M spends about N$ 10 per month for water and this she shares with her partner and her 
neighbour and the child. They try and use as little water as possible, mainly for cooking and 
drinking, and a little bit of washing. E is treated in hospital for TB. She had to pay N$ 9 initially, 
which covers all the follow-up medicines. This was a large sum of money for E, given to her by a 
friend. The problem now is the transport money to reach the hospital to get her medicines, 
N$10 each time, which again she cannot afford. 
 
Both M and E live a precarious life. But at least M is able bodied, and even if the babysitting 
job should be terminated, she will be able to ‘sell something’. E, however, does not have much 
hope. Since she has been sick her relatives have not come and she is just no longer able to work 
anything. Her mother in the rural areas is herself old and poor, and she does not want to 
burden her further by returning there. E’s only hope and greatest fear lies in her neighbour: the 
kind M might one day leave Uupopo and her behind. 
 
Source: Interview, Uupopo, 2 January 2004 
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Electricity 
Electricity supply in Ondangwa is very unevenly divided between the formal and the informal 
settlements (87% in the formal settlements against 15% in the informal ones). One of the reasons 
why so few households are connected to electricity is that many of the newer informal settlements 
(and some of the old) are not yet connected to the grid. However, even in settlements were 
electricity is available, few household are actually connected. Yet, as suggested earlier, even though 
electricity is considered second in importance to water; the majority of households in our survey 
who had private connections in Ondangwa (94%) also felt that electricity was affordable. 
Furthermore, 42% of the respondents said they were willing to pay for electricity (in both the formal 
and the informal areas), yet so few are connected in the informal settlements.  
The reasons for this are manifold: Ultimately water is more important than electricity for 
survival. Electricity can be more easily replaced by other energy sources, and the range of sources 
that can be used is broader and more varied, according to both financial means and use: candles, 
paraffin, wood, etc can be used instead of electricity without having a major impact on the quality 
of life. Even in formal areas, where electricity use is high, 39% of all households reported using 
alternative sources of energy. Accordingly, cooking might still take place outdoors on a wood fire, 
while electricity is reserved for fridges and perhaps televisions, radios or lightning in the evenings. 
Some households just choose to use electricity for fridges, if this represents the basis of a business 
enterprise. Other uses can easily be replaced or altogether stopped, if costs are too high or supply is 
disrupted. 
According to interviews, what stops many households connecting to electricity are the high 
connection fees, even in settlements, which are already on the grid. This is also consistent with the 
findings of a recent report on fiscal gaps in local authorities in Namibia, commissioned by the 
ministry responsible for local governments (MRLGH, 2004:19). Many households are just not able 
to afford the lump sum that is demanded. Moreover, unlike with water, where households can get 
together and share the water source, shared connections, i.e. indirect connection from one household 
to others are not reported, and they are illegal. Respondents in the informal settlements variously 
commented that NORED should supply the connection to houses and then recover the costs through 
monthly billing or through somewhat increased electricity prices.  
Sewerage and toilets 
Compared to water and electricity supply, the availability of sewerage and toilets are according to 
our survey not considered to have high priority in both formal and informal settlements. Sewerage 
is, however, a service ranked as slightly more available than electricity (27%), while the availability 
of communal toilets (61% overall) is only surpassed by the availability of water. These figures 
reflect an unwillingness of residents to pay for these services rather than a lack of need or 
dissatisfaction with the delivery. Sanitation needs are clearly larger than peoples’ willingness to 
pay.  
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Table 6.9 Ondangwa: Ownership and use of toilet facilities  (in % of the respondents by column) 
Status of settlement 
Toilet type owned Formal Informal Total 
N 75 87 162 
VIP - 0.6 0.5 
Pit long drop latrine - 20.0 16.4 
Communal toilet 20.5 20.6 20.6 
Flush w/ communal septic 53.8 6.3 15.0 
Flush w/ private septic 25.6 6.3 9.8 
No toilet facility - 45.1 36.9 
 Answer missing - 1.1 0.9 
N 39 175 214 
Status of settlement 
Toilet type used Formal Informal Total 
VIP - 5.7 4.7 
Pit long drop latrine 12.8 33.1 29.4 
Communal toilet 7.7 7.4 7.5 
Flush w/ communal septic 53.8 6.3 15.0 
Flush w/ private septic 25.6 6.9 10.3 
No toilet facility - 32.6 26.6 
Other - 7.4 6.1 
 Answer missing - 0.6 0.5 
N 39 175 214 
 
 
Table 6.9 presents the availability and use of toilet facilities. With regard to the two types of flush 
toilets listed, we note congruence between ownership and use. This is not the case with the other 
categories, with communal toilets being underused and VIP and pit latrines being overused. 
Consequently, those who reported not to own a toilet facility is much larger than the category which 
reported not using a facility. The results of the survey would suggest that people who own either 
pit-latrines or VIP toilets share their facilities with those who have no access to own toilets. Owners 
of flush toilets do not, according to our data, share their facilities with outsiders. This is 
corroborated by our interviews where respondents declared that if one did not have a toilet it was 
always possible to ask others who had or to use the bush. Respondents were not willing to put 
toilets high on the ‘want to pay for’ list, even though many respondents felt humiliated by having to 
wait till nightfall to relieve themselves. Unlike private toilet facilities, however, public toilets are 
underused, because they either do not function or because user fees are considered to be too 
expensive.  
That people need toilet facilities, but are not willing or able to prioritise them in their 
expenditure plans, might be further explained by the fate of the public toilet scheme in Okangwena. 
The installation of public toilets in this township formed part of the GTZ funded SWAMP project, 
aimed at upgrading the settlement with sewerage lines. According to residents, the idea of public 
toilets was welcomed in the settlement. Several toilet buildings were constructed in 1998, which 
contained two flush toilets and adjacent shower rooms with different entrances for each sex. The 
toilets were entrusted to caretakers who were to clean and maintain the toilets by charging N$ 1 per 
customer. GTZ anticipated that up to N$ 200 could be collected each month, enough to buy 
cleaning agents and toilet paper, pay the water and sewerage bills and compensate the caretaker.  
Things turned out differently, however, since despite the great needs for toilet facilities 
people stayed away, finding the fee too high to pay. Some caretakers halved the price to attract 
customers. Others increased their profits by cutting corners on cleaners and toilet paper, offering 
newspaper instead, which led to blockages and general disrepair. Many could not make enough 
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money to pay the council fees. Today only one public toilet in Okangwena is in working order, run 
by the secretary of the settlement committee. Even though she does not make a profit, she likes free 
access to the toilet and shower for herself and her family. People are still using pit-latrines and the 
bush. Residents claim that the fee is too high, considering that many households have 10 or more 
members bringing the cost of toilet to a minimum of N$ 10 per day, which is too much for 
households that have difficulty raising N$ 6 each month for site rent. They even point out that 
HIV/AIDS positive residents, plagued as they are with persistent diarrhoea would use up a ‘fortune’ 
every day should they make use of the public toilets. 
While the toilets have fallen in disrepair, Okangwena residents still have the price to pay, 
since residents with plots adjacent to the sewerage line are charged a fee of N$3 by the council. This 
is done in spite of the fact that they are not connected to the sewerage and have no private tap 
and/or flush toilet. This has angered residents considerably. In Uupopo, also part of the GTZ 
project, the sewerage line is equally unused by residents (apparently only three households are 
connected) and equally resented, even though consultations about the intervention were held and 
people were keen to be ‘offered flush toilets’. They were, however, not told about the connection 
fees of N$400 to be raised on top of the expenses for the actual toilet and the council charges. The 
community simply cannot afford sewerage, and its members do not need it. According to one 
resident, what are people to do with a sewerage line when they live in shacks and even lack private 
water connections? Even as toilets are important for both formal and informal settlement dwellers, 
sewerage is not ranked as an important service by them and very low prioritisation in the formal 
settlements. Therefore, the availability of sewerage to 15% of the households in the informal 
settlements has not brought any improvement in living standards to its residents. On the contrary, it 
has meant for many an extra payment to the council only. 
Refuse collection 
Garbage collection is a service offered by the council to 58% of the Ondangwa residents (almost 
80% in the formal and 53% in the informal settlements, respectively). Satisfaction with the service 
is, however, very low (14% of the respondents). Informal settlement residents perceived refuse 
collection to be irregular, as well as expensive. Some residents reported that they needed to buy a 
dust-bin for N$100 to make use of the council collections, which they cannot afford even if they 
share a bin between households. Many residents failed to understand why they should pay for refuse 
collection, when the service was so irregular that they had to resort to burning of refuse anyhow.  
Street lights, market place, storm water drainage, roads and crime prevention 
These are services which residents generally are not willing to pay for, even though they generated 
responses indicating the least satisfaction both in the formal and the informal settlements. Storm 
water drainage facilities registered the worst responses from residents of both formal and informal 
settlements with respect to satisfaction levels (80% and 84%, respectively). Roads and marketplaces 
are also met with high dissatisfaction rates (around 60% for both types of settlements). Differences 
in the satisfaction levels between formal and informal settlements are apparent with regard to street 
lightning, with a larger percentage of the respondents from the informal settlements registering 
dissatisfaction (close to 70% compared with 43% in the formal settlements). With respect to crime 
prevention, perhaps surprisingly, formal settlement dwellers feel more dissatisfaction (62% against 
53% in the informal settlements). Other services that were frequently demanded by informal 
settlement dwellers, or pointed out as absent, were public telephones. Respondents explained that 
very few households had phone connections, or mobile phones, because these were too expensive 
for the residents. However, they felt that access to phones was important in case of emergencies and 
for the occasional calls to friends and family.  
Storm water drainage is a big problem in both formal and informal settlements, particularly 
in the rainy season. In Okangwena B, the part where Build Together houses are located, residents 
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claim that plots allocated by the council were waterlogged and never really dried out. Many 
residents also complained that even if plots were waterlogged and flooded, the council would not 
come to solve the problem, unless payment was made.  
The issue of street lighting was hotly debated in some parts of the informal settlements 
where this service was totally missing (see Box 6.6). Informal residents appreciate lightning for 
purposes of crime prevention, but also because street lightening is important when the houses are 
not electrified. Some respondents also suggested that for informal settlement dwellers street 
lightening – like electricity in the house – would conform to a minimum stereotypical image of 
urbanity, which they aspired to. However, while residents were willing to pay for electricity – if 
connection fees were not charged in a lump sum – they clearly considered street lightning a service 
the council should provide for free.  
 
Box 6.6: Solar streetlights in Uubenge was not what people had in mind 
The lower part of Uupopo, Uubenge, had long complained to the council about being neglected. 
Even though the area housed approximately 185 households, only 7 households had electricity 
connections which they financed privately by branching off the grid further away. Only one 
communal water tap was provided, which often broke down. During a meeting with the council 
in November 2003 they raised these points, as well as the need for public telephones and 
street lights. The only response to these demands from the council was the installation of two 
solar street lights for the whole area. Residents felt cheated by the council since not only were 
the lights few, but they only produced very small and weak circles of light immediately under 
the lamp. It was not at all the service they had in mind!  
Source: Interview Uubenge, 21 January 2004 
6.1.4 Problems with payments: coping strategies 
Payments of services charges compete with other payments and expenses, and households have to 
make choices what service and/or expense they prioritise. As we have seen, water and electricity are 
considered the most important services for which households are most likely be willing to pay. 
Access to piped water cannot be replaced easily unless with unsafe water sources. In Ondangwa 
very few people admitted to doing so. However, this might be true because there are only few 
seasonally available alternative water sources. Electricity can more easily be replaced. Many 
households in Ondangwa are forced to use alternative sources of energy because they are not 
connected to the electricity grid or the grid is not available. Communal pre-paid water taps offer 
easier access than to electricity, but they are also fraud with uncertainty because they might break 
down, or because cards run out on weekends when they cannot be renewed, or the money to renew 
them with is lacking. Very poor households might find it even difficult to make the initial 
investment of buying a card and need to rely on those of others, further increasing uncertainty of 
access.  
One of the coping strategies employed has been the sharing of a private tap and expenses 
between a number of adjacent households. This works apparently well and is in everybody’s 
interest. However, such arrangements are not obviously available for very poor households, who 
have either no or very meagre incomes, because they do not represent trustworthy co-tap-users with 
regard to sharing bills. Moreover, most likely the quantity of water they can afford is so small that 
equal sharing of water bills would not be beneficial. Using cards of neighbours against or without 
payment is then the only option to access tap water. Poor respondents in Ondangwa have observed 
that sharing of cards could best be done with almost equally poor friends and neighbours. 
Consumption of water in such cases can be restricted just to drinking water and cooking, leaving 
unsafe water sources for washing. If sharing of cards is not possible, begging or the use of unsafe 
water represents the only options. 
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Obviously, allocation of money for water, while very important, competes with allocations 
for food and many other expenditure items. Tables 6.10 and 6.11 set out what people spend money 
on every month. They show the main expenditure items for formal and informal settlement dwellers 
respectively, as well as for men and women. Table 6.10 suggests that food and water are the most 
frequent and therefore important expenditure items both in the formal and the informal settlements. 
Electricity is also an important and frequent expenditure item in the formal settlements, while 
negligible in the informal settings. School fees, remittances, transport, clothing, entertainment, and 
burial expenses play an almost equally important role in both types of settlement. Interestingly, both 
rental for housing and mortgages were fairly frequent expenditures in the formal settlements, while 
site rentals and expenditures for home improvement dominate in the informal settlements. With 
only 7% naming it as an expenditure item, rental has almost no significance for the informal 
settlement dwellers’ budgets. 
 
 
Table 6.10 Ondangwa: Items which money are spent on every month by settlement type  
(in % of the respondents) 
Status of settlement 
Items spent money on every month Formal Informal Total 
    
Food 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Water 94.9 93.7 93.9 
School fees 74.4 84.6 82.7 
Remittances to rural area 61.5 68.0 66.8 
Transport 69.2 60.6 62.1 
Clothing 51.3 63.4 61.2 
Site rent/property tax 48.7 56.0 54.7 
Savings/insurance 43.6 36.6 37.9 
Entertainment 30.8 31.4 31.3 
Burial expenses 28.2 29.7 29.4 
Electricity 87.2 13.1 26.6 
Paying debts 28.2 19.4 21.0 
Hiring and purchasing instalments 38.5 13.1 17.8 
Home improvements 10.3 17.1 15.9 
Rental for property 35.9 6.9 12.1 
 Mortgage and housing loans 30.8 4.0 8.9 
N 39 175 214 
Note: The respondents may report on all items of expenditure 
 
Table 6.11 suggests that expenditure patterns of men and women differ less than between settlement 
types. In fact, gaps are minor, with men spending slightly more on savings, burial expenses and 
hire/purchase; while women spend more on transport, clothing and paying back debts. Interestingly, 
expenditure patters on entertainment appear in our survey equally distributed between women and 
men, suggesting that men do not necessarily prioritise entertainment over other financial 
obligations, as suggested by some of the respondents during in-depths interviews.  
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Table 6.11 Ondangwa: Items which money are spent on every month by gender  
(% of the respondents)) 
 
Gender                       Items spent money on 
every month Male Female Total 
Food 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Water 95.5 93.2 93.9 
School fees 83.3 82.4 82.7 
Remittances to rural area 69.7 65.5 66.8 
Transport 57.6 64.2 62.1 
Clothing 57.6 62.8 61.2 
Site rent/property tax 54.5 54.7 54.7 
Savings/insurance 40.9 36.5 37.9 
Entertainment 31.8 31.1 31.3 
Burial expenses 36.4 26.4 29.4 
Electricity 27.3 26.4 26.6 
Paying debts 18.2 22.3 21.0 
Hiring and purchasing instalments 21.2 16.2 17.8 
Home improvements 16.7 15.5 15.9 
Rental for property 13.6 11.5 12.1 
 Mortage and housing loans 9.1 8.8 8.9 
N 66 148 214 
 
For informal settlement dwellers education of children appears to be a very important expenditure 
item, which they prioritise immediately after food and water. Since expenditures for schooling are 
more seasonal with peaks at the beginning of school year or terms, when fees, school uniforms and 
books have to be purchased, poorer households who are less able to save for this event, tend to 
prioritise this expenditure against other items, including council fees (site rent, electricity bills etc) 
as well as debt repayments, remittances, home improvements and the like (see Box 6.7 below). 
However, peak expenditure periods like the beginning of a school year can present serious problems 
for poorer households, particularly in the informal settlements. During the year, poorer households 
might also balance various expenditure items against each other, in an attempt to offset being cut off 
council services. Thus, poor households may choose to service debts on water one month and on 
electricity another, and/or reduce consumption according to seasons. In the rainy season, for 
example, water consumption can be reduced by using alternative sources, while the savings offer 
opportunities to service electricity arrears or to pay for ploughing of fields in the rural areas. In the 
dry, hot season, cooking can be more easily done outside on open fires, while water consumption 
increases – clean drinking water and water for washing are more important then and alternative 
sources are not available. 
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Box 6.7 Survival strategies: Flowing with the seasons 
S. lives in an informal settlement. She is single, lives in a brick house and runs a popular Cuca 
shop, selling local spirits and ukapana. Her main expenses are the school-fees for her four 
children, who do not live with her and the grandchildren who live with her. She pays N$ 210 for 
the children that are boarding and N$ 180 for those not boarding. She would rather wear rags 
than take the children under her care out of school. School, she believes, is the most tangible 
hope to improve life. Medical expenses also take much of her money, both the fees and the 
transport costs.  
 
Her priorities change with the seasons. In the beginning of the year school fees take priority, 
while in the rainy season the priority is to paying labourers to plough her field in her home 
village. The ploughing might cost her N$ 150. But that investment means that in other seasons 
she can save on food purchases. Electricity is important to her (she is connected to the grid) 
because she is in the ukapana business. Particularly electricity is required in the rainy season 
when she has to cook inside the house, and using wood or charcoal is not feasible. Water on the 
other hand can be collected in the same season and the water bill can thus be reduced. This way, 
by balancing seasonal needs, she manages.  
 
Source: Interview Okangwena, 21 January 2004 
 
 
The poorer the household, the fewer are the opportunities to make choices, however. For them, food 
and water are paramount and they simply have no space to negotiate that by adjusting consumption 
which already is at a minimum. In such cases, a reduction in consumption of these main items 
against school fees, medical expenses, clothing or site rent payments are simply not possible.  
But even better off households with regular income sources might arrive at situations where 
choices no longer exist. Households that took on loans to build brick houses, be it Build Together 
Loans or smaller loans from the Shack Dwellers Federation, are vulnerable to shock when the 
regular income earner on whose salary the loan was financially based, is not longer able to work, on 
account of sickness or death. This event can plunge the rest of the family into serious financial 
problems, where even the purchase of food and water become a problem. While the two loan 
schemes offer some, even though limited, security through insurance, at times cases are 
complicated. This may happen when the main income earner acts as guarantor for his wife (see Box 
6.8). Problems with repayments have bred a culture of fear and avoidance: most of the women we 
met who succeeded to upgrade their shacks to houses or their cuca shop to a ‘proper’ restaurant had 
done so without a loan. Instead they had chosen to embark on a long journey of financing it brick 
for brick – building the house step by step.  
One of the respondents explained that she came to Uupopo in 1989 to make a living. She 
obtained land from the traditional authority and built a small shack on it. Ten years later she decided 
to build a brick house, because “a shack is not a place where you want to stay, it is not a home”. In 
her mind shacks are too hot and dusty and too small for the children. The first step to house building 
was her investment into a tap, to facilitate brick making. She started to make her own bricks, one by 
one, which took over one year. Saving the N$18 000 that the house eventually cost her, however, 
took much longer. 
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Box 6.8 Housing loan trouble 
N. is 32 years old, has six children under her care (two are her sisters) and is owner of a 5 bed-
roomed brick house with electricity, water and sewerage connections and an inside flush toilet. 
But what appears as a success story is in fact a sad story of failure. N. moved to town with her 
husband, who had steady employment with the roads authority. Encouraged by the steady 
income and the incomes she made with her cuca shop and ukapana business, she joined a Shack 
Dwellers Federation group to start saving in order to qualify for a loan for constructing a brick 
house. She saved the N$ 750 required and was granted a loan of N$ 17,000, with her husband 
acting as guarantor. She constructed her house with it. But then the death of her husband pushed 
her into total crisis. 
 
Now she is no longer able to pay back the loan of which N$ 14 000 remains. She also has to pay 
for all the rates and for the school fees for 3 of the children. She is also no longer able to run her 
informal business, because she lacks the money to invest in goods. She tried to borrow money 
from neighbours, but they too struggle, because it was just the beginning of the school year. Her 
husband was not on social security and therefore she will receive no compensation. Her 
immediate family, too, is not able to help, and her extended family would rather “see her fall from 
her high horse”. Her home village also is out of the question since her mother already has a house 
full of children and no money. She will soon fall behind with all her payments. She had already 
failed to pay the water bill and the loan repayment for the current month. 
 
The SDFN branch has not been helpful. Its members are adamant that she will have to pay the 
loan back, since her guarantor has passed away. They have suggested that she move out of the 
brick house again, construct a shack in the yard of her home and live in this in order to rent out 
the nice house, to raise the repayments of the loan. They also offered her a new N$ 500 loan for 
trading, but this is in her estimation not enough since half of this would go on loan repayments. 
Her SDFN group also has not been able to help, since they now have 60 members and the needs 
of all those make the available loans very small. N. believes that she would need a private N$ 
1000 loan with no interest to move to a semi-urban area where life is cheaper, and she could 
start trading again. But, that money is nowhere in sight. 
 
Source: Interview Uupopo, Ondangwa, 2 February 2004. 
 
Ability to pay for expenditure items and flexibility to make choices or survive shocks do, however, 
not only relate to income but also to other factors. One is the relationship a person or household has 
to the rest of the community or the neighbours. Another is the relationship to rural areas. While 
families in rural areas represent a drain on the resources of urban households, in that remittances are 
regularly sent by both formal and informal settlement dwellers, rural areas are also a source of 
wealth. Part of this wealth, which adds to the survival of urban households, is rural produce, which 
moves from the rural area to town. The other is the link to relatives and close family, rather like a 
last resort and resting place in times of great hardship.  
Our survey suggests that Ondangwa’s informal settlement dwellers maintain as close a 
relationship to rural areas as do formal settlement dwellers, and that they outdo formal settlement 
dwellers with regard to maintaining fields there (see section 4.1.2). However, they receive 
somewhat less produce and fewer build homesteads there. This would suggest that informal 
settlement dwellers invest more in rural areas than what they would tangibly get back, unless it is 
the implicit security to know that they can return there. If we consider gender differences, we find 
that in Ondangwa women generally keep a closer contact to rural areas than men do. Women also 
receive more produce, even though the share of those women who keep fields (91% in our survey) 
and those who receive produce (25%) would suggest investment for multiple purposes, of which 
produce is only one. Feeding children who are living with relatives in the rural areas or just keeping 
in touch might be other significant reasons. 
We frequently heard during interviews that rural links were considered very important, and 
that loosing these links is a great misfortune. Informal settlement dwellers designated their 
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neighbours who had lost rural links as the poorest and most desperate of all. The respondents 
discussed their lack of contact to rural areas as a great disadvantage. One of our respondents 
explained that some people just stay in town too long, waiting for some break-through, but instead 
their poverty levels increase: “It is like a tree and in the end there is no branch left to hold on to any 
more.” What often happens is that the poorer you get, the more difficult it becomes to keep up the 
connection to home, by sending money, ploughing fields and visiting, which in turn creates a deeper 
poverty, forcing the poor to stay in town and in poverty because they have nowhere to go. And 
having nowhere to go is the ultimate condemnation of poverty.  
Often the break with rural areas is not a conscious one, but caused by circumstances. Urban 
living is sometimes not the only factor involved. It might also happen that rural relatives are jealous. 
Hence, when misfortune strikes they are unwilling to come to help, or they themselves live such 
marginal lives that they cannot afford to take on more economically inactive members. Whatever 
the reason, in many of the life stories we heard, the really destitute are just too ashamed to ask their 
poor rural families for help or to impose on them beyond sending their children there to be cared 
for. The absence of roots, the aimless, hopeless drifting in urban areas is likely to be a contributing 
factor to the widespread alcoholism, which is such a serious problem in the informal settlements.  
And alcoholism not only swallows all money, it also swallows all initiative to improve and energy 
needed to improve one’s life. 
6.1.5 Governance and participation  
We noted that informal settlement dwellers seem to hold stronger opinions when it comes to 
judging service delivery compared to their formal settlement counterparts, who are more likely to 
admit to a neutral attitude. Informal settlement dwellers are also those who are neglected when it 
comes to service delivery issues and who have lost out in the decentralisation and urbanisation 
processes. How then do they view the new council structures, whose coming deprived them of 
previous rights to their plots and subjected them to charges for water (which was provided free of 
charge before) and to other utilities, many of which people find on their bills but do not even use or 
receive? Above we have looked at how households try to cope with the new dispensation in their 
daily decisions, but do they also actively try to seek redress? What roles do community based 
organisations, regional and central government institutions, traditional authorities and NGOs play 
for the informal settlement dwellers?   
Table 6.12 sets out the responses of formal and informal settlement dwellers regarding their 
participation in various CBOs and local government institutions. The results suggest that in 
Ondangwa both settlement committee and council meetings are more frequently attended by the 
informal settlement dwellers, while council and traditional authority meetings are favoured in 
formal settlements. Informal settlement dwellers, in fact, attend a much larger range of meetings, 
including the settlement committee, town council, local and regional councillors and traditional 
authorities. This suggests that they have a greater need or desire to have their voices heard or to be 
informed. However, apart from the settlement committee other neighbourhood committees appear 
to be less important for the residents. Meetings of the Shack Dwellers Federation, which caters for 
the informal settlement residents, surprisingly attracted only 7% of the respondents in informal 
settlements.  
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Table 6.12: Ondangwa: Participation in CBOs and local government 
(in % of the respondents by column) 
 
Status of settlement Have you participated in the meetings of 
these institutions Formal Informal Total 
The settlement committee Yes 17.9 63.4 55.1 
The town council Yes 25.6 57.7 51.9 
Local councillors Yes 7.7 36.0 30.8 
Regional councillors Yes 7.7 26.3 22.9 
Traditional authorities Yes 20.5 20.6 20.6 
Water management committee Yes - 10.3 8.4 
Shack dwellers association Yes - 6.9 5.6 
Waste disposal committee Yes - 5.7 4.7 
 Neighbourhood watch Yes - 4.6 3.7 
N 39 175 214 
 
 
It is also interesting to note that meetings of the traditional authorities, while eliciting almost the 
same volume of participation in formal and informal settlements (21% attend the meetings), they 
represent the second largest attendance for formal settlements, while in informal settlements they 
come fifth only. Our assumption would have been that traditional authorities carry more weight in 
informal settlements since they where in charge before the town council took over. If we look at 
participation by gender (Table 6.13), subsuming formal and informal settlements in Ondangwa, we 
find that women prefer dealing with the settlement committees while men prefer town council 
meetings. Moreover, women are less eager to attend meetings with traditional authorities. 
According to our survey data, men dominate meetings of the Shack Dwellers Federation. This 
finding does not correspond to our qualitative data, which clearly indicates the predominance of 
female members.   
 
Table 6.13 Ondangwa: Participation in CBOs and local government by gender  
(in % of the respondents) 
 
Gender 
  Male Female Total 
The settlement committee Yes 47.0 58.8 55.1 
The town council Yes 57.6 49.3 51.9 
Local councillors Yes 31.8 30.4 30.8 
Regional councillors Yes 24.2 22.3 22.9 
Traditional authorities Yes 31.8 15.5 20.6 
Water management committee Yes 7.6 8.8 8.4 
Shack dwellers association Yes 7.6 4.7 5.6 
Waste disposal committee Yes 4.5 4.7 4.7 
 
Neighbourhood watch Yes 4.5 3.4 3.7 
N 66 148 214 
 
 
Many residents in Ondangwa’s informal settlements have complaints about the town council. 
People feel the council ‘cheats’ them, because they are required to pay for services they do not 
actually receive (e.g. waste removal), they cannot afford to connect to (private water connection, 
electricity), or they have no use for (e.g. sewerage). Many do not understand why they suddenly 
CMI REPORT LOCAL GOVERNANCE, URBAN POVERTY AND SERVICE DELIVERY IN NAMIBIA R 2005: 12 
 87
have to pay for services that used to be free and pay for plots they previously ‘owned’. They are 
also upset about the fact that with the inclusion of the informal settlement in the town borders they 
no longer receive draught relief, open only to rural residents.  
Informal settlement dwellers perceive the town council staff as persons who come and 
promise, but never deliver. There have been many instances when settlement populations have 
requested certain services, and they were promised action, but then nothing happened. Examples are 
street lights, public phones, individual pre-paid water connections, assistance with clearing water-
logged places etc. At times the facilities requested have been delivered in a way not suitable to the 
residents needs; for instance public toilets with user fees attached, sewerage instead of public toilets 
with septic tanks, two solar panels instead of ‘proper’ street lights. Generally people perceive the 
situation as: 
 
Living in Uupopo just means that you have to pay too many charges and fees. There 
are fees attached to selling (hawking), fees for licences when you have a small 
business. But then there is nothing in return. The Council always comes, promises 
and then nothing happens, and the council does not even bother to explain why.74 
 
But problems and suspicions of the council go deeper. In Okangwena residents living in shacks 
believe that the council want to chase them out “because they want to formalise the area”. 
Apparently the council sent a message that everybody who wanted to stay in Okangwena had to 
build a brick house, or they would be removed or ‘dumped’. People started to fear when rumours 
abounded that the council would move in with bulldozers to break down shacks. Some left on their 
own accord, both in order not to risk their shacks being damaged, but also in order to pick the best 
plots on the new site, much further away from the road. Others joined the Shack Dwellers 
Federation to start saving with them, because they wanted to be ready to take a loan for a brick 
building in order to avoid moving to the less attractive site.75 
 
Box 6.9 The Council has not been making friends in Okangwena 
First the council came to Okangwena to do a survey, when plot sizes were reduced. One elderly 
single woman was asked to reduce her plot, meaning that she has to demolish her brick veranda 
where she runs a popular ukapana/liquor business, because it is in the way of a planned road. She 
has also been ordered to demolish or move a shed used for storage. She does not know how to do 
this, causing her sleepless nights. How is she going to break down the brick veranda and then 
rebuild it?  
 
The council also came and said that shacks were no longer tolerated, and that people had to 
convert their shacks to brick houses. Those who cannot afford this or to buy the plot will have to 
move to more remote areas: “People are told to move, but they have their business here and they 
are not even given transport [by the council] to transfer their shacks to the new area. They will 
not be able to go.” On top of this the new council doubled the annual hawking fee. People also 
find it hard to pay N$ 6 for the site rent and now it is increased to N$ 12. They have asked the 
council to fill in waterlogged places and holes in the road where drunk people fall into at night 
and hurt themselves. Residents also requested the installation of private pre-paid water taps, 
and again there was no reaction from the council.  
 
Source: Interview, Okangwena 20 January 2004. 
 
Many of our respondents from the informal settlements felt not only neglected by the council, but 
also exploited and disliked. Residents got a very clear feeling that they were just residing in 
informal settlements as a matter of time and on the sufferance of the council. This impression seems 
                                                     
74 Interview Uupopo, 3 February 2004. 
75 Interviews, Okangwena, 20 January 2004. 
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confirmed by the observation that when the council holds meetings in the informal settlements they 
already have a decided agenda, and use the occasion merely to inform the affected population of 
those decisions, rather than seeking their comments, advise and priorities. And when the concerns 
of the population are listened too, they are hardly ever responded to in reality. Council staff was at 
least seen as having a certain interest, but councillors, on the other hand, were dismissed as being 
just interested in their political position. Voted in on a party list system, residents of informal 
settlements had no choice in the kind of person elected to office. Often they did not personally 
know the councillors or failed to establish trust in them. Local councillors certainly were perceived 
to be on the wrong side of the fence, encouraging people to pay rates and charges (72%) rather than 
sympathising with the poor who cannot afford to pay (1.4%) or even offer solutions (2%).  
Regional councillors, however, were considered more trustworthy, since they were not 
directly connected to the council, rather perceived as being above the council. They were also voted 
in directly and, thus, represented known entities. Even though not many of our respondents in the 
informal settlements went to their meetings (26%) they were clearly more popular with the informal 
settlement dwellers and trumped the meetings with traditional authorities. Respondents claimed that 
they had more confidence in the regional councillor to pick up their complaints in their favour, 
rather than local councillors.  There also seems to be distrust between the regional and local 
councillors, which is reflected in limited communication and dialogue. This distrust was also 
reflected in interviews with local and regional councillors, respectively (see chapter 5).   
Our survey data confirm that only 55% of the respondents participated in council meetings 
in the last two years. Most participated in order to hear about electricity delivery (15%), get 
information (14%) and to hear about sewage (11%) while only 4% participated with a view to air 
their views and problems. Likewise only 35% of the respondents in Ondangwa believed it was 
useful to contact the council to voice discontent with service delivery. Many relied on the settlement 
committee (24%) followed by the regional councillor (14%). All other institutions were considered 
to be of little use, including the mayor (5%). As for the respondents view of local government 
officials, the majority (62%) believed that they were trying, but that they could improve. However, 
a staggering 54% of the respondents believed that corruption is a serious problem in the Ondangwa 
town council (see section 5.1.3).  
Surprisingly, community based organisations seem not to play a large role in Ondangwa. In 
the informal settlements, the only CBO with any presence is the Shack Dwellers Federation (see 
chapter 4). However, even this organisation, which specifically aims to help informal settlement 
dwellers with few means, does not appear to be very popular. Only 6% of the respondents in our 
survey admitted being members. Moreover, two of the members in Okangwena whom we 
interviewed were members only by default. One became a member because she wanted to be ready 
for the eviction of shack dwellers. Another became a member by mistake, since she did not favour 
loans for fear of burdening her children with debts after her death, and anyhow the SDFN did not 
finance the upgrading of brick houses, an endeavour she had in mind.  
The fear of taking on loans is widespread and fuelled by examples like the woman reported 
on above (see Box 6.8). The tendency is rather to build brick houses slowly bit by bit in order to 
avoid problems. Moreover, the fact that in Okangwena SDFN was involved with the council to 
upgrade Section A, might have discredited the organisation with the shack dwellers. The council 
came to an agreement with SDFN for the allocation of part of Onkangwena A, which they are 
expected to develop for their members within a five-year timeframe. For many shack dwellers, this 
inevitably means the formalisation of the area, where they no longer will have the choice to live in a 
shack.   
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 6.2 Outapi   
6.2.1 The settlements  
There are only two informal settlements in Outapi. The smallest one, Kasikili, owes its informality 
not to shacks and informal businesses, but to a lack of surveying and services. The largest informal 
settlement, Unhimbu, covers a large area that includes ’proper’ shops, bars and other businesses. 
Moreover, the residential areas in Unhimbu are striking mixtures of brick, mud and corrugated iron 
sheet housing interspersed on the edges by traditional homesteads.  
The large business district contains shops that give the impression of being well established, 
selling a diversity of goods, ranging from clothing and bedding to tools and other accessories. The 
business part of Unhimbu also contains a lively market where produce, cooked food and second-
hand clothing are sold. It is surrounded by bars and cuca shops, ranging from bigger bars selling 
bottled beers to small residential places selling local brews. In Unhimbu, alcohol and cooked food 
seem as popular as in Ondangwa’s informal settlements.  
Ondangwa and Outapi are marked by many differences, both with regard to service delivery 
and coverage, by the people who live in the settlements and their attitudes and strategies. The 
presence of larger and more formal businesses in the informal settlements suggests that its residents 
have different backgrounds and priorities, and that the status of the informal settlements is different 
from the correponding ones in Ondangwa. Unhimbu grew with the civil war in Angola during the 
last 20 years, when it developed as a business centre for Angolans. Rural people from Angola 
brought their animals for slaughter and their produce for sale, and converted what they gained into 
household wares, clothing and tools which they took back to Angola to sell. Unhimbu had thus an 
importance before Outapi proper gained importance, and this is today still visible: most of the shops 
and business activities are located in the informal part of town, while the formal part is quietly 
residential. ‘Unhimbu’, some people suggest ‘is the real powerhouse of Outapi!’ 
Situated close to the border to Angola, Unhimbu is home to many Angolans, who come 
over the nearby border post to trade and run businesses. Angolan pick-ups arrive in the morning 
with rural produce and return in the evenings with ‘urban’ produce (made in China), hard to find in 
Angola. Chinese shop owners established themselves in Unhimbu earlier because they pay very 
little by way of council taxes and have a steady market for their wares calculated to cater for the 
needs of Angolans. While the business section is busy all day and night, during daytime many of the 
residential buildings, many of them small one-room shacks, are closed and barred. We were told 
that many of their inhabitants are illegal immigrants who only come there under cover of night to 
sleep. We were also informed that many shacks in Unhimbu are actually owned by Outapi residents 
from the formal part of town who rent them out to Angolans.  
The presence of more permanent structures in the informal settlement and the many 
businesses suggests that Unhimbu residents are relatively better off compared to people in the 
informal settlements in Ondangwa. Again, residents of Outapi suggested to us that female headed 
households were more numerous in the formal part of town, while Unhimbu was said to consist of 
large male headed households. Our survey data confirm this: the share of female headed households 
in formalised Outapi is indeed higher than in the informal settlements (51% in Outapi against 44% 
in Ondangwa), and it is generally lower than in Ondangwa (47% against 55%). 
6.2.2 Availability of services and priorities  
In Outapi, the service coverage of electricity supply (Table 6.14) is much broader than in 
Ondangwa, also in the informal settlements (70% in total in Outapi against 28% in Ondangwa, and 
55% against 15%, respectively, in the informal settlements only). Availability of garbage disposal 
services, by contrast, reaches only 24% of informal settlement dwellers in Outapi (compared to 58% 
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in Ondangwa). Sewage is available to only 5% of the informal settlement dwellers in Outapi 
(against 15% in Ondangwa).  
 
Table 6.14. Outapi: Services available by formal/informal settlements (in % of the respondents) 
Status of settlement 
Description Formal Informal Total 
98.7 100.0 99.4 
88.0 55.2 70.4 
89.3 24.1 54.3 
81.3 4.6 40.1 
Water 
Electricity 
Garbage disposal 
Sewage 
Communal toilets 5.3 43.7 25.9 
N 75 87 162 
 
When it comes to gaps in service delivery between the formal and the informal settlements in 
Outapi, we find that access to garbage disposal and sewage (as well as public toilets) show the 
largest disparities in favour of the formal settlements. With regard to the ranking of services by 
importance, we find that like in Ondangwa water is considered the most important service in 
Outapi, generally (Table 6.15). In the informal settlements toilets are ranked second in importance 
after water. Electricity comes third. However, the share of respondents ranking this service as the 
most important is less than half that in Ongangwa, while the percentage of those who rank toilets 
highest is almost twice the Ondangwa figure. As in Ondangwa, other services have much less or no 
importance in the ranking. 
 
Table 6.15:Outapi: Ranking services by importance (in % of the respondents) 
Status of settlement Service ranked  
most important Formal Informal
Total 
Water 81.3 58.6 69.1 
Electricity 10.7 12.6 11.7 
Sewerage 1.3 3.4 2.5 
Toilets 5.3 17.2 11.7 
Garbage removal - 4.6 2.5 
 
Street lightening 1.3 2.3 1.9 
N 75 87 162 
 
In terms of households’ willingness to pay for services (Table 6.16), we find that while water ranks 
highest, electricity is of much less value for both the formal and the informal settlement dwellers in 
Outapi, presumably because they are connected to the electricity grid already. Again toilets rank 
high, also when it comes to citizens’ willingness to pay. In the informal settlements, 10% of the 
respondents are willing to pay for the service – a substantially larger share of the respondents than 
in Ondangwa (3%).   
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Table 6.16 Outapi: Willingness to pay for services (in % of the respondents) 
Status of settlement    Service ranked most 
willing to pay for Formal Informal 
Total 
Water 76.0 64.4 69.8 
Electricity 17.3 19.5 18.5 
Sewage 1.3 1.1 1.2 
Toilets 4.0 10.3 7.4 
Garbage removal - 3.4 1.9 
Street lighting 1.3 - 0.6 
 Answer missing - 1.1 0.6 
N 75 87 162 
 
In Outapi’s informal settlements women value sewage and toilets more than men (Table 6.17), 
while men are slightly more in favour of water, electricity, garbage removal and street lightning. 
Men are also somewhat more willing to pay for water, sewage and garbage removal, while women 
favor electricity and toilets for payments.  
 
 
Table 6.17 Outapi: Ranking importance of and willingness to pay for services by gender (in % 
of the respondents in informal settlements only) 
Gender Service ranked most 
important Male Female
Total 
Water 60.6 57.4 58.6 
Electricity 15.2 11.1 12.6 
Sewerage - 5.6 3.4 
Toilets 15.2 18.5 17.2 
Garbage removal 6.1 3.7 4.6 
 
Street lightening 3.0 1.9 2.3 
N 33 54 87 
Gender Total Service ranked most 
willing to pay for Male Female  
Water 66.7 63.0 64.4 
Electricity 18.2 20.4 19.5 
Sewage 3.0 - 1.1 
Toilets 9.1 11.1 10.3 
Garbage removal 3.0 3.7 3.4 
 Answer missing - 1.9 1.1 
N 33 54 87 
 
Gaps between the formal and the informal settlements also become apparent when we look at the 
share of the respondents who are satisfied with service delivery. Satisfaction levels are, as expected, 
generally higher in the formal settlements (Table 6.18). The only exception is schools, with 
satisfaction levels being lower in the formal settlement (8% against 24% in the informal settlements. 
On the other hand, we find that for the informal settlement dwellers water and electricity delivery, 
refuse collection, sanitation and crime prevention are the sectors where the gaps to the formal 
settlements are perceived to be greatest. Formal and informal settlement dwellers registered fairly 
similar satisfaction levels with regard to health services, market places, roads and storm water 
drainage.  
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Table 6.18 Outapi: Satisfaction with services (in % of the respondents by column) 
 
 
Service 
 
 
Share of the respondents feeling satisfied with services 
 Formal             Informal Total 
Water supply 63.3 25.2 43.8 
Electricity supply 62.7 23.0 41.4 
Health service 36.0 32.0 34.0 
Refuse removal 44.0 5.7 23.5 
Crime Prevention 33.3 10.3 21.0 
Schools 8.0 24.1 16.7 
Toilets 24.0 0 11.1 
Street Lightning 9.3 1.1 4.9 
Market 4.0 4.6 4.3 
Storm water drain 2.7 1.1 1.9 
Road maintenance 2.7 0 1.2 
 
 
As in Ondangwa, there is a mismatch in Outapi between the dissatisfaction with services and 
peoples’ willingness to pay for the services (Table 6.18). Willingness to pay is most pronounced 
with respect to water. For electricity, however, service satisfaction was generally quite high, while 
the willingness to pay for electricity was relatively low. Moreover, the lack of satisfaction with 
sanitation facilities (toilets) in Outapi’s informal settlements is not matched by an equal willingness 
to pay. Only 10% said they were willing to pay for this service, while 100% said they were 
dissatisfied. Similar disparities exist with regard to refuse removal in the informal settlements: only 
6% are satisfied, yet only 3% are willing to pay for the service. As in Ondangwa, more general 
services supplied to the community, such as markets, roads, street lightning etc. are marked by high 
dissatisfaction levels coupled with very low willingness to pay.  
When it comes to prioritisation for improving services, overall 29% of the respondents 
prioritise an improvement of water services, 15% prioritise electricity supply, and 14% health 
services. With respect to schools, only 8% of informal settlement dwellers prioritised them. In 
Ondangwa, by contrast, formal and informal settlement dwellers prioritised improvement of schools 
(37%), health services (15%), followed by water and electricity supplies (12% and 9%), 
respectively. 
6.2.3 Types of services provided and used in informal settlements 
Unhimbu is particularly disadvantaged with regard to garbage collection, sewage and the 
availability of toilets. While electricity is available to fewer households in the informal settlements, 
still the coverage is good compared to Ondangwa where it reached only a few households in the 
informal settlements (55% in Outapi against 15% in Ondangwa). Informal settlement dwellers are 
particularly keen to effect changes with regard to garbage disposal and toilets, and all of the 
respondents prioritised improved water supply. This might, however, not relate so much to 
connections, but to supply, which is frequently disrupted due to the fact that the town does not have 
a water tower. The problem of disrupted water supply affects both the formal and the informal 
settlement dwellers. 
Water 
As for Ondangwa, water is the service that is prioritised by Outapi’s citizens both in terms of need 
and willingness to pay. Table 6.19 provides a breakdown of the water services that are available for 
both the formal and the informal residents. Note that in the informal settlements communal stand-
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pipes with the pre-paid card system are by far the most common source of water. Other systems 
hardly feature at all. In fact communal pre-paid water taps provide water to a much larger number 
of the residents in Outapi’s informal settlements than what is the case in Ondangwa (93% in Outapi 
against 48% in Ondangwa).   
 
Table 6.19 Outapi: Water connection types used in formal and informal settlements 
(in % of the respondents by column) 
 
Status of settlement 
Description Formal Informal
Total 
Comm. tap - prepaid meter 22.7 93.1 60.5 
Comm. tap - no meter 2.7 2.3 2.5 
Piped water - Comm. Meter 5.3 - 2.5 
Piped water - Private meter 50.7 3.4 25.3 
Piped water – prepaid 17.3 1.1 8.6 
Shared private tap - private meter - - - 
 Answer missing 1.3 - 0.6 
N 75 87 162 
 
 
While in Ondangwa, residents share private taps to avoid disruptions in the water supply caused by 
vandalism of the communal stand-pipes, this coping strategy has not been reported in Outapi at all. 
Perhaps the problem in Outapi is not so much the inadequacy of the communal taps, but rather the 
lack of a steady flow of water due to technical problems. Private taps would not solve this problem.  
If communal water taps present less of a problem to Outapi’s residents, water prices are 
apparently affordable for only half the informal settlement dwellers. By contrast, in Ondangwa, 
only 11% of the same group could not afford the water service.  
The better coverage and supply of water in Outapi goes hand in hand with higher prices 
Yet, the share of informal settlement dwellers who own their own access card (90%) is substantially 
higher than in Ondangwa (72%). In Outapi too, the share of those who use the card of a neighbour 
without payment, is higher, accounting for almost all the remaining respondents who do not own 
cards (Table 6.20). Using the card of others against payment, which accounted for 12% in 
Ondangwa, was not reported in Outapi (1%).  
 
 
Table 6.20 Outapi: Mode of access to communal taps (in % of the respondents) 
 
   
Status of 
settlement  
 Formal Informal  Total 
 Accessing communal 
tap using? 
Your own access card 89.5 90.4 90.2 
    The card of a neighbor 
without payment  8.4 6.9 
    The card of a neighbor 
with payment  1.2 1.0 
    Answer missing 10.5  2.0 
  Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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The use of alternative sources of water is more pronounced in Outapi, both in formal and informal 
settlements compared to Ondangwa. The majority uses alternative sources of water when the town’s 
water system is closed down or when they have no money to buy or refill a card. Given the fact that 
the informal settlements are almost exclusively accessing water through communal taps, closure of 
water supply due to non-payment is not a problem. The main alternative water source in Outapi is 
the canal. However, in Unhimbu people also draw water from a small lake and the seasonal flood 
plain located in the middle of the settlement. The latter presents a particularly dangerous source of 
water, since it is stagnant and polluted, and also used by residents at night as a toilet. We were 
informed that some of the households on the edge of this health hazard, who brewed local beer, 
would draw water from the flooded area to use for the beer preparation to reduce production costs. 
One resident interviewed, argued that the fact that people still use unsafe water sources is not only 
an issue of saving money, however. According to him, people use unsafe water because they are 
unable to change their traditional mind-set. He suggested it was a cultural inflexibility that got some 
people to drink unclean water. 
Electricity 
While access to electricity is more evenly spread between formal and informal settlements, the 
share of the respondents using alternative sources of energy in the informal settlements is as high as 
it is in Ondangwa (93% in Outapi against 91% in Ondangwa). In fact, even in Outapi’s formal 
settlements, as many as 65% of the responding households reported that they use alternative sources 
or energy. This seems, however, not to be related to affordability: 92% of the respondents who had 
connections in Outapi also stated that they could afford the rates. The most popular alternative 
sources of energy are by far wood (79%) and candles (68%), which are used for cooking and 
lighting, respectively. Thereafter follows paraffin (45%), used both for cooking and lighting. Gas, 
charcoal, batteries, or animal dung, however, are not important energy sources for Outapi’s 
residents.  
Irrespective of electricity connection, people still seem to favour wood and paraffin for 
cooking and candles for lightning. The share of the respondents using candles, for example, is the 
same in Outapi and Ondangwa (67%). With regard to the use of wood for cooking, figures are only 
slightly higher in Ondangwa (85% against 72%). This suggests that for those households who are 
connected to the electricity grid, electricity is mainly used for other purposes, such as perhaps 
fridges, televisions, radios etc.   
Sewage and toilets 
In Unhimbu the lack of toilet facilities is clearly a big problem for people. All the respondents 
interviewed brought up the issue. For some residents it was a problem because people defecated in 
their yard at nightfall. Others mentioned the dreadful practice of using the flooded area of the 
settlement as a toilet, as we also heard in Uupopo, after night fall. Unlike in Ondangwa, however, 
the share of households with access to sanitation facilities was even lower. In the informal 
settlements 48% of the respondents owned no toilet facilities, and surprisingly 11% of the formal 
settlement dwellers said they were in the same predicament (Table 6.21). Communal toilets were 
not accessible to any of the residents in the informal settlements. They existed, but had fallen into 
disrepair due to lack of maintenance. The communal toilets were under the control of the Unhimbu 
settlement committee, which could not handle the task. One of its members suggested that what 
they needed was a system, similar to that used in Okangwena, in which care-takers collected fees 
from users in order to pay for maintenance and a small salary for the care-taker.   
The lack of communal toilets left pit latrines and VIPs for the informal settlement dwellers. 
Interestingly VIP toilets are as common as ordinary pit latrines, while they are not found at all in 
Ondangwa’s informal settlements, even though residents there expressed a strong interest in this 
type of sanitation. 
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Table 6.21 Outapi: Ownership and use of toilets (in % of the respondents by column) 
 
Status of settlement 
Toilet type owned Formal Informal Total 
VIP 2.7 25.3 14.8 
Pit long drop latrine 2.7 21.8 13.0 
Communal toilet 2.7 1.1 1.9 
Flush w/ communal septic 78.7 - 36.4 
Flush w/ private septic 2.7 3.4 3.1 
 No toilet facility 10.7 48.3 30.9 
N 75 87 162 
Status of settlement 
Toilet type used Formal Informal Total 
VIP 2.7 37.9 21.6 
Pit long drop latrine 2.7 21.8 13.0 
Communal toilet 4.0 1.1 2.5 
Flush w/ communal septic 77.3 - 35.8 
Flush w/ private septic 2.7 3.4 3.1 
No toilet facility 8.0 34.5 22.2 
 Other 2.7 1.1 1.9 
N 75 87 162 
 
With respect to the actual use of sanitation facilities, we note that in the informal settlements 
ownership and use of toilet facilities is congruent, with the exception of VIP toilets, which seem to 
be frequented by more people than the owners. Still, 35% of the informal settlement respondents 
have no access to toilets. In the formal settlements some residents without toilets seem to use 
communal toilet facilities, leaving, however, another 8% without facilities. 
Refuse collection  
Disposal of household refuse is another weak spot of Outapi’s service delivery to Unhimbu. 
Availability of and satisfaction with the service is low in the informal settlement. Only 1/3 of all the 
respondents in Unhimbu have access to garbage removal services, forcing 22% to dispose of their 
rubbish on a private refuse dump. For those who are connected to the service, the council removes 
garbage once a week for 12% and more rarely in 14% of the cases. In fact, Outapi town council 
relies on one contractor with only two pick-ups to deal with waste management. The contractor is 
evidently not able to deal with the volume of work and appears to be concentrating on the formal 
areas. In order to help make Outapi cleaner, the council has been running clean-up campaigns, 
where members of a youth club did some cleaning and encouraged others to clean up. But these 
initiatives do not solve the waste disposal problem permanently.  
Street lighting, market place, storm water drainage, roads and crime prevention 
The respondents are very dissatisfied with these services which they believe the council should 
provide free of charge. The dissatisfaction shows little difference between the formal and the 
informal settlements. About 87% of the respondents were dissatisfied with the roads. The 
corresponding figure for the market places is 80%,76 while 71% of the respondents are dissatisfied 
with street lighting and 37% with crime prevention. 
                                                     
76 This figure is likely to have improved since the council inaugurated its new open market in early 2005. 
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It is no wonder that the market place, situated on the edge of the flooded area in the centre 
of Unhimbu without cover or benches and slabs is considered a problem. Moreover, the roads in 
Unhimbu are almost impassable in the rainy season. Only the main roads in Outapi are tarred. 
Unhimbu residents have ‘demanded’ that the council fill in the ‘flood plain’ in the middle of the 
settlement, but the council claims that this is not possible. Street lightening is not available in the 
Unhimbu part of town.   
As for schools and health services, it seems that the respondents in Unhimbu are happier 
with these services than the respondents in formal Outapi. Perhaps they expect less to be happy, or 
perhaps they do, in fact, not need the service so much, because they are not permanent residents?  
6.2.4 Problems with payments: coping strategies  
As we have seen, the situation in Outapi’s largest informal settlement Unhimbu appears to be quite 
different from the situation in Ondangwa’s informal settlements. Unhimbu is less of an organic 
settlement and more a place of business. Everybody seems to be there to pursue some business. 
There is a lot of movement as people travel from and to Angola. For many residents, Unhimbu is 
just an occasional home to conduct business, while ‘real’ home is somewhere else, perhaps in rural 
Angola.  
This face of Unhimbu creates different needs and priorities. Certainly, in Unhimbu too, 
residents prioritised water and electricity together with toilets and waste removal as the most 
important services. But many residents also use alternative sources of electricity, particularly for 
cooking and lightning. Table 6.22 below provides a breakdown of the items people spend money on 
every month. We note that, as in Ondangwa, food and water make up monthly payments for all 
residents. In informal areas in Outapi, site rent is ranked third, with 76% of the respondents having 
this monthly expenditure. In Ondangwa, site rent did not feature among the most frequent and 
largest expenditure items for informal settlement dwellers. Surprisingly, while school fees feature in 
the monthly pay packages of 53% of the Outapi informal settlement sample, remittances to rural 
areas, transport, debts, home improvements, hire and purchase payments and home improvements 
are of minor importance. 
The relative importance of site rent might be explained by the fact that in Outapi site rent is 
higher than in Ondangwa, generally, and that site rent/tax for businesses is collected in a more 
rigorous fashion. In fact, many of the premises are either businesses or mixed businesses/residential 
places, and thus are charged higher rates than pure residential houses. In November 2003, the Town 
Council had to reduce the site rent by 35% after complaints from the public that it was too high.  
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Table 6.22 Outapi: Items which money is spent on every month (in % of the respondents)  
 
Status of settlement 
Items spent money on every month Formal Informal Total 
Food 100.0 98.9 99.4 
Water 96.0 100.0 98.1 
Electricity 86.7 50.6 67.3 
Site rent/property tax 50.7 75.9 64.2 
School fees 46.7 52.9 50.0 
Remittances to rural area 58.7 23.0 39.5 
Savings/insurance 64.0 10.3 35.2 
Transport 46.7 14.9 29.6 
Clothing 21.3 35.6 29.0 
Entertainment 30.7 25.3 27.8 
Rental for property 37.3 2.3 18.5 
Mortgage and housing loans 33.3 - 15.4 
Paying debts 26.7 2.3 13.6 
Hiring and purchasing instalments 25.3 - 11.7 
Home improvements 9.3 4.6 6.8 
 Burial expenses 5.3 - 2.5 
N 75 87 162 
   
 
The lower importance of remittances, debt repayments, and home improvements, point to the fact 
that many Unhimbu residents still have strong roots in rural society. When moving from rural areas 
to Unhimbu and back, remittances are perhaps not relevant, just as home improvements would have 
less or no relevance in rented or temporary accommodation. This relative detachment from the place 
they conduct business in may also explain why Outapi informal settlement dwellers apparently have 
less of a problem with the council’s plans to formalise Unhimbu. For the majority of the residents, 
formalisation of the area simply means shifting to a new location where business will be conducted 
as usual. Considering that the customers are largely coming from outside Outapi, and Outapi is not 
so big as to displace people far away from the centre, this might well be true. The different outlook 
is also apparent in Unhimbu residents’ attitude to and relations with various institutions, especially 
the town council. 
6.2.5 Governance and participation 
With respect to peoples’ satisfaction and dissatisfaction with services in Outapi, we note that 
differences between formal and informal settlement dwellers are less noticeable compared to our 
observations in Ondangwa. In Outapi residents of both the formal and informal settlements have 
almost identical sentiments regarding various services, be it satisfaction, neutrality or 
dissatisfaction. The only exceptions are with respect to toilets and street lightning, which caused the 
residents of Unhimbu to be much more dissatisfied than people in the formal settlements.  
Regarding participation in CBOs, the respondents in Outapi are more passive than in 
Ondangwa. The highest participation rate among respondents was registered in the HIV/AIDS 
committee, which was initiated and is run by the council health officer (Table 6.23).  Settlement 
committees seem to have limited importance in Outapi, both among formal (15%) and informal 
(13%) settlement dwellers. The comparative figures for Ondangwa are 21% and 49% respectively. 
The Shack Dwellers Federation, by contrast has more significance in Outapi’s informal settlement 
than in Ondangwa’s (18% in Outapi against 6% in Ondangwa). Moreover, unlike in Ondangwa 
where women formed the majority of participants in the settlement committees, in Outapi they are 
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frequented more by men, as is the case with all but the HIV/AIDS committee, were women 
dominate.  
 
Table 6.23 Outapi: Participation in CBOs (in % of the respondents) 
 
Status of settlement                Do you participate in meetings 
of any of these CBOs Formal Informal Total 
HIV/AIDS committees Yes 34.7 39.1 37.0 
Settlement committee Yes 14.7 12.6 13.6 
Shack dwellers association Yes 6.7 18.4 13.0 
Water point committee Yes 5.3 11.5 8.6 
Burial society Yes 4.0 5.7 4.9 
Waste disposal committee Yes 8.0 1.1 4.3 
Neighbourhood watch Yes 6.7 2.3 4.3 
Credit and savings schemes Yes 2.7 1.1 1.9 
 
Other Yes 1.3 - 0.6 
N 75 87 162 
 
 
The town council is drawing participants from both formal and informal settlements (Table 6.24). In 
Ondangwa, by contrast, participation levels are generally highest in informal settlements. In Outapi, 
however, significant differences between formal and informal settlements are only apparent with 
regard to participation in Shack Dwellers Federation, traditional authority and water committee 
meetings where informal settlement dwellers dominate, and in meetings with local councillors, 
where formal settlement dwellers have a higher participation level. 
With regard to participation in CBOs and formal institutional set-ups, except from town 
council meetings, participation levels are generally low (Table 6.23). Formal settlement dwellers 
seem to like meetings with local councillors less than meetings with the town council, while 
informal settlement dwellers favour meetings with traditional authorities over local and regional 
councillors. As already mentioned, settlement committees have less importance  in Outapi’s 
informal settlements compared to the water management committee, for example, which appears to 
have more prominence. The Shack Dwellers Federation is also more important for the informal 
settlement dwellers in Outapi than was the case in Ondangwa. 
 
Table 6.24 Outapi: Participation in CBOs and selected local government institutions  
(in % of the respondents) 
 
Status of settlement Have you participated in the meetings of 
these institutions Formal Informal Total 
The town council Yes 66.7 66.7 66.7 
Local councillors Yes 36.0 23.0 29.0 
Traditional authorities Yes 22.7 31.0 27.2 
Regional councillors Yes 25.3 12.6 18.5 
The settlement committee Yes 13.3 19.5 16.7 
Water management committee Yes 10.7 21.8 16.7 
Shack dwellers association Yes 5.3 14.9 10.5 
Waste disposal committee Yes 8.0 4.6 6.2 
 Neighborhood watch Yes 4.0 2.3 3.1 
N 75 87 162 
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Moreover, we find that women participate more in meetings with settlement and water 
management committees, while men favour town council and local councillor meetings. Unlike in 
Ondangwa, traditional authority meetings are attended by both genders equally. Overall, a larger 
share of the respondents attend such meetings (27%) compared to Ondangwa (21%).   
Unlike in Ondangwa, where complaints about the council are widespread in the informal 
settlements, this is not the case in Outapi. People are dissatisfied with service delivery and complain 
about the rainy season lake in the centre of Unhimbu, which the council is doing nothing about. But 
there was no sense of feeling disadvantaged or discriminated against by the town council. This is 
perhaps due to the fact that residents stay there only temporarily, or in order to run a business, 
thereby avoiding high taxation, which would have incurred in the formal sector in the town. In 
Unhimbu no great opposition to the plans of the town council to formalise the settlement could be 
discerned. On the contrary, residents apparently co-operated with the council on deciding which 
layout the new formalised settlement should have.  
According to the CMT, people who have been living in the area for some time would be 
given larger plots of 800 m2 instead of 300 m2. Services planned for formalised Unhimbu include 
one communal VIP toilet for every four households and one communal tap for each 15 households. 
Compensation for resettlement is, theoretically, only due to those who own permanent structures. 
Moreover, the Shack Dwellers Federation branch in Outapi has received a piece of land from the 
council in order to resettle people there who will not afford to stay in a formalised Unhimbu. The 
Federation certainly enjoyed more support in Outapi than is the case in Ondangwa. 
In Outapi the share of respondents who would contact the town council in case of problems 
is much higher (52%) than is the case in Ondangwa (35%). Almost a third of the residents of Outapi 
also believe that local government politicians do not really care about payment of service charges 
(against 72% in Ondangwa). Moreover, while in Ondangwa people went to council meeting largely 
to obtain information or on account of electricity, water etc., Outapi residents claim to go to council 
meeting for a host of reasons, including to learn about and contribute to general ideas about town 
planning, site rental, town development, service delivery to air views and to discuss debt settlement. 
Water and electricity delivery, however, are not specified as a cause. Outapi residents thus seem to 
be more actively involved with the council itself, while they also seem to be more critical of both 
local councillors and the town council staff. Despite the critical views, almost half the respondents 
in Outapi said they felt that the council was taking their views into account. In Ondangwa, only 
27% of the respondents believed this possible. 
The support the town council apparently enjoys in Outapi is not reflected in the support for 
local councillors, however. Only half of those who participate in the town council meetings in the 
formal settlements also go to meetings with local councillors, while only a third did so in the 
informal settlements. This is, however, still more than those who attend settlement committee 
meetings, which are important for the informal settlement dwellers in Ondangwa. Regional 
councillors, who are important for informal settlement dwellers in Ondangwa, seem to be less 
important for their counterparts in Outapi.  
6.3 Summary 
The study reveals substantial differences between Ondangwa and Outapi with respect to service 
provision and citizens’ attitudes and coping strategies. In particular, the differences between formal 
and informal settlement dwellers are significant. Gaps in service delivery between formal and 
informal settlements are especially wide in Ondangwa, where people living in the informal 
settlements are clearly disadvantaged. Electricity supply is perhaps the most glaring gap identified. 
Such gaps also exist in Outapi, but they are less pronounced. Actually, in Outapi residents in both 
formal and informal settlements struggle not so much with service coverage, but with service 
quality. This particularly refers to disruptions in water supply, which hit people across settlements 
and cause similar problems.   
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Lack of toilets in the informal settlements, is a cross-cutting problem in both councils. 
Many people do not have access to proper sanitation. In Ondangwa and Outapi stagnant water 
sources (oshana) are used both as toilets and as sources of water, perhaps even for drinking. This 
represents a serious health hazard. Moreover, the fact that toilet access has to be negotiated by 
asking the use or waiting until nightfall creates an even deeper feeling of being poor outsiders. The 
sewage lines installed in Ondangwa's informal settlements did not improve the sanitation problems 
of its residents, however. Instead the sewage added to poor peoples’ payment burden.  
Residents of Ondangwa's informal settlements, generally appear to be poorer and lead a 
more precarious existence compared to the situation in the informal settlements of Outapi. 
Furthermore, informal settlement dwellers in Ondangwa perceive both the town council and local 
councillors as more hostile and untrustworthy compared to the situation observed in Outapi, where 
the informal settlement appears to be a place of business and temporary residence. For instance, 
remittances to and investments in keeping relations with rural areas seem to be of minor importance 
for residents in Unhimbu informal settlement. In Ondangwa, however, investing in rural relations is 
an essential part of many residents’ survival strategies; to allow children to stay there, to maintain 
fields and receive produce, and to ensure one has a place to return to in case of adversity. Losing 
rural connections is often a condemnation to urban poverty, marked by alcoholism and a lack of 
energy to move forward.  
Neighbours and the community also play an important role in the survival strategies of the 
poor. In Ondangwa this is apparent by the importance informal residents attach to the community 
based settlement committees, with functions that encompass traditional authority roles and 
mediation with the council. Again residents in informal Outapi, who are relatively more prosperous 
and who have a closer relationship to the council, feel less need for the mediation of settlement 
committees. In fact, citizens’ higher trust in the council is reflected in a more open, interactive and 
critical relationship with the town council in Outapi, and also by a stronger adherence to the 
traditional authority. By contrast, informal settlement dwellers in Ondangwa say they feel 
discriminated against by the council, particularly because they feel they have to pay for services 
they do not really receive.  
In both councils a mismatch between dissatisfaction with service delivery and citizens’ 
willingness to pay for the services has been observed. People give highest priority to improved 
water and electricity supply. These services also have top priority in peoples’ monthly expenditure 
plans. With respect to other services, such as street lightning, market place facilities, storm water 
drainage etc, people may complain about quality and limited availability, but are not willing to 
contribute financially to their improvement. This is due to the fact that these services do not 
immediately impinge on ones’ survival. Due to low ability to pay hard priorities must be made. 
Particularly in the informal settlements many residents are too poor to divert money for the services 
which are not essential for survival, including toilets, for which there is much need, but little 
willingness to pay for. One can manage without a proper toilet, but one cannot survive without 
clean drinking water. Thus, desire, expectation and need are not sufficient criteria to establish viable 
service delivery.  
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7 Lessons and policy recommendations  
The ultimate aim of the decentralisation policy in Namibia is to reduce poverty by means of service 
delivery improvements. Short term improvement in service delivery can be measured by the degree 
of universal access, with accessibility also determined by affordability. Long term improvement of 
service delivery is measured by the quality of services – their effects on economic and social life, 
their perceived use value (benefit) for citizens, including those classified as poor. The point of 
departure for pro-poor service delivery and poverty reduction should therefore be based on a 
participatory and democratic understanding of development. 
Based on the findings presented in the previous chapters, this final chapter provides a set of 
policy recommendations for improving the delivery of basic services to people living in poor urban 
settings in Namibia. Though interlinked, the recommendations are organised in accordance with 
challenges related to (1) local governance and citizens’ participation; (2) finances and financial 
management; and (3) sustainable service delivery and coping strategies for poor people (see Figure 
1.1).  
7.1 Local governance and citizen participation 
Planning capacity and human resources 
Limited planning capacity, combined with lack of relevant data and statistics represent major 
constraints for the implementation of the council plans in both Ondangwa and Outapi. In general, 
data on availability, coverage and affordability of services is lacking. Moreover, no poverty or 
socio-economic profiles are yet available in the two councils. Knowledge about the needs for 
infrastructure investments, access to electricity, sanitation, water etc. is also limited. Consequently, 
a key challenge that has been identified is the lack of local authority preparedness for planning and 
robust decision making. Although some direct consultations with residents in poor communities on 
plans and priorities take place in Outapi, planning in both case councils is often based on 
guesswork.  
 
• A key priority in the short run for the town councils should be to develop poverty profiles 
reflecting availability and affordability of key services. This will require co-ordination and 
support from the central government. 
 
Lack of qualified personnel to take charge of the operation and maintenance of infrastructure and 
financial management and accounting is a common problem for both councils, although Outapi 
seems to be a slightly better off in this respect than Ondangwa. The finance departments of both 
councils in particular lack skilled staff. In addition, there is also shortage of technical staff, such as 
planners, engineers, plumbers, mechanics, etc. Consequently, town planning and land surveying are 
to a large extent outsourced to private consultants. This practice makes town planning and the 
development of formalised residential and business areas expensive and often long drawn out.   
 
• Considering the inadequate financial resources at the disposal by the towns and the short 
supply of qualified engineers and accountants willing to work there, adjoining towns should 
consider to jointly hire a small number of such personnel and share their services. There is 
a good case for provision of joint financial accounting, for instance, since the towns are of 
modest size. 
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Demarcation of functions between officials, councillors and traditional authorities  
Measures are required to improve the co-operation between local government officials, councillors 
and community leaders in setting common goals, and to clarifying their respective roles. In 
Ondangwa, for instance, the management skills of the Council Management Team (CMT) need to 
be up-graded. Moreover, communication and dialogue between members of the CMT and between 
the CMT and elected councillors need improving.  
  
• Good internal communication within the CMT is essential for the performance of the 
council. Co-ordination between the planning officers and the community development 
officers are important to avoid duplication and misunderstandings in their separate 
dealings with the communities. 
 
At present, the demarcation of powers, functions and duties between elected councillors and 
administrative staff are unclear, even though guidelines are in place which explicitly outline the 
roles and functions of council management team and elected councillors, respectively.  
 
• The MRLGH in collaboration with ALAN should organise workshops in the councils that 
address and clarify the respective roles of council staff and councillors. Newly elected 
councillors, in particular, should be provided with such short term courses. 
 
Currently the functions of the regional councils are not very clear. Moreover, the financial resources 
available to regional councils are inadequate for them to do anything substantial. If the regional 
councils are meant to serve as a co-ordinating agency for the central ministries, this function should 
be spelled out.  
 
• The regional councils should be provided with adequate resources from the central level to 
be able to perform their responsibilities.  
 
The traditional authorities may have an important role to play in conflict resolution in the town 
council areas, where people still come and consult them. Currently, the traditional authority assists 
people with problems that concern traditional matters and also hands out emergency food to 
families who are starving.  
 
• To improve and strengthen the trust relations between the council and the residents, the 
councils should consider to engaging a member of the traditional authority in order to 
interpret customary law and the attitudes of the people. Meetings of a regular, 
institutionalised nature between the council and the traditional authority would also help. 
Citizen participation  
Popular mobilisation is a key factor for making local governments more responsive and 
accountable. Participation, it is assumed, will lead to more organisational commitment and 
ultimately greater control by citizens. Citizens’ involvement in identifying problems and setting 
priorities may motivate a greater sense of community involvement and thereby also to enhance trust 
relations between citizens and the council. Community initiatives should be encouraged for gradual 
improvement of the living conditions in poor urban areas. Hence, while the community based 
settlement committees are important for informal residents in Ondangwa, with functions that 
encompass traditional authority roles and mediation with the council, residents in informal Outapi, 
who are relatively more prosperous and who have a closer relationship to the council compared to 
Ondangwa, feel less need for the mediation of settlement committees.  
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• Effective mechanisms for citizen involvement in planning and priority setting with respect 
to service delivery may vary between councils depending on local circumstances. In some 
town councils settlement committees may provide a useful entry point for stronger 
involvement of residents in the informal settlements. In smaller councils citizen involvement 
with the councils may be more direct, without establishing intermediate structures such as 
settlement committees.  
• Because of the invaluable work settlement committee’s perform, councils should develop a 
structure which rewards committee members with a small honorarium or offers 
reimbursement of expenses. 
7.2 Finances and financial management 
Financial performance  
Of the systemic reforms, fiscal decentralisation has a high priority, affecting among others the town 
councils’ autonomy. Key elements in the decentralisation policy in Namibia are to transfer duties 
and responsibilities from the central government to local authorities. However, increased 
responsibilities have not been followed by an increase of financial resources to the local authorities. 
It is crucial for the sustainable implementation of the decentralisation reform that the financial 
aspects are well understood and taken care of. At present, there is no systematic monitoring of the 
financial performance of local authorities in Namibia. Although the town councils submit their 
budget to the MRLGH and their financial statements to the Auditor General, no government body 
maintains a database on local finances and expenditure allocations. To some extent this is due to 
lack of standardised accounting practices and computerisation.  
 
• There is an urgent need to establish and maintain a database on local government finances 
and expenditures. The potential benefit of establishing and maintaining such a database 
may be substantial. 
Transfers from the central government 
Ondangwa and Outapi town councils currently appear not to have the financial capacity to fund new 
developments and improvements in services in the informal areas. Moreover, the pressure to 
maintain and upgrade decaying infrastructure in the formal settlements and steady rural-urban 
migration further restrict the financial resources available for new developments in the informal 
areas. Only a few urban governments, including Windhoek, Swakopmund and Walvis Bay, are 
currently able to finance a substantial share of their total expenditures by their own sources. Hence, 
local own revenues should be considered a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for fiscal 
decentralisation.  
  
• Transfer systems based upon grants from the central level and revenue sharing between the 
central and sub-national levels of government should be considered essential components 
of the fiscal decentralisation programme in Namibia.  
• Central government support must take into account that different councils have different 
needs and priorities. 
Own revenues 
Although neither Ondangwa nor Outapi are financially viable, there is a potential in both councils to 
improve collection efficiency, for instance by outsourcing revenue collection. However, the mixed 
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experiences from Outapi with privatised collection of site rates in 2003 show that outsourcing 
requires proper planning, including training of the collectors.  
 
• Fundamental issues to be addressed in the context of local government fiscal reforms are to 
redesign the current revenue structure and to strengthen local financial management.  
• Measures are required to improve the accountability of revenue collectors and elected 
councillors. This cannot be achieved without substantial and consistent political support 
from the central government.  
 
The establishment of the electricity supplier NORED in 2002 seems to have benefited neither 
Ondangwa nor Outapi. Both councils complain of the lack of transparency in NORED’s 
information to the councils. In addition, the councils are still responsible for the development of 
new electricity infrastructure. When new areas are developed and settlements are formalised, the 
councils will have to take the capital costs. Furthermore, no maintenance agreement between the 
local authorities and NORED is in place.  
 
• There is a need to renegotiate the councils’ agreement with NORED.  
Addressing non-payment 
Enhanced citizens’ compliance requires stronger links between payment of charges and service 
provision (see section 7.3). To improve service delivery it is also of crucial importance to address 
the broader problem of free-riding. Many people seem to be in a position to pay, but opt for non-
compliance.  
The problem of non-payment should therefore be attacked on several fronts, including service 
provision, better administration and payment schemes, and community involvement. To achieve 
this, in depth knowledge and data are required on payment levels for each ward, the number and 
type of complaints received, living conditions for the poorest segments of the population, including 
the elderly and unemployed, etc. This underlines the importance of developing socio-economic 
profiles of the residential areas in the two councils, and to developing databases on local 
government finances and expenditures. 
 
• Measures to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of revenue administration are crucial 
to enhancing citizen compliance. Relevant instruments include improvements to the billing 
and accounting systems, establishing more accessible and efficient payment facilities, and 
strengthening the capacity to follow up cases of non-payment through fair and reasonable 
enforcement.   
Information on local government budgets and accounts 
The financial statements and finance reports from the councils are hard to understand by non-
experts, including councillors. Citizens’ access and right to information on local government 
budgets and accounts is often seen as a necessary condition for good governance. Without basic 
information on public revenues and expenditures, people cannot hold their leaders and executive 
officers accountable. This is most acute when formal accountability institutions, such as audits and 
legislative reviews, are weak as is common in many town councils in Namibia. Improved 
information to the public on budgets and accounts may improve opportunities for citizens to 
exercise their voice and demand accountability from local authorities. It is, however, important to 
stress that encouraging citizens and the civil society to engage in fiscal and financial monitoring at 
the local level does not imply that such measures should replace formal auditing and accounting 
mechanisms.  
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• There is a need to improve the financial reporting in order to make this information 
accessible to council staff, elected councillors and the general public, who at present have 
limited access to budgets and accounts.  
 
The relatively successful dissemination of information on HIV/AIDS prevention may provide useful 
lessons for how to design and distribute information on budgets and accounts to the communities. 
Written and oral methods of dissemination should be combined, including information submitted at 
service outlets such as schools and dispensaries. More active use of the settlement committees and 
elected councillors to communicate such information to citizens may also pay high dividends.  
7.3 Service delivery and coping strategies 
The poverty reduction action programme 
Poverty and unequal access to services such as water, electricity, and sanitation are major problems 
in the town councils. Access to housing is also inadequate. This is acknowledged in the 
government’s poverty reduction strategy, which considers three central areas of poverty reduction: 
(a) a more equitable and efficient delivery of services in the context of Namibia’s commitment to 
regional decentralisation; (b) acceleration of equitable agricultural expansion; and (c) employment 
creation outside agriculture.  
Though the poverty reduction action programme refers to the role of Regional Councils and 
Development Committees, it makes no explicit reference to local authorities. This impasse may 
have potentially serious consequences for local government finances. In particular, it is likely that 
urban migration will increase the financial burden of municipalities and town councils. In the 
absence of significant central government subsidies, the various local authorities have to carry the 
lion’s share of the costs from inadequate internal resources when developing and upgrading poor 
informal areas.  
 
• Local authorities should be given an explicit role in the national poverty reduction 
programme. Additional funding from the central levels should follow. 
 
Although plans are in place in many local authorities, the process of developing and/or upgrading 
informal townships into (semi-)formal areas with demarcated stands, water supply, electricity and 
small roads, is very slow. This problem is partly due to the financial constraints facing town 
councils, but also due to the characteristics of the land tenure system (see Gulyani et al, 2002). The 
following general principles might be applied for improving poor urban areas:  
 
• All upgrading of informal settlements should be technically and financially appropriate. 
• Community acceptance and understanding of the development plans should be ensured. 
• Community initiatives should be encouraged for gradual improvement of own living 
conditions. 
• Permanency and forms of ownership of plots and security of tenure should be promoted. 
• Financial risks for the council and the settlement dwellers should be minimised in the 
development and upgrading of land. 
• Costing, pricing and administrative systems for land sales and leases of each development 
project should be standardised yet be flexible. 
• All low-income service upgrading and developments should be aimed at financial, social 
and environmental sustainability. 
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Cost recovery and choice of technology 
Experiences from a number of African countries, including Zambia (Gulyani & Connors, 2002) and 
South Africa (Alence, 2002; Fjeldstad, 2004; Smith & Hanson, 2003), show that full cost recovery 
has proven difficult. The issue of cost recovery is particularly sensitive given a history of 
subsidisation in urban areas and rate boycotts during the political struggle, and a subsequent 
unwillingness on the part of the urban poor to pay for basic services where others before them have 
not. Moreover, the majority of residents that do not currently receive services are unemployed or 
underemployed. Hence, their ability to pay for services is limited, which implies that it is likely that 
the council will have problems to recovering the costs if services are extended. Furthermore, due to 
the existing tariff structure and the relatively small number of formal households it is unlikely that 
the councils will be in a position to cross-subsidise indigent consumers to a large extent. This 
implies that: 
 
• Alternative ways to financing services are required if the service level is to be extended. 
• The councils need to develop more realistic plans and strategies for how to improve service 
delivery, which implies a much stronger priority setting than what is reflected in the current 
plans. 
• The choice of technology for service delivery must be cost-effective and low-tech reflecting 
the financial capability of poor people to pay for the fees, and provide them with incentives 
to maintain the facilities.  
• The council plans should reflect citizens’ priorities with respect to service delivery.  
 
Currently, in the informal settlements in Ondangwa as well as in other towns in Namibia, 
communal water taps are just placed in the streets, accessible to everybody, and the 
responsibility of nobody. Assigning each tap to a few households might limit misuse by 
outsiders, by allowing the ‘owners’ to limit access and enhance the sustainability and 
maintenance of the communal taps. 
 
• Communal taps should be assigned to specific and a limited number of households, in order 
to avoid disconnection due to breakage and misuse by outsiders. These households should 
be responsible for maintenance and protection of their water source in collaboration with 
the town council.  
 
As noted above, many households in poor urban areas would prefer private water connections. 
However, often the largest obstacle for the poorer households is not the tariffs (water charges), but 
the large initial investment related to the connection fees. In some cases the initial price of a 
connection may also be the main reason for non-payment later. If the installation of water and 
meters was subsidised, the entrance costs would be lowered and the newly connected are more 
likely to manage to pay higher tariffs. Connection fees were also seen as a problem for electricity 
and, where applicable, for sewage. 
 
• The town councils should consider the acceptance of labour as partial payment for 
individual household connections to water supply. This measure is likely to have many 
other positive spin-off effects in a situation characterised by very high unemployment rates 
and health problems related to waterborne diseases. 
• Households should be given the option to pay the initial connection fees to water in 
instalments. 
 
Giving poor people access to a source of ready credit for household connections to public services 
may be a significant stimulus for developing infrastructure in poor communities. Recent 
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experiences from India show that such measures are increasingly being adopted, on both a 
community and an individual basis, to develop and improve access to services in poor urban areas 
(UNDP-World Bank). Coupled with measures aimed at empowering poor people, especially 
women, to manage their own affairs, this has resulted in greater levels of confidence and the 
exposure required to voicing their needs when approaching local government officials.  
 
• The government should consider providing soft loans to the urban poor for household 
connections to infrastructural services, including water, sewage, sanitation, drainage 
connections, and electricity. The credit scheme could be established as a specialised 
government fund for the development and upgrading of infrastructure facilities in poor 
urban areas, and be provided through already established organisations such as the 
Namibia Housing Action Group and/or the Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia.  
’Lifeline’ supply of key services to the poor  
Both Ondangwa and Outapi are at present depleting their financial reserves to reduce the backlog of 
developing the formal settlements and to upgrading decaying infrastructure. It is therefore required 
that the central government earmarks future funding to assist local authorities to improve service 
infrastructure and service delivery according to realistic strategic plans developed by the town 
councils. By increasing social rights and protection of the poorest segments of the population, the 
state can play an important role in improving the equity of the service delivery system, and thereby 
gaining legitimacy and enhancing social trust among the population. The national government’s 
policy of making service delivery its priority seems to reflect this approach. Successful 
implementation of this policy, however, requires that local governments are enabled to: 
 
• make basic council services accessible to all citizens, and 
• provide free basic services for poor citizens who cannot pay.  
 
The challenge is foremost to ensure that poor households are the primary beneficiaries of the free 
services policy and associated resources. In particular, the government should consider providing a 
minimum free ‘lifeline’ supply of water to households.77 There are of course risks connected with 
the design and implementation of this ‘lifeline’ policy. A risk assessment analysis must address and 
take into consideration: 
 
• the minimum volume of the free water supply which is required to sustain poor households; 
• a means-testing system for households to establish whether or not  they qualify for the free 
services; and  
• the administrative challenges of delivering free services across the country, particularly in 
poor urban areas. 
  
To summarise, the challenges to improving service delivery in poor urban areas in Namibia should 
be attacked on several fronts, including improved technical and financial support from the central 
government, better and more flexible local government financial administration, and community 
involvement. To achieve this, in depth knowledge and data are required on living conditions for the 
poorest segments of the population, the actual supply of basic services in the informal settlements, 
payment levels for services, the number and type of complaints received on service provision, etc. 
Moreover, customer care must show that complaining to the council will bring results. Citizens 
should therefore be encouraged to report faults such as leaking taps or streetlights not functioning. 
                                                     
77 Some developing countries have already introduced such a system. For instance, since July 2001, every 
municipality in South Africa is supposed to provide minimum free ‘lifeline’ supply to households of 6000 
litres of water and 50kWh of electricity per month (Pape 2002:184).  
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The prompt redress of such complaints may help convince people that the town council means 
business. Furthermore, citizens’ involvement in identifying problems and setting priorities may 
motivate a greater sense of community involvement. Finally, co-operation between local 
government officials, councillors and community leaders in setting common goals might be a 
crucial trust-enhancing device.  
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SUMMARY
The urbanisation of poverty is one of the most dramatic developments on the African 
continent, yielding contrasting images of affluent residential and business districts and 
utter misery in sprawling shantytowns or slums. Namibia has one of Africa’s highest urban 
growth rates, taking thousands of women, men and children to towns in search of a better 
life. The large majority of these end up in poverty-stricken informal settlements in urban 
areas. The current service delivery approach of the government has left out informal 
settlements and has instead focused on improving and expanding services in formal 
areas. The inadequacy of this situation has detrimental effects on the poor. This report 
examines challenges for pro-poor service delivery in two towns in Northern Namibia 
– Ondangwa and Outapi - as seen from (i) the two local government institutions finding 
themselves in between the central government and their own poor populations; and (ii) the 
informal settlement population with hitherto unfulfilled expectations for basic services 
in the form of housing, water, electricity and sanitation. The study suggests that main 
obstacles to improved service delivery to people living in the informal settlements are 
associated with distrustful relations between local government and the communities, 
weak ability and incoherent efforts by civil society to act as development agents, and 
inadequate government driven approaches. In particular, the study argues that the local 
governments’ need for revenues to finance service provision is incompatible with the 
ability to pay for these services for a majority of the population in informal settlements. 
This implies that new collective approaches to service delivery in informal settlement 
areas will have to be developed. 
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